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Elitist Revolution or Revolution of the Masses?

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Modern bourgeois theories of social revolution

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ЭЛИТАРНАЯ РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ
ИЛИ РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ МАСС?

На английском языке

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CONTENTS

Page

Introduction 7

PART ONE. BOURGEOIS SOCIOLOGY OF REVOLUTION ON THE ESSENCE AND NATURE OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION 12

Chapter One. Social Revolution as an Object of Research . 12
Chapter Two. Types of Social Revolution 36
Chapter Three. The Genesis of Social Revolutions 53
Chapter Four. The Theory of the Revolutionary Process . 71
Chapter Five. Determinism and Free Will 100
Chapter Six. The "Cost" of Revolutions and Social Progress 116

PART TWO. THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AS THE SUMMIT OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION AND ITS BOURGEOIS CRITICS 136

Chapter One. Sociology of Revolution and Bourgeois Historiography of the October Revolution 136
Chapter Two. Prerequisites and Causes 154
Chapter Three. The Makers of Revolution 169
Chapter Four. The Subjective Factor and the Communist Party . . . . . : 185

Conclusion . . . . . : 200

Introduction

"The liberation revolutions triggered by the Great October Revolution are determining the image of the 20th century."[1] This phrase, uttered by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev at the 27th Party Congress, points to the scope and significance of the revolutionary change that has been under way on the planet ever since 1917, when a socialist revolution was accomplished in Russia. Indeed, a wide cross-section of the world's population is getting more and more involved in public life, and powerful revolutionary movements are arising across the globe. The numerous actions of the working people against capitalist exploitation have erupted into a campaign for socialist ways of development and for building a human society free from oppression and war.

Enhanced revolutionary activity of the people necessarily exacerbates the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism, between bourgeoisie, which protects the old order and upholds obsolete ideas, and the working class, which promotes a new, advanced, revolutionary outlook. In this situation, bourgeois ideologists are forced to look for increasingly sophisticated and subtle forms of influencing the masses, not stopping at the use of direct falsification and trickery.

The hostile attitudes of bourgeois ideologists toward new social ideas, as well as unceasing efforts to distort the actual purport of these ideas so as to make them tally with the set of views and conceptions accepted by their class, find the most vivid expression when they define their attitude to the problem of revolution—one of the key problems of the

[1] M. Gorbachev, *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, p. 10.

epoch. And this is only natural, since the character and content of the revolutionary processes under way in today's world have long stood at the centre of mankind's attention. Moreover, the very survival of the capitalist system hinges on the way in which these issues are resolved.

Seeking to reinforce the shattered foundations of capitalism, bourgeois ideologists have been increasingly concentrating on research into the question of revolution in the hope of discovering an efficient strategy against the revolutionary movement.

The leading role in this effort has been taken on by bourgeois sociology.

Western sociology as well as other branches of the social sciences have been producing an ever-growing flood of literature expressing bourgeois scholars' increased attention to revolution as a social phenomenon. They have set out to negate the regularity and objective character of revolutions and their significance for the modern epoch. A favourite target of their attacks is the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of social revolution, which is seen by them as the principal source of threat to the capitalist system.

Attempts at counteracting the mounting revolutionary process spearheaded against the very foundations of the capitalist system have brought to life the sociology of revolution, an independent branch of knowledge within bourgeois sociology. Its chief purpose is to examine the social revolutions that have been accomplished in the world, look for ways to prevent them in the future, and discredit revolutionary struggle in the eyes of people. The sociology of revolution is at present one of the more rapidly advancing disciplines in capitalist countries. Being part of the bourgeois propaganda machine, it serves to affect the views and mentality of the working people in the capitalist world, and to distract them from fighting for their rights. Its sphere of action is not restricted to industrialized Western states, but stretches to take in the nascent intelligentsia in the developing countries so as to influence these countries' choice of social development.

All this goes to show that the attitude to social revolution and revolutionary change under way on the planet has

moved to the forefront in the sharp ideological battle between socialism, a future-oriented doctrine and system, and imperialism, which hangs on to the past, seeking to perpetuate its rule and reverse the course of history.

Soviet scientists have long been involved in a dispute with those who refuse to recognize the revolutionary path of development for human society and who misrepresent the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of social revolution. Uncompromising and principled polemics against the bourgeois conceptions of revolution have been carried on in leading scientific journals and full-length works dealing with the various aspects of the theory of social revolution. Bourgeois sociology, too, has recently witnessed an influx of writings on the subject. This renders particular topicality to a scientific analysis and debate of the modern bourgeois conceptions of revolution, many of which are aggressive, pointed and outspokenly anti-communist.

The present book analyzes, from the Marxist-Leninist stand, the bourgeois theories of social revolution propagated by recent British and American works on the subject. Today these theories are the leading ones as regards the intensive treatment of the problem of revolution. The American and British sociologists of revolution represent the most numerous group of researchers who seek to inculcate bourgeois ideology in the minds of people. The authors consider it essential to trace the evolution of ideas that come under the heading of the sociology of revolution in order to make a judgement concerning the trends which have developed in this field. For this reason, the book stresses the continuity existing between modern bourgeois theories of social revolution and the old conceptions, as well as the more general objectives pursued by the sociology of revolution. This is the angle from which the conceptions of social revolution are considered showing the attitude of bourgeois science to the object of research itself and to the classification of revolutions. It is also the angle from which the authors treat the bourgeois interpretations of the causes, character and content of the revolutionary process and the role of revolutions in social progress. A significant portion of the book is devoted to the exposure of bourgeois

distortions of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of social revolution. All these are pivotal points in the confrontation between the two world outlooks of the epoch.

An important part in the debate between Soviet scholars and their ideological opponents belongs to disproving the numerous fabrications about the Great October Socialist Revolution—the herald of social revolutions of the 20th century. The distortion of the essence, nature and goals of the October Revolution forms part of the overall offensive that has long been conducted by Western ideologists against Marxism-Leninism and the theory and practice of socialism.

The book reveals the close interconnection between bourgeois sociological theories of revolution and modern Sovietological conceptions of the October Revolution. The authors show that the emergence of the sociology of revolution in the West as an independent trend has been prompted by the striving of bourgeois scholars to expand and give deeper substance to the arguments used against the ideas promoted by the revolution in Russia. Bourgeois ideologists cannot but realize that the controversy has taken on a more comprehensive character, involving fresh scientific quarters. For this reason, spokesmen of the sociology of revolution have recently been increasingly adopting the role of direct opponents of the ideas championed by the October Revolution pertaining to the theory of the contemporary revolutionary process. At present, this trend of bourgeois sociology to a large extent provides a theoretical and methodological basis for bourgeois historiography, which deals with issues of concrete revolutions, and above all for bourgeois historiography of the October Revolution.

Today, the essence and significance of the October Revolution have become extremely pertinent. In order to undermine its impact on today's labour and national liberation movements, attempts are made in the West to represent the Russian Revolution as an "accidental" revolution, while its lessons are declared out-of-date and inapplicable to the present time. For this reason, one of the main objectives of this book is to analyze bourgeois theories which deny the significance of the October Revolution as the highest type of social revolution. The authors argue

against the unobjective and inaccurate assessments of the experience and lessons of the October Revolution. The purpose of this book is to show that the principal regularities of the socialist revolution, which found expression in the revolution of 1917 in Russia, are universal and objective by nature and retain their significance even today. In this connection, the book considers major issues which attract the attention of bourgeois ideologists: the objective and subjective prerequisites of a socialist revolution, its motive forces, and the role of the Marxist-Leninist party of the working class.

Part One

Bourgeois Sociology of Revolution on the Essence and Nature of Social Revolution

Chapter One

Social Revolution as an Object of Research

Social revolution as a phenomenon has long aroused hostility and anxiety among bourgeois ideologists, who use a wide range of arguments in the campaign against it. Many bourgeois researchers even deny the very concept "revolution", preferring to use the concept "social change". They refuse to recognize that the revolutionary way of social development has the nature of a regularity. The main road to development, it is declared, is that of evolution, which is supposed to effect a gradual change through reform. Bourgeois sociologists are trying hard to find an alternative to social revolution. Take, for example, the book *Peaceful Change in Modern Society,* brought out by the Hoover Institute of War, Revolution, and Peace. It mirrors the search for theoretical conceptions undertaken in the West which would make it possible to resolve the current problems of capitalist society by means other than revolutionary change, e.g., by superficial reforms.

Many bourgeois researchers have attempted to play down the importance of revolutionary changes, putting in question their independent and primary role in the development of human society and declaring them a part of the more broadly interpreted evolutionary process. They are seeking to establish the primacy of the latter and thereby dissolve the concept of revolution in other notions, treating it as one particular ingredient of social development. With this end in view it is asserted that, considered in a broader context, revolutionary changes are nothing but an integral part of long evolution. This approach, in fact, also leads

to the negation of the revolutionary process as a major trend and natural law of development in antagonistic societies, and stands opposed to the Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution.

However, despite the wide currency gained by this conception, it is now possible to state that a new stage has been ushered in in the history of the concept under discussion: "advances" are being made to the term "social revolution", while its essence continues to be either ignored or distorted.

Bourgeois science is finding it more and more difficult to ignore the growth of the revolutionary process in today's world. Against this background, a substantial number of Western researchers make an effort to thoroughly analyze this process in order to counter the Marxist-Leninist doctrine with their own conceptions of social revolution. Exposing the true purpose of such research, Hannah Arendt, a prominent member of the American school of the sociology of revolution, wrote: "In the contest that divides the world today and in which so much is at stake, those will probably win who understand revolution..."[1]

The common anti-Marxist and scientifically unsound position of bourgeois authors researching the problem of social revolution reveals itself with the greatest clarity in their attitude to the object of research. A liberal interpretation of the very term "revolution" is the principal feature of the conceptions advanced by bourgeois sociologists. An analysis of their approach to the definition of this basic concept, an approach which often amounts to distorting its essence and content, makes it possible to expose the chief drawbacks of these conceptions.

Discordance and confusion in defining concepts are a feature of bourgeois sociology (as well as other social sciences). Western "pluralism" in science, which bourgeois scholars pride themselves on, frequently manifests itself as inconsistency and absence of methodological clarity. This is particularly noticeable with respect to the term "revolution". Dale Yoder, an American sociologist, wrote that "the term 'revolution' is one of the most misused of words.

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[1] H. Arendt, *On Revolution*, New York, 1963, p. 8.

Both within and without the literature of the social sciences it has acquired a variety of meanings which make it as adaptable to personal purposes as is the chameleon's skin".[2] A. S. Cohan, a British researcher, stated that there is a considerable variation among definitions of revolution, "that it may be concluded that the authors are not talking about the same phenomenon".[3] And Mark N. Hagopian, an American researcher, noted: "The word 'revolution' is a popular, even glamorous, word nowadays. Thus many people overwork it until it loses all definite meaning..."[4]

In the first place, it should be pointed out that Western literature often gives a very broad interpretation to the term "revolution". Scientific, technological, commercial, financial, agrarian, educational and even sexual "revolutions", as well as a revolution in fashions, are distinguished as independent phenomena on the grounds of their influences throughout society.

It is indisputable that the use of some of these concepts, e.g., an industrial, a scientific and technological, or a cultural revolution is quite legitimate in any, including Marxist, literature. That is not the point at issue. What is implied here is that it is impermissible to apply the same criteria to the analysis of phenomena falling within different categories, and to utter the above-mentioned terms in the same breath with that of social revolution, which signifies a drastic, qualitative turnabout in the overall socio-economic structure of society. In the meantime, many bourgeois sociologists refuse to acknowledge that a distinction of principle exists between these concepts. Mark Hagopian writes, for instance, that revolution sometimes comes to embrace such phenomena as the Reformation and the Industrial Revolution, which in fact lie outside the ground

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[2] *The Sociology of Revolution, Readings on Political Upheaval and Popular Unrest.* Edited by Ronald Ye-Lin Cheng, Chicago, 1973, p. 2.

[3] A. S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution: An Introduction,* University of Lancaster, 1975, p. 11.

[4] Mark N. Hagopian, *Regimes, Movements, and Ideologies. A Comparative Introduction to Political Science,* New York, 1978, p. 276.

covered by the term. Even such developments in America's political life as President Roosevelt's New Deal have been given the status of revolution, e.g., the "revolution of the New Deal", "Keynesian revolution", etc.[5]

Approaching the definition of revolution from a formalist stand, bourgeois researchers turn a blind eye to the distinctions between phenomena which have a vital, fundamental impact on the destinies of mankind, and those processes under way in various restricted areas of man's activity. By doing so, they are in fact equating the so-called revolutions in fashions or the world of theatre with the great social revolutions in man's history. Taken by themselves, substantial changes in either individual or even several aspects of the life of society are far from equivalent to revolutions, with their tremendous social and economic consequences, as understood by Marx, Engels and Lenin.

"Revolution is a change which breaks the old order to its very foundations", wrote Lenin.[6] In other words, it is a drastic change of the very social system.

Placing essentially different phenomena in the same category, bourgeois sociology is hoping to belittle the significance of revolutionary changes and reduce them to routine occurrences.

The adherence of Western sociologists and political scientists to form, to the detriment of content, becomes apparent in their analysis of revolution as a social and political phenomenon. The range of its definitions employed by bourgeois science is very extensive. According to Dale Yoder, "it is used to describe any sort of change, from a change in the location of sovereignty, a purely political phenomenon, to a change in the social processes underlying and supporting the fundamental structural elements of society: the political, economic, religious, and other institutions."[7]

The absence of a scientific approach to the definition of revolution as the object of research has for a long time

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[5] *Ibid.*

[6] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 110.

[7] *The Sociology of Revolution*, p. 3.

compelled many bourgeois researchers, especially those belonging to the older generation, to see it as a fairly restricted political event, a political coup d'etat entailing changes in the top echelons of state power. Attempting a description of the revolutionary process, Jean Bodin defined revolution as a strictly political turnabout. This view gained prevalence among the scientific community and was supported by Brooks Adams, Pitirim A. Sorokin, Everett D. Martin, Donald Webster and Lyford P. Edwards.

Although using the broader term "social revolution" when analyzing the revolutionary process, Brooks Adams also in fact implies the same limited political event as Jean Bodin. Referring to the French Revolution of 1789 as an example, he develops the idea that the problem of revolution is above all the problem of adapting to new conditions or complete reorganization of the administrative state authority. While acknowledging the primary importance of the economic factor underlying any revolution, he nevertheless views the revolution as a political change. Pitirim Sorokin, one of the founding fathers of the sociology of revolution, also regarded it as a coup d'etat.

In his book on popular movements, Everett D. Martin interprets revolution as a purely political change involving the abolition of the traditional state authority or the encroachment on its prerogatives. This, in his view, upsets the previously existing social balance and sets the masses in motion. In fact, he departs from his own treatment of the term when citing the Reformation as an example, which he describes, in the most general terms, as revolution.[8]

Everett D. Martin's conception of revolution, which incorporates the concept of the "mass activity", has been used by other authors, including Lyford P. Edwards and Donald Webster.

This palpably narrow interpretation of revolution was unsatisfactory to many bourgeois researchers in the field. The very course of the revolutionary process in the world

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[8] E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds. A Psychological Study*, New York, 1920, p. 184ff.

has faced them with the need to find criteria which would take due account not only of the political but also economic, social and other aspects of this phenomenon. Attempts of bourgeois sociologists to find a more adequate definition is in fact an acknowledgement of the role played by the revolutionary process in the world of today. A number of researchers, both in the 1930s-1950s (Crane Brinton, George S. Pettee, Sigmund Neumann) and the more distant past (Gustave Le Bon, Charles A. Ellwood), have found the treatment of revolution as a coup d'etat or a local political act boiling down to replacement of individual figures in the government too narrow and unfit for use. However, this has led them to the opposite extreme. They insist that the term "revolution" should be extended to cover not only political changes but also economic, social, and technological, religious and other changes. The founding fathers of the bourgeois science of revolution Gustave Le Bon and Charles A. Ellwood stressed that their interpretation of the term leaves ample room for forms of revolution other than political ones. In his book *The Psychology of Revolution* Gustave Le Bon wrote: "We generally apply the term *revolution* to sudden political changes, but the expression may be employed to denote all sudden transformations, or transformations apparently sudden, whether of beliefs, ideas, or doctrines."[9]

In the early stages of his career, Charles A. Ellwood maintained that the term "revolution" should be used in a strictly political sense, and tended to share Jean Bodin's idea that revolution is a change in the power structure.[10] At that time, he defined revolution as one form of social change. This in essence made revolution a sudden and violent political act effecting a social change, one of the two major categories denoting change with which a sociologist deals. Subsequently, Ellwood's ideas underwent an evolution. He adopted and developed the idea, which is not

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[9] Gustave Le Bon, *The Psychology of Revolution*, New York, 1913, p. 23.

[10] Ch. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, New York, 1920, p. 163.

dissimilar to that of Le Bon, that the concept of revolution implies a variety of changes afoot in society, from "palace revolutions" to changes in the world of fashion and industrial upheavals triggered by great scientific and technological breakthroughs.[11]

The interpretation of revolution as a phenomenon entailing fundamental consequences and affecting a broad variety of aspects of human activity is linked by a number of the next generation's researchers to the understanding of "great revolutions" in the history of mankind, by which they mean the American Revolution and the French Revolution of the 18th century, and the major 20th-century revolutions, i.e., the October Revolution in Russia and the Chinese Revolution of 1911. An instance of this approach is provided by George Sawyer Pettee in his book *The Process of Revolution,* who defines revolution as "a reconstitution of the state". This type of revolution is, in his view, fraught with profound consequences for a given society or a number of societies. The outcome of the revolution is such that the new condition of the state has nothing in common with its original structure. G. Pettee admits that the scope of such change is difficult to estimate, and should include a wide range of factors.[12]

However, Pettee's discourse about the magnitude of changes is merely a substitute for an analysis of the actual social and economic content of the revolutionary process and its class direction, which are beyond doubt the fundamental aspects of a social revolution. The crux of the matter—the destruction of the old production relations underlying the moribund social system, the transition to a new social and economic system, and the vital prerequisites and class core of this process—remain outside Pettee's analysis. This leaps to the eye when, after the discussion of the scope of revolutionary change, he proceeds to list the factors that have prompted it. Here, a complete set of abstract terms

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[11] Ch. A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society. An Introduction to Sociological Theory,* New York, 1927.

[12] G. S. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution,* New York, 1971. p. 3.

is found: the need to change "the political institutions" and the "social structure", "the prevalent ideology", the "myths", "the apparatus of coercion" and the "spiritual values". That which is vital is absent from his discussion: an analysis of real social and economic contradictions and the struggle between classes, which are the principal factors of revolutionary change. It is these factors that determine the truly tremendous scope of the radical shifts in the economic basis and the superstructure of society which have been made by the great social revolutions in the history of mankind.

The bourgeois sociology of revolution reveals both a tendency to rush from one extreme to the other when defining the object of research and an inability to distinguish between the primary and secondary aspects of the phenomenon under discussion. The concept of social revolution is either declared non-existent, or is thrown in to be dissolved among others. In some cases the entire complexity and diversity of occurrences coming under the heading of revolution is reduced to being analyzed as common shifts among the personnel at top level; while in others, the concept of revolution is stretched to mechanistically incorporate the sum total of the changes afoot in society without making any attempt to assess the significance and place of each in the process of revolutionary transformation, and thus obscuring the true meaning of the concept.

For the sake of justice, it should be mentioned that bourgeois sociology is taking pains to put an end to abstract theorizing and to overcome a formalist approach to the object of research. Apparently, failing to find a key to the problem of revolution by building abstract and formalist structures, certain bourgeois researchers have decided that the solution lies in studying the history of this phenomenon from concrete examples in order to pave the way for research into what they call real or genuine revolutions.

The majority of Western scholars associate their ideas on the real, or genuine revolution, with the so-called political revolutions, which are subjected to a fairly narrow interpretation. The term "political revolution" has gained much wider currency and is used more willingly than

"social revolution", a fact which serves to obscure the true meaning of such social revolutions of the present epoch as the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia and the socialist revolutions in other countries.

It is a fact that the term "political revolution" is also used by Marxism. However, Marxist researchers by no means confine its meaning to the overthrow of the ruling elite, or to mere cabinet shifts. In Marxist analysis, the concept "political revolution" is given class meaning. Engels associated the use of the term with the struggle of the classes on the issue of ownership of the means of production.[13] Referring to the capture of political power by the revolutionary class, Lenin wrote: "Every political upheaval, if it is not a mere change of cliques, is a social revolution."[14] What Lenin meant by this is that a definite link exists between the two concepts: socio-economic and political changes are closely interwoven. The capture of political power opens up opportunities for radical reforms in the socio-economic system, which in turn renders stability to the new political power.

It is obvious therefore that Marxism does not intend to substitute the concept "social revolution" with that of "political revolution", but rather interprets the latter as part of the former, a broader concept. A political revolution signifies that decisive moment of social revolution when the action of a revolutionary class is directed at capturing political power—the major means of effecting the vital transformation of the overall social and economic system.

The political revolutions have provided subject-matter for a great number of conceptions advanced by bourgeois science. And, by no means, these conceptions are all alike. Their authors proceed from a variety of premises, attaching primary importance to this or that group of factors which in their view determine the general aspect of the revolution. However, even considering the great variety and num-

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[13] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Volume Three, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 280.

[14] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, 1964, p. 439.

ber of conceptions it is possible to distinguish, albeit provisionally, three trends in their development according to the type of change occurring in the revolutionary period: 1) political and legal; 2) psychological; and 3) socio-structural.

A similar distinction between the trends in the development of conceptions of revolution has been made by the British scholar, Stan Taylor, lecturer in political science at the University of York. He singles out: 1) sociological theories of revolution; 2) socio-psychological theories of revolution; 3) political and economic theories of revolution.[15] The authors who develop the first, and probably the broadest, trend stress the purely legal and political aspects of revolution, often with particular emphasis on the terror and lawlessness allegedly inherent in any revolution. In such instances, the conceptions of social revolution as developed by bourgeois authors include changes in the power structure introduced by illegal and violent means. This is the spirit of the conceptions of revolution as elaborated by Crane Brinton, Carl Friedrich, Eugene Kamenka, Raymond Tanter, Manus Midlarsky, Robert C. Hunt, George Pettee, Paul Schrecker, Peter Calvert, James C. Davies, Hannah Arendt and others. Stan Taylor also numbers Samuel Huntington and Charles Tilly among the followers of this trend.

"If the change is made without violence in a free election", wrote Crane Brinton, one of the most prominent representatives of the sociology of revolution, "it cannot be termed a revolution." Such change is, in his view, part of a country's normal political development. A revolution, as he understands it, is an illegal and, as a rule, violent change of the existing form of government which, as distinct from a "palace revolution", affects the masses of ordinary citizens.[16]

In the introduction to the collection *Revolution*, which was brought out in New York, Carl Friedrich defined revo-

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[15] S. Taylor, *Social Science and Revolution*, London, 1984.

[16] C. Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, New York, 1965, p. 4.

lution as a sudden and violent overthrow of the established political order.

Another researcher, Eugene Kamenka, elaborates the conception of revolution, proceeding from a similar stand, but offers a more detailed definition. He holds that revolution is a drastic and sudden change in the position of political authority marked by a radical revision of government policies, the foundations of state authority and law, and the conception of social order. In contrast to other authors, Kamenka recognizes that in exceptional cases, such changes may be achieved without terror. He is more interested in another aspect of revolution, its political goals.[17] For this reason he finds it necesary to add that should all the above-mentioned changes be effected, this would mean that a revolution has taken place no matter whether it was accompanied by bloodshed or not.

The factor of "violence" and "illegality", plus the revolution's political goals, are cited by modern American researchers Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky as its main indices. "A revolution may be said to exist," they write, "when a group of insurgents illegally and/or forcefully challenges the governmental elite for the occupancy of roles in the structure of political authority. A successful revolution occurs when, as a result of a challenge to the governmental elite, insurgents are eventually able to occupy principal roles within the structure of the political authority."[18]

The conception of the "illegality" of any true revolution owes its existence, above all, to George Pettee, Paul Schrecker and Lyford P. Edwards. Discussing the main distinctive feature of revolution Pettee states that it always changes the existing form of government and, on the basis of this contention, defines revolution as a change of constitutional institutions by illegal means.

Paul Schrecker maintains that a political revolution is

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[17] E. Kamenka, "The Concept of Political Revolution" in: *Revolution*, p. 124.

[18] R. Tanter, M. Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution" in: *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Vol. XI, No. 3, September 1967, p. 267.

also an illegal change of constitutional institutions. A similar stand is taken by Lyford Edwards, who interprets revolution as an intention, the execution of which need not entail the use of violence, to terminate the operation of one legal system and cause another to emerge.

The categorical conclusions drawn by the advocates of the conception of revolution's "illegality", i.e., that a revolution, accomplished in a "legal", or constitutional way, cannot even be conceived, would hardly withstand a logical scrutiny. A. S. Cohan, a British researcher, stated: "If the electoral procedure brought to power a new class of rulers which then proceeded to alter the political and social structures of that particular state, a revolution would not, according to the broader conception of revolution, be said to have occurred."[19] Following this topsy-turvy line of reasoning, it would be legitimate to term as revolution, regardless of political goals and social consequences, any anti-constitutional coup d'etat, including the profascist coup accomplished in Chile by General Pinochet to overthrow the legal constitutional government of Salvador Allende.

The conception of the unavoidable "illegality" of revolution is directed, above all, against the possibility of a peaceful revolution. But even beyond this, it shows clearly that by concentrating on a superficial aspect which need not be inherent in the revolutionary process, bourgeois researchers once again touch only the surface and not the essence of the issue.

They close their eyes to the fundamental fact that the concept of legality must also be considered in class terms. In exploiter societies, the extraclass category of legality is non-existent. The laws which bourgeois theorists talk about have been written to protect the rights and privileges of the ruling class. In his work *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* Lenin wrote: "Take the fundamental laws of modern states, take their administration, take freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, or 'equality of all citizens before the law', and you will see at every turn evidence of the hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy with

[19] A. S. Cohan, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

which every honest and class-conscious worker is familiar. There is not a single state, however democratic, which has no loopholes or reservations in its constitution guaranteeing the bourgeoisie the possibility of dispatching troops against the workers, of proclaiming martial law, and so forth, in case of a 'violation of public order', and actually in case the exploited class 'violates' its position of slavery and tries to behave in a non-slavish manner."[20]

Exposing the hypocrisy of Kautsky's theorizing about revolution leading to law-breaking and disorder, Lenin noted: "If Kautsky had wanted to argue in a serious and honest manner he would have asked himself: Are there historical laws relating to revolution which know of no exception? And the reply would have been: No, there are no such laws."[21]

Contrary to Kautsky Lenin insisted that the revolutionary classes were historically justified when rising against exploitation and oppression, and that the revolutionary power of the proletariat could not possibly be restricted by any bourgeois laws.[22]

Amidst numerous works on social revolution, the research of American scholar Hannah Arendt stands somewhat apart. She develops her own special conception of political revolutions, interpreting revolution as a road to freedom (emancipation). Drawing a clear-cut line between true freedom of the personality (i.e., the opportunity for its complete self-expression) and liberalisation (i.e., moderate freedom marked by a certain slackening of social pressure), Arendt states that revolution as a road to freedom is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Revolutions in the real sense of the word did not exist until the 18th century; the first revolutions under the banner of freedom were the American Revolution and the French Revolution.

However, admitting the need to determine the significance of other great revolutions, above all those accomplished in the modern epoch, into her conceptual scheme, she resolves this question in a simple fashion. In her opinion,

[20] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, 1977, p. 244.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 238.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

modern revolutions merely juggle with the concept of freedom. Hannah Arendt has chosen the October Revolution in Russia and other socialist revolutions of the 20th century as the chief target of her attack, claiming that "Marxist revolutions" have distorted the idea of freedom. What is the foundation of this harsh statement? It transpires that the author is outraged by the fact that "Marxist revolutions" proclaim it their goal to attain material prosperity and economic advance and allegedly turn their backs on true emancipation of man. However, is the true emancipation of man attainable without first achieving a certain standard of economic and social development? This is a question which remains unanswered by the American scholar.

Hannah Arendt idealizes the early bourgeois revolutions; she opposes them to socialist revolutions which, she maintains, have betrayed the lofty ideals, e.g., attainment of the freedom and all-round harmonious development of the personality. This approach cannot but understate the significance of socialist revolutions and their impact on mankind's historical progress.

Alongside the concept of freedom, Hannah Arendt introduces two other elements in her conception of revolution: the concept of a "new beginning" and that of "violence". She holds that "crucial . . . to any understanding of revolutions in the modern age is that the idea of freedom and the experience of a new beginning should coincide".[23] In other words, the goal of modern revolutions is freedom, but the very realization of the ideal of freedom through revolution heralds a new historical phase in the development of mankind.

The third element of Hannah Arendt's theory is the same old, much-bandied "violence", which she understands as lawlessness and ruthless suppression. Freedom and the new beginning, she maintains, have to be attained through struggle; moreover, violence and terror are the only way. The final conception of revolution as defined by Hannah Arendt boils down to the following: "only where change

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[23] H. Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution."[24]

Hannah Arendt's definition is not only unnecessarily long; what is most important is its contradictory character, an attempt to bring together irreconcilable elements. For instance, the concepts of violence and suppression as features of revolution are incompatible with the concept of freedom which, according to the author's reasoning, leaves no room for any form of oppression. The concept of the "new beginning" goes directly against the concept of "liberalization", a traditional form of action uncharacteristic of revolution. The contradictory character of the formulations reveals the author's failure to grasp the class essence of the revolutionary process, its causes, content and goals. This makes itself felt above all in Hannah Arendt's interpretation of "freedom" as a concept that has nothing to do with the existence of classes, as emancipation of the personality outside the system of its social contacts. Looming behind the superficial objectivity of Hannah Arendt's treatment of the goals of true revolution is the shadow of bourgeois individualist consciousness, whose ambitions perfectly fit in the boundaries of bourgeois democracy. An abstract, limited bourgeois understanding of freedom and of ways to attain it has not only trapped Hannah Arendt into idealizing bourgeois revolutions of the 18th century but prevented her from grasping the class nature of the revolutionary process as a whole.

Another major trend in the sociology of revolution involves attaching primary importance to its psychological aspects. Researchers within this trend believe that theoretical structures resting on an analysis of revolution's political and legal aspects leave themselves opened to criticism, since they deal with the superficial features of revolution and fail to grasp its hidden inner core. They maintain that the authors of the political and legal theories of rev-

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

olution examine such aspects as conflict, violence, or changes in the power structure, but overlook the main thing, the inner meaning of the changes, i.e., the issue of psychological development and the changing mentality of the masses. The criticism which adherents of the psychological trend level against the political and legal theories is certainly justified, however the crux of the matter is that their own doctrines are also based on unsound premises. Let us consider some of their conceptions.

The psychological approach has been developed by quite a number of prominent bourgeois researchers of different generations, including Charles A. Ellwood, Gustave Le Bon, Pitirim A. Sorokin, Peter Amann, Dale Yoder, Sigmund Neumann and Samuel Huntington.

According to Charles A. Ellwood, the psychological basis of revolution is a universal, all-embracing element inherent in all revolutionary movements. He wrote: "The essence of the theory is this: that revolutions are disturbances in the social order due to the sudden breakdown of social habits under conditions which make difficult the reconstruction of those habits, that is, the formation of a new social order."[25] In other words, revolutions arise as a reaction to obstructions or disruptions in the normal process of the evolution of social habits. Under normal conditions, even when social habits and institutions[26] are being replaced by new ones, this is a slow and gradual process. Revolution effects these changes promptly and more profoundly, making the old habits and institutions suddenly lose their significance. Incidentally, this is how Ellwood accounts for the anarchy and disorder which, he believes, accompany all revolutions. He maintains that this is a period when points of reference are lost, and norms of behavior are undermined, with the people seeking to break through the traditional boundaries. "If the theory of revolutions here outlined is in any degree correct, it is evident that they are regular phenomena con-

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[25] Ch. A. Ellwood, "A Psychological Theory of Revolutions" in: *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XI, No. I, July 1905, p. 51.

[26] In Ellwood's viewpoint, state institutions are also a sort of expressions of habits and traditions.

forming to the laws of the mental life. It is possible, therefore, to predict their occurrence in the sense that the conditions favorable to their development can be stated."[27]

Based on this conception, Ellwood proceeds to describe the conditions that could culminate in revolution: the probability of its emergence multiplies, he believes, when the social habits and institutions become fossilized, lose their flexibility, and "do not change with changing life-conditions".[28]

Conceptions similar to that of Ellwood were advanced by other bourgeois authors as well. One of the most important representatives of the sociology of revolution trend, Gustave Le Bon, affirmed that the cornerstone of human society is formed by beliefs and myths. Truly great revolutions are revolutions of the spirit and the thought; they change human mentality. "Whatever its origin," wrote Le Bon, "a revolution is not productive of results until it has sunk into the soul of the multitude."[29]

Following in Le Bon's footsteps, Pitirim Sorokin, a Russian by extraction, also associated his conception of revolution with a wide range of psychological manifestations and conflicts in society, although, as distinct from his predecessors, he views them as an accompaniment to political change.[30]

George S. Pettee, a classic of the bourgeois sociology of revolution, also stressed the significance of the so-called mythology in revolutions. Stating that each great revolution is "a reconstitution of the state", he declared in the same breath that it is nothing but replacement of one set of myths prevailing in society by another. This was also the stand of Sigmund Neumann, who incorporated the idea of a prompt and drastic change of the myths prevailing in society into his conception of revolution.

The psychological approach was closely associated with the study of the masses' behavior in revolution and the im-

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[27] Ch. A. Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] G. Le Bon, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[30] P. A. Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution*, Philadelphia, 1925.

pact of myths on their mentality. Peter Amann wrote that "the power monopoly of the state depends largely, not on the consent of the governed, but on their habit of obedience, whatever its move".[31]

Dale Yoder, another prominent champion of the psychological trend in the sociology of revolution, introduced an additional element into his conception: alterations in the value system. It should be noted that his position is specific in one respect: he recognizes the significance of social relations in the life of society. His idea is that "the real revolution is the change in the social attitudes and values basic to the traditional institutional order".[32]

This criterion has gained wide currency in Western writings on social revolution. The implication is that it describes the changes occurring in ideological, cultural, ethical and other social values. A. S. Cohan believes, for instance, that most Western "theorists would consider the alteration of values to be a critical and perhaps most important feature of a revolution".[33] This view is shared by Samuel Huntington, who puts in the first place "a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society".[34]

However, in actual fact, it is not the alteration in beliefs, values or myths that lies at the root of revolutionary transformations, but rather the class struggle—representing the struggle between doomed and new production relations. Changes in the mentality of the people are a consequence of the changing objective conditions and the material world, and not the other way around.

Criticizing the political and legal conceptions of revolution for failing to reveal the underlying meaning of revolutionary change, the psychological trend nevertheless supplants the study of the content of the revolutionary process

[31] P. Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition" in: *Political Science Quarterly*, New York, March 1962, Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 37-38.

[32] D. Yoder, "Current Definitions of Revolution" in: *The American Journal of Sociology*, November 1926, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, p. 441.

[33] A. S. Cohan, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[34] S. P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, 1970, p. 264.

with reviewing its superficial features, overlooking the core of the matter—the struggle between classes.

The persistent attempts of bourgeois scientists to represent the changes in man's mentality and social consciousness as the main factor determining the content and character of a revolution expose the extreme idealism typical of bourgeois sociology at large.

The third trend in the analysis of revolution is a fairly recent one. It is associated, first and foremost, with Chalmers Johnson, the American sociologist who has advanced the conception of the equilibrium, or balance, of social systems. The problem of revolution, he maintains, must be considered within the framework of the theory of social systems, while concrete revolutions must be studied in the context of those social systems where they arise. The major indicator or sign determining the stability or the very existence of a social system is, in Johnson's view, the degree to which it is balanced. Not a single social system can exist off-balance. Hence his conclusion that revolution is a state of a social system shaken out of balance, i.e., the destabilization of a system.

According to Johnson, the loss of equilibrium includes the plummeting of the significance of the system's institutions, functions and values. What is implied by loss of equilibrium is the emergence of "multiple micro-disfunctions" within the social system caused by the inability or unwillingness of the "intransigent elite" to eliminate them. However, the presence of "micro-dysfunctions" in society and the inflexibility of the elite's policies are in themselves insufficient to cause a revolution, writes Johnson. To start it, the contradictions must reach extreme magnitude as a result of a nation-wide crisis, e.g., a defeat in a war.

In his later works, Johnson modified his conception somewhat. The loss of balance came to imply a disruption in the synchronism of two mutually related processes: the change of social values in society, and the general trend of change in the social and political environment. Destabilization is conducive to deflation of authority, causing the ruling elite to increasingly rely on force as a means of regaining the equilibrium. A revolution occurs, Johnson

sums up, if confidence in the authority and legitimacy of the existing system are undermined by the inability of the authority to exercise its regulatory function required to regain the disrupted synchronism. As we see, Johnson has introduced a number of new criteria, e.g., "the loss of equilibrium", "deflation of authority", "accelerator of the revolution", i.e., its immediate driving force. It is on this basis that Johnson has formulated his definition of social revolution:

"Revolution is not the same thing as social change; it is a form of social change...

"True revolution ... is the acceptance of violence in order to cause the system to change when all else has failed, and the very idea of revolution is contingent upon this perception of societal failure."[35]

Bourgeois science of revolution has recently manifested an urge to fuse the leading conceptions of revolutions, to unify the very term "revolution" and to find a formula incorporating the conceptions that have gained the widest currency.

Noting the absence of a unified approach to the definition of revolution, but failing to see the real cause behind this state of affairs, i.e., the subjectivist character of bourgeois sociology, many Western researchers attribute it to the fact that in the past, scholars researching this problem did not examine it in its entirety. So, to remedy matters, they have voiced the need to launch a comprehensive study.

This point of view has found particular expression in recent works. American political scientist Mostafa Rejai, author of the book *The Strategy of Political Revolution*, has built his definition of revolution out of eight major elements borrowed from the conceptions which have won the widest recognition in Western literature. He had made an attempt to fuse the political and social aspects of revolution.

Considering the term "political revolution" the most widely used equivalent for the concept of revolution, he interprets it as an introduction to social change and defines

[35] Ch. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, London, 1966, pp. 5, 12.

it as "abrupt, illegal mass violence aimed at the overthrow of the political regime as a step toward over-all social change".[36]

Another recent attempt to fuse the major concepts of revolution has been made in the *Encyclopedia of Sociology*, brought out in the USA in 1974. It defines revolution as "a far-ranging, pervasive, radical change in part, or in many parts, of society; the violent or non-violent replacement of one power elite by another in the climactic phase of such a change".[37]

A synthesis of a whole range of conceptions has provided the foundation for a definition offered by another contemporary American researcher, Mark N. Hagopian. In the course of his career he updated his earliest definition of revolution to some extent, amplifying it with a number of new elements. In his view, revolution is "an acute, prolonged crisis in one or more of the traditional systems of stratification (class, status, power) of a political community, which involves a purposive, elite-directed attempt to abolish or to reconstruct one or more of said systems by means of an intensification of political power and recourse to violence".[38]

"Such a definition of revolution," Hagopian writes, "is designed to fulfill several purposes: (1) to distinguish revolutions from subrevolutionary forms of collective political violence, such as coups d'etat, revolts, and secessions; (2) to stress the importance of social stratification; (3) to highlight the role of ideology and leadership; (4) to relate revolution to social change; and (5) to show the importance of power and violence."[39]

However, attempts of Western sociologists to work out a definition of revolution by bringing together a certain number of its superficial features described by individual scholars are powerless to eliminate the fundamental faults of such a definition, stemming, above all, from a disregard

[36] M. Rejai, *The Strategy of Political Revolution*, New York, 1973, p. 9.

[37] Mark N. Hagopian, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

[38] *Encyclopedia of Sociology*, Connecticut, 1974, p. 244.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 277.

of the laws of development of human society. The various definitions of revolution evolved by bourgeois sociology have nevertheless failed to reveal the essence of revolution, highlighting instead either its individual aspects or a sum total of a number of its superficial features.

In all fairness, it should be noted that the bourgeois researchers of revolution are trying to overcome the mechanistic quality, vagueness and eclecticism of their structures. Some bourgeois sociologists have even tried to describe the essence of revolution by using the Marxist categories of basis and superstructure. Ronald Ye-Lin Cheng, lecturer at the University of Hawaii, has justly pointed to the confusion and lack of precision in the bourgeois researchers' application of the term "revolution". On the strength of the fact that extensive and profound changes are under way in society,[40] he believes it necessary when defining this term to single out phenomena relating to the basis.

The conception advanced by Cheng boils down to this. Being in the process of continuous movement, societies, like living organisms, must be able to adapt their "basis" to constantly changing situations. If for some reason the top ruling group stands in the way of this process, dissatisfaction is provoked which may well lead to revolution. Following such reasoning, the author defines real revolution as a change in the social relations and values which form the foundation of the old order. What factors does he consider lie under the heading of phenomena relating to the "basis"? The jumble of heterogeneous elements listed by the author shows that he is just as mixed up about the processes of revolutionary change as the researchers he criticizes. In his concept of the "basis", along with the arbitrarily interpreted social structure and political institutions, the author includes culture and traditions which operate through habits, morals, customs and conventions.

Thus, the bourgeois sociologists' concept of the "basis" fails, as always, to embrace that which is essential, i.e., the

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[40] R. Ye-Lin Cheng, *The Sociology of Revolution*, Chicago, 1973.

material relations of production into which people enter in the process of social production, and which find expression in the struggle between classes—the bearers of these relations. Moved to the forefront in the bourgeois sociological definition of the "basis" are values and myths amplified by the concept "social relations", which is treated in a deliberately vague fashion, i.e., categories relating to the realm of human mentality and not material, production relations.

Marx made it a point to stress that "the mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness".[41] With reference to the process of revolutionary transformation of society, Marx wrote: "In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production."[42]

The bourgeois sociologists stubbornly ignore these fundamental precepts of Marx when opposing the Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution with their own constructions. Their purpose is to obscure and misrepresent the essence of the contemporary revolutionary process and the genuine goals and targets of the social revolutions of our epoch, which are directed at overthrowing the capitalist system and replacing capitalist production relations with socialist ones.

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[41] Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 20-21.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

The actual content of the process of revolution has been thoroughly examined by the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution. "At a certain stage of development," wrote Marx, "the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution."[43]

Disregard of the class struggle under way in society is a feature of many bourgeois definitions of revolution. And yet, it is through class struggle that a revolutionary transformation of society is effected. "Each real revolution," wrote Engels, "is a social one, since it brings a new class to power and gives it a chance to change society after its own image."[44] Lenin also wrote: "The passing of state power from one *class* to another is the first, the principal, the basic sign of a *revolution*, both in the strictly scientific and in the practical political meaning of that term."[45] The transfer of political power to the new revolutionary class is the crucial moment of a social revolution, determining its entire political content.

The treatment of social revolution by the Marxist-Leninist theory provides the key to a proper understanding of the term "revolution". It is transition from one socio-economic formation to another, based on the replacement of the outdated mode of production by a new and more progressive one, the destruction of obsolete production relations obstructing the advance of society. The decisive moment of a revolution is the seizure of political power by the revolutionary class through class struggle.

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[43] *Ibid.*

[44] Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 18, Berlin, 1969, p. 560.

[45] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, 1964, p. 44.

Chapter Two

Types of Social Revolution

Working out a scientific definition of the types of revolution has always been a stumbling block for bourgeois researchers. "When defining the basic types of revolution," writes Soviet researcher Yu. Krasin, "the Achilles' heel of the sociology of revolution comes into view: lack of contact between its abstract conceptions and the practice of the revolutionary movement."[1] Subjectivism and the absence of a single methodological approach which, as we have seen, make themselves felt in the theorizing about even the very object of research, also leap to the eye when one reviews the numerous classifications developed by the representatives of the bourgeois sociology of revolution. These attempts reveal the same formalistic quality and the absence of an overall scientific theory which would make it possible to tie up the general regularities of the revolutionary process with its specific manifestations.

The attempts of bourgeois sociology to build a typology of revolution have been undertaken by researchers of several generations. There is a certain continuity among their principal classifications of revolution. The largest contributions to this typology have probably been made by Feliks Gross, George Pettee, Raymond Tanter, Manus Midlarsky, Chalmers Johnson, and James Rosenau. Their typology is still widely current in the West, and their names are associated with certain stages in the work done by the bourgeois sociology of revolution to classify revolutions. Let us consider the main trends in their classifications. The yardstick used by many bourgeois researchers when classifying revolutions is that of the anti-democratic tendencies and lawlessness, violence and cruelty supposedly inherent

[1] Yu. A. Krasin, *Intimidated by Revolution*, Moscow, 1975, p. 49 (in Russian).

in any revolution. The typology of revolution as worked out by Feliks Gross and George Pettee, representatives of the older generation of American theorists of revolution, includes all changes of state power effected by illegal and anti-democratic violent means.

Feliks Gross distinguishes four types of revolution:

1) Revolution from the bottom, which he characterizes as a largely spontaneous mass movement which, gradually advancing, erupts into a sudden explosion forcing the new leadership to agree to the introduction of far-reaching political and social reform.

2) Revolution from the top—the organized and planned, as opposed to spontaneous, seizure of power by an armed group of men who seize the power at the pinnacle. This leads to a prompt capture of government bodies (e.g., ministries), the apparatus of suppression, and the means of communication (including transport). However, in this case the new authorities display no wish to introduce social changes.

3) Combined seizure of power—revolution from the top combined with a limited revolution from the bottom. In such cases, the capture of the political and governmental apparatus is accompanied by a movement of the broad masses.

4) Palace revolution—a shift in the distribution of power within the ruling super-elite, often associated with violence. The seizure of power is carried out by a dissident group within the elite (e.g., a rival dynasty under a monarchy, or a party in a republican system), not by an outside group (for instance, the army). This category of "revolutionaries" does not champion political or social changes either.[2]

The classification of Feliks Gross was further developed by George Pettee, a prominent representative of the American school of the sociology of revolution. Following the example of his predecessor, he, too, ignored the social and economic aspects of the revolutionary process, believing that what characterizes revolution above all is a change in

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[2] F. Gross, *The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions*, New York, 1958, pp. 47, 39, 52, 54.

the constitutional forms of government.[3] Based on this idea, Pettee distinguished five main types of revolution. The first three types correspond to those distinguished by Feliks Gross:

1) a great national revolution (Gross's "revolution from the bottom");

2) coup d'etat (Gross's "revolution from the top");

3) palace revolution.

The last two are entirely new categories:

4) insurrection, defined as a revolt against unjust administration, law or government;

5) revolution of systems.

The last term is used by Pettee to describe the most extensive social change, including that of entire social systems, which he defines as great historical changes of political systems. However, the examples of revolutions of this type which he offers have very little in common with the categories used by the Marxist theory of social revolution, whose core is the transition from a lower socio-economic formation to a higher one. Some of the instances of great historical changes cited by Pettee include the transitions from city-state to empire; from empire to feudal system; and from feudal system to national state. The basis of this classification is also purely superficial, i.e., the form of the state.

Seeking to provide a theoretical basis to their classifications, bourgeois sociologists advance a variety of criteria on which the typology of revolution rests. Although they reflect some of the features peculiar to revolution, these criteria are for the most part extremely arbitrary and controversial, stemming as they do from a subjective view of the revolutionary process.

Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, for instance, advance a sketchy and exceedingly narrow concept of the revolutionary process, which contains no analysis of the social and economic genesis of the revolution nor of its class character. Their analysis is restricted to the study of the power struggle between elites, which has necessarily detract-

[3] G. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution*, New York, 1971, p. 3.

ed from the real choice of criteria for their classification, rendered it superficial, and made the classifications they have evolved one-sided. Tanter and Midlarsky distinguish four criteria to be applied when classifying revolutions:

1) the degree of mass participation; 2) the length of the revolutionary process; 3) the level of violence (which could be measured in different ways, e.g., by calculating the number of victims); and 4) the goals of the insurgents.

On the basis of these criteria, four types of revolution are singled out:

1. Revolution of the masses, characterized by broad popular participation in the revolutionary movement over a long period of time, is accompanied by a high rate of violence within the country, and signifies an era of fundamental political and social change.

2. Revolutionary coup, characterized by a low level of popular participation, short duration, and moderate use of coercion. The changes in the political structure do not affect the social structure of society at large.

3. Reform coup, carried out with an extremely low level of popular participation, is, as a rule, brief, makes little use of coercion and aims at moderate changes in the political system.

4. Palace revolution, in which the masses take no part, is brief, totally non-violent and does not introduce any substantial change in the political structure.[4]

The reviewed classification is not very original, having a great deal in common with that evolved by Feliks Gross and George Pettee. The revolution of the masses is essentially a revolution from the bottom (F. Gross), while a revolutionary coup does not differ in any way from revolution from the top (F. Gross) or coup d'etat (G. Pettee). Palace revolution is still there; the only new element is reform coup, which lays claim, paradoxically enough, to the status of revolution.

The classifications drawn up by Tanter and Midlarsky

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[4] R. Tanter, M. Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Vol. XI, No. 3, September 1967, pp. 264-279.

is a typical example of a subjectivist and most unexpected combination of heterogeneous elements. Thus, it quite illegitimately brings together such entirely unconnected criteria as the degree of popular participation in a revolution and its duration. The broader the social basis of a revolution, the authors believe, the longer the revolutionary period, and vice versa. However, the interdependence they have discovered tallies ill with historical facts and, what is most important, serves to obscure the more profound link between the subjective and the objective factors in a revolution. It was precisely thanks to the revolutionary drive of the broad masses of workers and soldiers, combined with a high degree of organization and thorough preparation of the revolutionary action that the October 1917 Revolution in Russia was accomplished promptly. But this brilliant feat was preceded by a lengthy period during which both objective and subjective conditions for the socialist revolution had matured in Russia. Its decisive and rapid success was to a large degree secured by the painstaking and courageous work of the Bolshevik Party headed by Lenin. And yet, it is precisely these major factors determining the character of a real social revolution that remain outside bourgeois analysis.

An important step forward in the elaboration of the typology of revolution has been made by Professor of the University of California Chalmers Johnson. The classification he has proposed is among the most widely accepted in the West. This noted American scholar, author of the theory of equilibrium of social systems, has a keen awareness of the need to examine revolution in a concrete context and in connection with the study of social development. "To pull revolutions out of the system," he wrote, "and to try to compare them without reference to the disfunctional system destroys the very idea of revolution."[5] Although it is not very clear just what the author means by the social system, still the recognition of a close mutual dependence between the problem of revolution and the problem of social order

[5] Ch. Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System,* Stanford University, 1964, p. 30.

was objectively of positive value. It reflects the attempts of certain bourgeois researchers to overcome the excessively scholastic approach to research into revolution and to describe it in more concrete terms. In fact, however, even Chalmers Johnson himself has departed from his stated principle and, by his own admission, has also built his classification of revolutions on the scholastic method of formal analogies.

Johnson introduces four criteria, such as "targets of revolutionary activity", "identity of revolutionaries" (masses, elites-leading-masses, and elites), "revolutionary ideology" (citing reformism, nationalism and messianism as examples), and revolutionary regulation ("whether or not the revolution is spontaneous or calculated").[6]

Based on these four criteria, Johnson builds a far-reaching classification which attempts at making a differentiated approach to existing forms of revolutionary action. He distinguishes six types of revolution, with only coup d'etat finding a parallel in the earlier typologies. A significant portion of Johnson's classification is taken up by forms of peasant actions. This includes:

1. "Jacquerie", a spontaneous mass rebellion of peasants pursuing strictly limited aims, i.e., to remove specific grievances in a given locality or state or to restore lost rights. The demands put forward by the rebels usually include a set of reforms to be introduced but not directed at overturning the political system.

2. "The Anarchistic Rebellion", which Johnson also labels as a "nostalgic revolution", a reaction to the changes afoot in society, which stems from an idealized view of the old system and is aimed at restoring the old order. "Examples include such varied instances as the counter-revolution in the Vendée, 1793-1796; the Boxer Rebellion, 1899-1900. . ."

3. "The Militarized Mass Insurrection", "calculated mass revolutionary wars" unfolding on the basis of guerrilla warfare and having a broad social base. The examples

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[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

Johnson cites are the Algerian and the Vietnamese national liberation revolutions.

The next type singled out by the author embraces religious utopian movements, e. g.

4. "Millenarian Rebellion", a movement not unlike the Jacquerie, but permeated with a utopian messianic idea preached by charismatic leaders. According to this idea, a complete and just restructuring of society will take place in a millennium, in the "golden age". The classic example is the Taiping Rebellion in China, 1851-1864.

A special place in Johnson's classification belongs to:

5. "The Jacobin Communist Revolution", which the author defines as a spontaneous mass movement aimed at overall political and social reconstruction of society. Since the French Revolution of 1789 and the October Revolution of 1917 are both given as examples, Johnson obviously makes no distinction between the bourgeois-democratic revolution in France and the socialist revolution in Russia.

The classification is concluded with the traditional coup d'etat:

6. "Conspiratorial Coup d'Etat", an attempt at revolutionary change made by a small, secret association of members of the ruling elite. Their target is to replace one group of rulers by another.[1]

The bourgeois classification of revolutions underwent further evolution due to the work of sociologists Harry Eckstein and James N. Rosenau of Princeton University, who developed the conception of "internal war". The use of this conception reveals with striking clarity the wish of bourgeois researchers to dissolve the Marxist concept of social revolution in more amorphous categories stripped of class characteristics. Their fundamental idea is not the struggle between classes but the factor of violence taken by itself, irrespective of which group resorts to it and of the causes and methods of its utilization. Defining the concept he had introduced, Harry Eckstein wrote that practically any act of violence within the existing system, ranging from

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[1] Ch. Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-57.

revolution to strikes, aimed at changing the constitution, policy or the power structure, indicates the state of "internal war". Thus, "internal war" is another extraclass term coined by bourgeois sociologists and used by them alongside the concepts of revolution, civil war, insurrection, revolt, guerrilla war, putsch, Jacquerie, coup d'etat, etc. However, "internal war" has a number of specific features and is not completely identical to those listed above. It is a sort of universal category that incorporates all types of violent actions, including revolution.[8]

The conception of "internal war" is the basis of James Rosenau's classification, which singles out three types of "internal war":

1. "*Personnel* wars are those which are perceived as being fought over the occupancy of existing roles in the existing structure of political authority, with no aspiration on the part of the insurgents to alter either the other substructures of the society or its major domestic and foreign policies. . ."

2. "*Authority* wars are those which are perceived as being fought over the arrangement (as well as the occupancy) of the roles in the structure of political authority, but with no aspiration on the part of the insurgents to alter either the other substructures of the society or its major domestic and foreign policies."

3. "*Structural* wars are those which are perceived as being not only contests over personnel and the structure of political authority, but also as struggles over other substructures of the society . . . or its major domestic and foreign policies. . . It is difficult to imagine structural wars which are not also personnel and authority wars, and thus this is the most comprehensive type."[9]

In subsequent periods, Western sociology used the traditional classifications to build new ones claiming universality.

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[8] *Internal War. Problems and Approaches.* Ed. by Harry Eckstein, New York, 1964, p. 12.

[9] J. N. Rosenau, "Internal War as an International Event" in: *Internal Aspects of Civil Strife.* Ed. by James N. Rosenau, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964, pp. 63-64.

Mostafa Rejai, professor of political science at Miami University, has proposed an additional criterion to define the so-called political revolution. "The typology offered below," he wrote, "is based upon a single criterion: the target or targets of political revolution. The target, or 'enemy', against which a political revolution is directed is its most distinctive characteristic."[10]

"Employing the criterion of target," he goes on to say, "three types of political revolution may be identified: civil revolution, national revolution, and abortive revolution. By a civil revolution we mean mass violent overthrow of a domestic enemy, the replacement of one political regime by another, and the desire to introduce overall social change. Examples include France (1789), Mexico (1910), Russia (1917), and Bolivia (1952). The term 'civil' simply suggests that the target of political revolution is an internal one. A civil revolution, it should be noted, is not the same as a civil war." The latter, as distinct from a revolution, is a form of organized armed military conflict between rival governments, centres of political power or armed groups operating in the same territory. Rejai's interpretation of civil war completely ignores its social content, viewing it only as a form of military conflict. It also places an illegitimate restriction on the concept of social revolution, reducing it to settlement of purely domestic problems and limiting it to a certain territory, which cuts it off from the process of world development. This serves to minimize the significance of social revolutions, including the French Revolution and the October Revolution in Russia, and their impact on the overall advance of human society.

The second type of revolution under M. Rejai's classification is the national revolution, which "aims at mass violent overthrow of a foreign (external) power, a change in the political system, the termination of foreign rule, and the institutionalization of social change". It is also spearheaded against puppet regimes. Examples include the American Revolution of the late 18th century and also the

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[10] M. Rejai, *The Strategy of Political Revolution*, New York, 1973, pp. 19,20.

post-World-War-II revolutions—the Algerian, Chinese, Cuban, and Vietnamese revolutions.[11]

As compared to earlier typologies, which tended to ignore the movements against colonial rule, M. Rejai's classification adds a number of supplementary features. Bourgeois sociology can no longer afford to ignore the recent successes of the national liberation movements scored in many parts of the world. However the Western scholars approach these movements formally, glossing over their true content and divorcing their study from the practice of the revolutionary movement. Trapped by formalist structures, failing to give an analysis of concepts he has himself introduced, M. Rejai loses his bearings among his casuistic terminology. Fearing that his concept "national revolution" may be interpreted as a nation-wide venture, he introduces yet another term, "revolutionary war", which, he hopes, will help him to disentangle himself from terminological abstractions. But he only succeeds in walking into another terminological trap.

The definition of a national revolution, he states, is similar to that of a revolutionary war. "It is in fact both a war and a revolution unfolding at the same time—a war because of the formal armed clash involving a foreign government, a revolution because of the mass violence aimed at internal political and social change."[12] But in this case a question arises: what, then, is war? How can one reconcile M. Rejai's understanding of the concept with that of "internal war" introduced into scientific literature by other bourgeois sociologists? Having concentrated on building abstract terminological structures and gotten stuck in the process, bourgeois sociology assiduously avoids the main issue: that of finding objective criteria for constructing a genuinely scientific typology of revolutions.

The third type of revolution as defined by M. Rejai is the abortive revolution, which "refers to the failure of the violent mass movement to reach its target, whether internal or external. Reasons may include inept leadership, inadequate organization, failure of communication or plan-

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 20.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

ning, suppression at the hands of the authorities. An abortive revolution may be either civil or national. . ."[13]

The purely formal, abstract approach to the study of revolution often produces absurd typological structures which go directly against common sense. M. Rejai quite seriously suggests that "it may be useful to identify provisionally a fourth possible type of political revolution: counter-revolution". He is not at all embarrassed that counter-revolution is the concept just the opposite of revolution by its content. "Technically understood, a counter-revolution is mass violence designed to return to power a political group or regime (whether domestic or foreign) and to restore a pre-existing state of affairs."[14] Thus M. Rejai sees no substantial difference between revolution and counter-revolution, treating them as phenomena within the same category. In his definition of counter-revolution he resorts to the panacea of formal logic, seeking to find proof of his theory in external formal attributes. It is just this sort of device which allows bourgeois ideologists to put progressive and reactionary movements in human history on an equal footing.

Woolliness of judgement when defining the object of research and the very concept "social revolution" that marks bourgeois sociological studies has made quite a number of scholars try and introduce some sort of order into the matter—so to speak, to undertake a spring cleaning of their house. This becomes obvious in their attempts to draw a dividing line between the so-called real or genuine revolutions and phenomena that are similar, but cannot be classed as revolutions, and to establish criteria to be used as a guideline for this division. Such attempts have also been made in relation to the typology of revolutions.

An original approach has been demonstrated by Mark Hagopian, professor at the American International College, in his book *The Phenomenon of Revolution*. Based on his own definition of revolution (quoted in the previous chapter of this book), he applies the rule of contraries, i.e., develops a typology of phenomena that do not come under the

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Ibid.*

heading of revolution as he interprets it. "Understanding what revolution is not," he writes, "is crucial to fully understanding what it is."[15] Viewing revolution as an acute crisis of the system, he states: "The stress of this definition on acuteness and prolongation of crisis underscores the utter seriousness, and hence the relative infrequency, of the revolution situation."[16]

The acuteness and duration of the crisis are two of the six criteria offered by Mark Hagopian to determine whether this or that outbreak may be classed in the category of revolution. The other four are:

1) The degree of its impact on the system, since in his opinion, any real revolution exerts a comprehensive influence on society.

2) The place assigned to ideology.

3) Direction or orientation of the movement.

4) Type of leadership.

Some of the criteria mentioned above have been borrowed from the old stock-in-trade. Taken together, they form the basis of M. Hagopian's negative typology of what constitutes a revolution. He distinguishes three groups of phenomena. Group one covers coups d'etat, which include palace revolutions, executive, military and other elite coups; group two embraces revolts (Jacqueries and peasant revolts, aristocratic revolts, and millenarianism-messianism); group three comprises secessions of any type, including regional, colonial, ethnic, and religious.[17]

Elaborating his typology, M. Hagopian is, however, obliged to admit its conditional nature, its disconnection from any concrete historical development. "...We have not lost sight of the fact," he writes, "that revolutions sometimes develop out of coups, revolts, and secessions... The boundary separating the highly complex forms from revolution becomes precarious and contentious."[18] These observations taken by themselves are not completely unfounded. How-

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[15] Mark N. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution,* New York, 1975, p. 39.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 6, 7, 10, 31, 33, 36, 37.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

ever, by dealing with only the outward aspect of these distinctions, M. Hagopian overlooks that which is most important—the social, economic and class content of revolutionary movements as prime movers of social development.

The typologies of revolution built by a succession of generations of bourgeois sociologists bear the stamp of speculation. Abstract schemata have taken the place of typologies stemming from the concrete social and economic core of the many revolutionary processes under way in the world, an analysis of the entire wealth of forms and methods of revolutionary struggle between classes. A study of the class essence of social revolution in its concrete manifestations is replaced by a research of an imaginary problem, a search for formal common features. And, as the typologies gained in complexity and the number of criteria and types of revolution grew, these classifications departed further and further from real life, breeding chaos in the minds of the researchers themselves.

Of course, not all criteria applied by American and British sociologists when building typologies of revolution can be discarded. Marx, Engels and Lenin, as well as Soviet scholars have always attached great importance to such a major criterion as participation of the masses in revolution, whose involvement and activism frequently determine the scope of revolutionary change. The course of the revolutionary process in Angola and Ethiopia has shown that the revolutions there were to a large degree promoted by the large-scale involvement of the masses, while in the case of Egypt, the absence of a broad social basis of the revolution significantly restricted the introduction of revolutionary reforms, rendering them weak and unstable.

However, even this major criterion loses its significance and value when employed by bourgeois researchers. They regard it as just another formal criterion used in building typologies of revolution. It is dissociated from the real content of the revolutionary process and analysis of the motive forces of revolution. Disregard for these vital, principal features of any real revolution, as Lenin put it, and inability to distinguish between primary and secondary factors result in inner controversy and artificiality in bour-

geois classifications of revolution and sometimes even produce absurdities.

Examples of this sort can be cited by the score. In the classifications of revolution evolved by Feliks Gross, and by Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, the "revolution of the masses" and "palace revolution" end up in one muddled heap. The purely formal approach demonstrated by George Pettee brings together completely heterogeneous phenomena, such as the "great national revolution", "palace revolution", "revolt" and "revolution of systems". Chalmers Johnson lists such vastly differing movements as "Jacquerie", "coup d'etat" and the "Jacobin communist revolution" under the same heading. We have already discussed the flimsy link between revolution and "internal wars" invented by Harry Eckstein and James N. Rosenau. Just as contradictory are more recent classifications which, incidentally, rest to a large extent on old ones. However, some of the "new" typologies can put the old ones to shame. A case in point is the effort of Mostafa Rejai, who has put counter-revolution in the same category as revolution.

Incongruities also crop up in bourgeois sociologists' coinage of terms used to classify revolutions. Cases in point are "palace revolution" and "reform coup", which are nothing but a contradiction in terms.

The emergence of more and more new typologies, their mutual exclusiveness and dissociation from reality give rise to unbelief in their scientific soundness even among bourgeois scholars. One researcher, James Meisel, noted ironically that there were as many typologies of revolution as there were authors.[19] Stephen J. Andriole and Gerald W. Hopple, modern British researchers, also noted the absence of single principles on which to found the typologies of social revolution. "There are many qualitative typologies," they write, "but they are all different, and nobody likes anyone else's. T. Skocpol (1979), for example, focuses on the French, Russian ..., and Chinese Revolutions, maintaining that all three are basically similar; Johnson puts

[19] J. H. Meisel, *Counter-Revolution. How Revolutions Die*, New York, 1966.

them into three different categories."[20] This sceptical attitude toward many of the bourgeois typologies is also fed by the fact that many Western researchers reject them.

An analysis of these typologies indicates that not only does bourgeois sociology not possess a more or less generally acceptable classification of revolutions, but also that the typologies which have been suggested are not typologies of social revolution at all. At best, they may be regarded as classifications of political actions that are far removed from real revolutionary processes. The subjectivist approach to classification of revolutions which has gained wide currency among bourgeois researchers, isolation of the general from the particular and of abstract schemata from the concrete contents of the revolutionary process, necessarily restrict the extent of the study and hamper a truly scientific analysis of the problem.

It is true that the problem of classifying revolutions is among the most complicated in sociology. Our epoch, the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism, has evolved a wide range of forms of popular action and transitional stages of development. The course of a single world revolutionary process produces new forms of struggle for national liberation, democratic reform and social progress. A wide cross-section of the world's population is getting involved in the revolutionary movement for restructuring social relations and eliminating oppression and exploitation. The diversity and complexity of the contemporary revolutionary process poses great difficulties when classification is attempted. Soviet scientists put in a great deal of work in this area. There are still problems to be solved, but we believe that Marxism-Leninism offers a sound foundation for their solution, as well as scientifically substantiated criteria which make an objective approach to the typology of revolution possible. This implies, above all, consideration of the essence of the socio-economic contradictions within the existing system which give rise to revolution, and of the new socio-economic formation which the revolution seeks to establish.

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[20] St. J. Andriole and G. W. Hopple, *Revolution and Political Instability. Applied Research Methods*, London, 1984, p.17.

Not one of the bourgeois typologies considered above makes use of these major objective criteria which determine both the nature of social revolution and its type. Bourgeois sociology refuses to accept their significance, for they point to the historical conditionality of revolutionary processes and the transient character of the capitalist system.

When identifying social revolutions, bourgeois ideologists ignore the fact that the transition from one social system to another must be accompanied by acute class struggle, of which social revolution is the highest expression. The classes which consciously set themselves the goal of overthrowing the old social system and establishing a new and more advanced one, for which they are ready to fight to the last to attain, are the prime movers of social revolution. The role of classes and social groups as the motive forces of revolution, deciding its character and orientation, is another major criterion used by the Marxist typology of revolution.

It is precisely these criteria which provide the key to a scientific classification of social revolutions, making it possible to distinguish three basic types: revolutions directed against the slave-owning system, bourgeois (or anti-feudal) revolutions, and socialist revolutions.

At the same time, Marxist-Leninist theory does not negate the fact that within the boundaries of these types of social revolutions transitory sub-types are possible, the specific features of which may be determined by the inexhaustible variety of concrete historical characteristics and paths of development of the world revolutionary process.

Marxist researchers have stressed the fact that at the present stage of development of the revolutionary process, increasing importance is attached to national liberation revolutions spearheaded against the rule of imperialist powers and their henchmen. Many of these movements do not go beyond the boundaries of bourgeois-democratic revolutions, while others display features testifying to their socialist orientation. Both exert a substantial influence on the course of today's world revolutionary process and have characteristics which must be considered when building a typology of revolutions. It is obvious that the progress and growing complexity of this process renders additional topicality

to the problem of typology of social revolutions, necessitating its further research with due consideration for the new factors evolved by practice. The solution of this problem is possible on the basis of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory, which not only provides a firm foundation for working out a genuinely scientific classification of social revolutions, but also makes it possible to take full heed of the entire diversity of their concrete manifestations stemming from the realities of today's revolutionary movement.

Chapter Three

The Genesis of Social Revolutions

How and why do revolutions arise? This question is probably the principal concern of bourgeois sociology. And this is only natural, since an answer to this question will, at the same time, provide a clue as to how revolutions may be prevented and the rule of the bourgeoisie perpetuated. The crucial character of the question leaves its mark on the bourgeois researchers' treatment of the subject. In this instance, as in many others which are of vital importance for the continued existence of capitalism, bourgeois scholars cannot shake off the class illusions which hold them captive.

Western scholars themselves admit that a scientific explanation of the causes of social revolution represents one of the more knotty problems tackled by bourgeois research into revolution.[1] However, they refuse to recognize that the difficulty of their solution stems from the profoundly controversial nature of the very methodological foundations of bourgeois science. Bourgeois scholars have never found it easy to reconcile the idea of man's conscious activity with the notion of its being governed by objective laws. Refusal to recognize that social development is subject to certain laws and regularities, plus too much emphasis on the subjective aspects of social processes, lead Western researchers to the negation of causation in the life of society. Their interpretation of the genesis of revolutions betrays the subjectivist character of bourgeois sociological analysis and its failure to appreciate the role played by the laws of social development. They still dispute the very possibility of scientifically explaining the root causes of social revolution and re-

[1] Mark N. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, New York, 1975, p. 122.

present revolutions as accidents that do not lend themselves to scientific treatment.

Attempts are made to apply the methods employed by natural science to the social sphere. Carl Gustav Hempel maintains, for instance, that mere observation of natural developments is in itself an explanation. No one, he declares, is able to grasp a law of nature; at best, its existence and operation can be surmised from the sequence of events. This idealistic premise puts in question the existence of laws and regularities governing historical development and human behavior. This end is also pursued by asserting the alleged impossibility of their scientific analysis and explanation.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism, on the other hand, have always acted on the fact that only a scientific approach to the phenomena and processes observed in human society can throw light on how historical development really proceeds. They have proven the causality of history. According to Marxist theory, revolution arises in conformity with the objective laws governing social development. Marxism has built up a truly scientific theory of social development, historical materialism, which at the same time provides a method for social research. Lenin referred to it, and more than once, as the only scientific sociology. "Revolution," he wrote, "is a profound, difficult and complex science."[2] Bourgeois sociology, by refusing to recognize the method of historical materialism, denies itself the use of a reliable compass for finding one's bearings among the intricate tangle of processes and events which take place in society.

Direct negation of the possibility of a scientific approach to the study of revolution is, however, proving unconvincing. This is why increasing importance is being attached to other trends in bourgeois sociology which produce specific theories and models of the genesis of revolutions and try to find acceptable reasons for their emergence.

One such trend advocates a pluralistic approach, hold-

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[2] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, 1965, p. 198.

ing that not a single universal method nor a single theory of revolution can be worked out. This is the stand from which bourgeois researchers level criticism against the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of revolution, declaring it obsolete in the present era. They accuse Marxist scholars of dogmatism and the application of the same yardstick to revolutions of entirely different types, which supposedly obscures the diversity of history's ways. "Is there any uniformity", queries W. F. Wertheim, "to be discovered in the manifold situations throughout world history which we can assess, by hindsight, as pre-revolutionary? Do revolutions occur in situations of extreme misery or, on the contrary, under conditions of economic growth?... Do revolutions appear under political conditions of extreme harshness or, on the contrary, under regimes where political control has been somewhat relaxed and, consequently, the dissatisfied groups enjoy some latitude for manoeuvring?"[3] It should be clear from the outset, W. F. Wertheim concludes, that "an unambiguous and generally valid reply to such questions is hardly to be expected... Both the kind of society and the historical period in which a revolution occurs may widely differ and, consequently, influence the impact of separate factors."[4]

A similar idea has been expounded by Mark Hagopian. "Modern social science," he writes, "teaches that highly complex events such as revolution are caused by many factors and not by a single factor." In his opinion, the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution contradicts these provisions and does not correspond to the spirit of today. Without any justification he ranks this theory among the so-called monocausal theories that explain the origin of revolutions by the impact of economics or the existence of conspiratorial elites. "Our own approach will be to give a rough idea of the multiple factors whose interaction produces the revolutionary situation, which is then precipitated into the out-

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[3] W. F. Wertheim, *Evolution and Revolution. The Rising Waves of Emancipation*, London, 1974, p. 181.

[4] *Ibid.*

break of revolution." He calls the total package of such factors the "antecedent conditions".[5]

This "heterocausal" approach to the genesis of revolution has, however, failed to prove its advantages over the "monocausal" one; it has only revealed the absence of a single substantiated method of research and the failure of bourgeois science to grasp the laws of human development. Pluralism, along with the refusal to recognize the need for scientific analysis, questions the inevitability of social revolution. This stand is very clearly defined by the American scholar, Lawrence Stone. Directing justified criticism at Chalmers Johnson, the author of the functional theory of revolution, for likening the process of revolution to an automatically functioning mechanism, Stone tries to reduce the causes of revolution to chance, looking for them in the sphere of unpredictable personal decisions made by either the ruling elite or revolutionary leaders. A telling conclusion follows: revolution is not inevitable, or, to be more precise, the only proof of its inevitability is its actual advent.[6]

Marxist-Leninist theory, on the contrary, recognizes the operation of objective laws in social development and the natural appearance of revolutionary processes in antagonistic societies. However, advocating these ideas, Marx, Engels and Lenin have always pointed to the need to reckon with the entire complexity and changeability of the actual historical process. By contrast bourgeois sociology tends to consider revolution outside its historical environment and comes up with abstract schemata. Let us see what the doctrines of Western scholars designed to counter the Marxist-Leninist theory of the genesis of social revolutions have to say.

Diametrically opposed opinions and approaches immediately come to light. Many bourgeois authors make use of concepts offered by Marxist-Leninist theory but, more often than not, these concepts are twisted to mean something

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[5] Mark N. Hagopian, *Regimes, Movements, and Ideologies. A Comparative Introduction to Political Science*, New York, 1978, p. 285.

[6] L. Stone, "Theories of Revolution" in: *World Politics*, 1965, Vol. 18, No. 1, New Haven, p. 106.

else. A case in point is the division between subjective and objective causes or prerequisites of revolution current in the Marxist classification of revolutions. Bourgeois classifications, even when they employ Marxist concepts, end up being essentially very different. For example, bourgeois researchers completely ignore class contradictions and list economic, social, political and religious factors under the heading "objective", and the so-called psychological factors under "subjective". And, although they recognize the leading place of economics in the origin and development of revolutionary movements, bourgeois sociologists never stop trying to discredit the Marxist interpretation of the economic factors of social revolution by opposing it with their own models.

Wide currency has recently been given to the doctrine of Alexis de Tocqueville, a 19th-century French scholar, author of the books *Democracy in America* and *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. These works produced quite a stir at the time of their publication. De Tocqueville's doctrine was essentially feudal and conservative and was turned against the then progressive bourgeois democracy. Later, it became one of the major sources of the ideology of modern conservatism. But de Tocqueville was also one of the first non-Marxian European sociologists who came to realize the immense significance of revolutionary processes for the future of human society. The idea of an irreversible process—the triumph of equality, democracy or revolution—was the leading theme in de Tocqueville's work. "Withersoever we turn our eyes," he wrote, "we shall witness the same continual revolution ... The gradual development of the equality of conditions is therefore a providential fact ... it is universal, it is durable, it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as men contribute to its progress."[1]

The model of revolution evolved by de Tocqueville was aristocratic, anti-democratic, and intentionally opposed to the Marxist theory of revolution, which was represented in

[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Vol. 1, New York, 1900, p. 6.

crudely vulgarized terms. "There are basically two conflicting theories of the economic causes of revolutions," wrote W. F. Wertheim; "they are, to quote Lawrence Stone, 'the contradictory models of Marx and de Tocqueville, the one claiming that popular revolution is a product of increasing misery, the other that it is a product of increasing prosperity'."[8] In the 20th century, when the revolutionary movement began to spread, de Tocqueville's model has won ever broad recognition and is developed, for the most part, by the conservative trend. Crane Brinton, a prominent representative of the American branch of the sociology of revolution, wrote: ". . .as we look at economic life in these societies in the years preceding revolution, we note first that these societies have been on the whole prosperous, although certain groups feel that governmental policies are against their particular economic interests."[9]

Later, de Tocqueville's model was used and further developed by the American researcher, James G. Davies, who maintains that revolutions usually occur not when the hardships and privations are at their worst but when periods of improvement and progress, which have bred optimism and hope, give way to sudden and rapid decline. This is when discontent flows over as a consequence of profound disappointment and collapse of hope. In other words, revolution is engendered neither by poverty nor by satiety but by a real situation in which social progress is not as rapid as has been expected.

Setting such conceptions against the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, modern Western scholars researching the causes of revolution state that Marx's model is valid for only one type of revolutions, revolutions in backward countries, and can do nothing to elucidate the genesis of revolutions in bourgeois societies. Such assertions are made in an attempt to represent the Marxist theory as obsolete and inapplicable to the industrially developed capitalist countries of the West. This is the objective pursued when Marxism is

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[8] W. F. Wertheim, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

[9] C. Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, New York, 1965, pp. 35-36.

opposed to the doctrine advanced by de Tocqueville and his followers.

Rejecting the Marxist-Leninist theory of the basic contradiction lying at the roots of class antagonisms in exploiter society, i.e., the conflict between the growing productive forces and the obsolete production relations, bourgeois sociologists highlight the factors of the socio-psychological category. They ascribe to Marxism an oversimplified interpretation of the causes of revolution and an underestimation of extra-economic factors, whose role in the modern revolutionary process has recently been growing.

But the classics of Marxism-Leninism have never reduced the explanation of the genesis of revolution to strictly economic causes, e.g., a low living standard. They have always considered the sum total of the causes that combine to produce a revolution: not only economic to which primary importance is attached, but social, political, psychological and cultural causes as well. Defining the features of revolutionary situation, Lenin named, apart from "the suffering and want of the oppressed classes", "a crisis in the policy of the ruling class" and "a considerable increase in the activity of the masses", drawn "into independent historical action".[10] Further on, Lenin specifically emphasized that this general law is subject to change depending on the concrete situation.

The history of the modern revolutionary movement in developed capitalist countries (for example, the May events of 1968 in France, the mass actions of students in France and Spain in 1986 and 1987, the rebellions of the Black population and national minorities in the USA in the 1960s) has shown that the working people are fighting not only for the improvement of their economic situation, but for their social rights and democratic freedoms as well. Recent years have seen the growing change-over from purely economic forms of struggle to democratic social demands. In a context of the mounting scientific and technological revolution the working class intensifies its struggle to secure the access of its representatives to the policy-making in the

[10] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, 1978, pp. 213-14.

sphere of science and technology, since the ill-founded, chaotic modernization of enterprises carried out by monopolies in their self-seeking interests leads to mass unemployment and poverty. The working class sedulously advocates better living and working conditions, and an improved system of social insurance, the democratization of public education and the extension of civil rights. The striving for emancipation from all forms of capitalist oppression is the true source of the working people's revolutionary drive today.

Disagreeing with the Marxist proposition that economic factors play the decisive role in the emergence of revolutionary processes, many bourgeois theorists insist on the priority of political factors over economic factors, believing that economic conditions are an insufficient cause for the emergence of revolutions. "Massive poverty and exploitation in and by themselves are not enough to provide a revolutionary situation," wrote the American sociologist, Barrington Moore.[11] W. F. Wertheim also stated: "Since revolutions ... essentially embody a fundamental change within a political structure, it is obvious that we should try to define a pre-revolutionary situation primarily in political terms."[12]

Bourgeois researchers' analysis of political factors furnishes further proof of their desire to represent Marxist-Leninist theory as obsolete. They insist that the political factors emphasized by Marxists (harsh repressions, suppression of freedom, etc.) may engender revolutions only in non-democratic societies, under backward despotic regimes. Revolutions in democratic (i.e., bourgeois.—*Authors)* societies allegedly arise as an exception. "Economic growth and increasing vertical social mobility may produce a revolutionary movement if there is an intransigent elite that clings to its traditional privileges and if the political system is preponderantly authoritarian."[13]

The theories discussed above are designed to disprove the

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[11] B. Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston, 1966, p. 220.

[12] W. F. Wertheim, *op.cit.*, p. 200.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 202.

fact that revolution, above all in capitalist countries, develops in conformity with natural laws. Revolution is supposedly likely to occur in backward societies, while in bourgeois societies it is not at all inevitable. Revolution is a consequence of "utter distress". Moderation and good sense displayed by the ruling classes would safeguard "democratic" societies from danger. The anti-Marxist edge of such conceptions is apparent. They presume to furnish an explanation not only of past experiences but the present as well. Their main thrust is directed, above all, against modern revolutionary movements in the leading capitalist states. The active, revolutionary way of changing society is superceded by that of petty concessions and partial reforms aimed at perpetuating the capitalist system of exploitation.

The determination of Western sociology to regard revolution as an accident is clearly evident in its treatment of the issue of "accelerators of revolution". This concept was introduced to Western sociology by Chalmers Johnson, who holds that the knowledge of traditional factors is insufficient to get at the roots of revolution; a new set of factors, which he termed "accelerators of revolution", is required. A similar category, differently labeled ("precipitants"), has been employed by Harry Eckstein in his conception of "internal wars".[14]

Johnson's category of "accelerators" embraces a whole range of special circumstances, such as "the crippling of the armed forces through a defeat in war, a mutiny, or dissension within elite circles"; and "an ideological belief according to which the forces of a status quo elite can be incapacitated through direct action against them".[15]

Marxist-Leninist theory does not at all oppose the operation of "catalysts" accelerating the revolutionary process to the objective character of social revolution. The principal source of revolutions in antagonistic societies is the objective laws of social development. The "catalysts" are in no way able to alter the objective, law-governed course of the

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[14] H. Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars" in: *History and Theory*, Vol. IV, No 2, 1965, pp. 133-63.

[15] Ch. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, London, 1966, p. 153.

revolutionary process; they can only speed up its ripening. Despite the twists and turns, the revolutionary tendency is bound to make a way for itself by force of objective necessity.

Western scholars tend to regard "accelerators" as the sole cause of revolution. It is implied that without them, revolution as such would have been non-existent. They have been known to name the defeat of tsarism in the Russo-Japanese War as the cause of the Russian Revolution of 1905-07, and the financial difficulties of Louis XVI's government as the cause of the French Revolution of 1789-1794.

Chalmers Johnson, for instance, attached such overwhelming importance to the "accelerators" that in his doctrine they have nearly assumed the aspect of automatic "triggers". His idea is that such an "accelerator" is amply able to immediately set off a revolution. This position is essentially the same as that of extreme leftist elements, who have always maintained that revolution may be triggered artificially by terrorist or other violent acts.

The bourgeois view of the role of "accelerators" cancels out the objective character of revolutionary turnabouts in the development of human society. Revolutions are given the status of an accident. Suffice it to recollect the idea of Lawrence Stone, i.e., that "revolution is never inevitable".

Disregard of material prerequisites of the revolutionary way of changing society compels bourgeois scholars to turn to subjectivism and idealism for explanations. The struggle between classes engendered by objective material conditions in exploiter societies is supplanted by the struggle between "values" and ideas. Crane Brinton, for one, accounts for the growing revolutionary vigor of the masses by a specific psychological state of society. In doing so, he lays particular emphasis on two facts. The first is the emergence of an increasing number of competing ideologies which oppose the social status quo and around which, these generators of dangerous ideas, all thinking people are rallying. The second fact is the emergence of a special social type of personality, the medium of revolutionary psychology and propagandizer of new vital values, who is personified, in Brin-

ton's opinion, by the Eternal Figaro, the protagonist of Beaumarchais' famous comedy. Brinton holds that "the revolution is already almost full-blown in Figaro" and that he is a character embodying the features of counter-elite, consistently inspiring protest among those in his direct environment.[16]

Replacement of the class antagonism by the struggle of old and new values is a characteristic feature of recent works in this field. Raymond M. Momboisse, an American jurist, also looks for the chief source of revolution and the psychology of the individual in the conflict between the personality and his environment, which breeds discontent and mental instability. The root of the conflict, he believes, is "the failure of society to recognize values that the individual may cherish."[17]

It is, of course, indisputable that the emergence of new, progressive ideas and ethical values, of a new hero mirrors the growth of self-awareness of the more advanced social strata, and testifies to the growing influence of the historically progressive classes and of their critical attitude to the old system, customs and the members of doomed ruling classes. But it is just as indisputable that the emergence of new ideas and a new hero with his changed world outlook and mentality, of the man of a pre-revolutionary epoch (for the French society before 1789 Figaro was such a man), is a manifestation of in-depth social processes which are directly responsible for revolutionary events in human history. Not the clash between the old and the new values, not the moral discontent of the individual, but the struggle between the doomed classes and the classes that are ready to replace them, the struggle rooted in objectively existing contradictions—this is what propels society toward revolutionary change.

Bourgeois sociology has recently been making a great effort to introduce a systems approach to the study of revolutionary movements. Associated with this are attempts

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[16] C. Brinton, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68.

[17] R. M. Momboisse, *Blueprint of Revolution. The Rebel, the Party, the Techniques of Revolt*, Springfield, Illinois, 1970, p. 13.

to work out unified structures when classifying phenomena which fall under the heading of revolution, and to "simulate" the revolutionary process. British scholars Stephen J. Andriole and Gerald W. Hopple are even inclined to regard all research in the field from the angle of the evolution from traditional descriptive, non-theoretical works toward more complex, so-called "quantitative" research based on the use of mathematical methods. The first category incorporates the works of the so-called "natural history" school (the works of Crane Brinton and his followers are an example of this approach). While this trend is engaged in an analysis of individual aspects of revolution, champions of the second trend make a point of embracing the maximum number of cases and data which are combined and systematized in a variety of ways to form multivariant systems.[18] On this foundation, a group of Western sociologists of the new generation has built a unified classification of the causes of revolution, which reduces the entire sum of the factors under analysis to three major categories: 1) long-term factors; 2) middle-term factors; 3) short-term factors. However, the number of factors listed by different authors under these categories varies, and may be larger or smaller as they see fit.

The first category usually embraces such factors as 1) economic growth; 2) technical advances; 3) scientific achievements; 4) democratization of a system; 5) secularization; 6) modernization of a state; 7) the growth of nationalism, etc.

Each of these factors, or their combinations, are supposedly able to provide causes or prerequisites for a revolution, since they have a most universal and long-lasting effect. As we see, even the first category unites, on an equal footing, economic, political and social factors really belonging to different categories. The authors make no effort to distinguish between the primary (decisive) and secondary factors, and do not identify the specifics of their operation in concrete historical circumstances.

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[18] St. J. Andriole and G. W. Hopple, *Revolution and Political Instability. Applied Research Methods*, London, 1984, p. 19.

It is asserted further on that long-term factors to a certain extent pave the way for the emergence of factors with a shorter term of action. The appearance of the latter may also be a result, as bourgeois sociologists assert, of more restricted cyclical changes. Considered under the heading of "middle-term" factors are 1) economic depression; 2) alienation of intellectuals; 3) discord and corruption among the ruling elite of society; 4) wars; 5) collapse of or failure in government policies.

Much the same as the first, the second category brings together factors which ought to be referred to different categories. They are considered outside the concrete historical environment and are juggled with as the authors see fit.

It is interesting that when building their multivariant structures, bourgeois sociologists frequently use Marxist terminology. "If an appropriate combination of long-term and middle-term factors reaches a certain conjuncture, a revolutionary situation exists."[19] The need to reckon with the degree of maturity of the conditions making a revolution possible, and the presence of a revolutionary situation have been noted by other bourgeois authors as well.

These borrowed terms point to a certain influence of Marxism on modern bourgeois ideology. However, it seems that Western scholars borrow the terminology and individual tenets of dialectical materialism more for the purpose of concealing the anti-Marxist edge of their theories. This smoke screen is sometimes used to make their arguments seem more radical than they really are in order to play up to those sections of capitalist society that are leaning toward left-wing radicalism and Marxism.

The third category covers various ungovernable subjective factors. These are assigned a place of particular importance. Mark Hagopian said: "It then requires precipitating factors, planned or unplanned as the case may be, to cause the revolution to break out in the fullest sense of the term."[20]

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[19] Mark N. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, p. 186.
[20] *Ibid.*

In his view, it is this type of factor that acts as the detonator which triggers a revolution.

The advent of the pluralistic approach to the analysis of the genesis of revolution has also produced works based on the use of the comparative method of research, which amounts to a synthesis of the historical approach and multivariant analysis and is supposed to help avoid the extremes of the quantitative method. The appearance of the comparative method of bourgeois sociological research is associated with its attempts to evolve "global" theories of social development, such as modernization and post-industrialism, which require extensive historical and geographical comparative research. The most prominent champions of this trend are scholars like S. N. Eisenstadt, author of works on comparative analysis of civilizations and one of the theorists of modernization. It is, however, worthy of note that this mind-staggering scope of comparative analysis is originally to be found in works by Marx and Engels. Their research into the laws of succession of socio-economic formations at different historical epochs and among different peoples fully merits the name of a scientific achievement. An invaluable contribution to the development of this method was made by Lenin's analysis of the place of Russia in the capitalist world system. The comparative historical method has long held a solid position in Soviet research and in Marxist analysis in other countries.

One of the leading representatives of bourgeois comparativism engaged in researching the genesis of revolution is Theda Skocpol. She distinguishes three groups of factors producing revolution: 1) structural; 2) international; and 3) highlighting the role of the state. The first group is associated with what can also be termed as objective factors, i.e., mainly the contradictions between social and national groups inside the country, which stem from the existing system of class relations in society. The second group deals with the external influences on the situation within a country standing on the brink of revolution and this country's position in the world economic system. T. Skocpol points out that relations of inequality and competition between states promote destabilization of society

and undermine its class structure. The third group is singled out on the ground of the author's understanding of the role of the state as an independent force, which is not to be associated with socio-economic relations and contradictions but has a logic all its own and pursues its own interests. T. Skocpol holds that social revolutions are at present possible only in backward countries.

The Skocpol's theory of causality presents a curious medley of vulgarized Marxism and idealistic views on the supraclass role of the state. Recognition of the significance of individual objective factors in the development of revolutionary movements, specifically, of social contradictions and the plunder of the developing states by the transnationals, coexists with disregard for the vital Marxist tenets on the contradiction between productive forces and production relations as the prime mover of historical development and for the role of the more advanced classes, above all the working class, in the revolutionary process. Skocpol draws an arbitrary dividing line between objective and subjective factors when analyzing the causes of revolution and speaks against the need for the enhancement of the masses' revolutionary self-awareness as a major condition of successful revolutionary action. People cannot be the prime movers of revolution, she maintains. The revolutionary situation grows out of a military and political crisis of the state and the system of class rule. The sharp edge of Skocpol's causality theory is turned against the concept of the leading role of the working class in the modern revolutionary process. To relegate revolutions to the Third World means to underestimate the importance of the revolutionary struggle against monopolies and various forms of capitalist exploitation being waged by the working people and headed by the working class in the industrialized capitalist countries of the West. Skocpol views the revolutionary processes in developing countries as a consequence of contradictions between the state and the top stratum of the land-owning classes, while the revolutions themselves as peasant revolts led by the elite.

A scientific analysis of the causes producing a revolutionary outburst is replaced by bourgeois sociology with es-

sentially the same old descriptive structure. An in-depth study is substituted by a game of patience, by the building of diverse combinations that follow one another in quick succession but which reduce the genesis of revolution to a number of factors arranged in a completely haphazard fashion. But, since the required combination (as bourgeois researchers assert) arises only very rarely, the emergence of revolution is a chance phenomenon and not a regularity. Mark Hagopian stated quite unequivocally: "The total package of factors leading to outbreak can be called the 'antecedent conditions'."[21] This makes it clear that the purpose of the "positive" theories and hypotheses advanced by bourgeois scholars, just like the purpose behind rejecting a strictly scientific explanation of the genesis of revolution, is, in fact, to prove that social revolution is no more than a chance occurrence. They do their best to "bury" the major, decisive factors leading to a revolution under a heap of allegedly newly discovered "factors", under bulky combinations of arbitrarily selected factors. And all this is represented as the latest word in social science.

The building of increasingly sophisticated structures is accompanied by unceasing attempts to find fault with the clear and well-substantiated Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the genesis of social revolutions. Severing this doctrine's theoretical portion from its practical (the so-called practical model of revolution) portion, bourgeois authors hope to reduce it to a featureless scheme that would resemble their own mechanistic efforts, to dissociate the theory of Marxism from its revolutionary practice. Their purpose is to knock the ground from under the feet of Marxism, making its further development impossible.

Dissection of Marxism is designed to deal a blow at Marx's major theoretical proposition on the presence of antagonistic class contradictions in exploiter societies which necessarily give rise to the class struggle in its highest form—revolution. Ralf Dahrendorf, a bourgeois sociologist, insists that whether or not class antagonism is the decisive

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[21] Mark N. Hagopian, *Regimes, Movements, and Ideologies. A Comparative Introduction to Political Science*, p. 284.

cause of social conflict is a moot point. Having placed in doubt the validity of this Marxist tenet, he proceeds to put in question the usefulness of Marxism as a whole in an analysis of the causes of revolution. But, of course, bourgeois science not only doubts but directly challenges Marxism.

In contrast to bourgeois sociological conceptions, the Marxist-Leninist theory offers a strictly scientific, materialist explanation of the causes of social revolution, which reveals the objective character of any real revolution. This theory substantiates the objective need for a revolutionary transformation of society.

Marxist theory rests on the concept of succession of socio-economic formations, which is dependent on the growth of productive forces. The transition to a higher formation is prepared by the entire course of development of society's productive forces, which promotes the shaping of new production relations inside the old system. The emergence, under certain economic conditions, of a new mode of production, which enters into a conflict with the obsolete system of production relations, engenders the material prerequisites for drastic social change. Consequently, the main cause of social revolutions is the conflict between the new productive forces and the old production relations, which obstruct the former's progress. Marx pointed this out in his preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.*[22] Bourgeois sociology has always rejected point-blank this major element of Marxist theory, since its acceptance would signify not only recognition of the materialist understanding of history but also of the transient nature of the capitalist system and its historical demise.

Western ideologists insist that Marxism is hidebound and crude, seeking as it does to reduce the entire diversity and complexity of factors causing revolution to economic and production factors. But this is not true; what is more, Marxism-Leninism does not believe that economic factors will operate automatically, and takes care to attach due importance to the influence of the superstructure and the

[22] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works,* pp. 181-182.

basis. The conflict between productive forces and production relations is the basis of social revolution in the proper sense of the word, but it is not its sole or all-embracing cause, for a whole range of significant factors stem from this basis.

The development of productive forces exerts a revolutionizing influence on all aspects of the life of society. The conflict between the new productive forces and the old production relations generates clashes between classes, with each of them acting as a medium for either new and progressive or old ideas. While one group of classes is fighting to preserve the social and political system formed on the basis of the old relations of production, the other group is campaigning to abolish it and establish a more progressive social and political system, based on the new relations of production. The classes that personify new socio-economic relations are revolutionary classes. They are fighting for the abolition of the old and the establishment of new state power so as to use this power to complete the destruction of the old and the building of new production relations. The old classes, i.e., those in power, are naturally trying to hold on to power and would spare no effort to protect their position, their privileges and their wealth. Consequently, the revolutionary classes are faced with the task of wrenching the state power from the hands of the reactionary classes, i.e., accomplishing a social revolution to smash the old economic order hampering the progress of new productive forces. These are the basic causes of social revolution described in the most general terms.

Chapter Four

The Theory of the Revolutionary Process

Modern bourgeois sociology displays an extremely subjectivist approach to the analysis of the very mechanism of social revolution, which fact is particularly manifested in its refusal to recognize the class nature of revolution. To counter Marxist-Leninist theory, Western researchers have advanced a multitude of various conceptions. Some of these have gained wide currency in the West; they are handed down from generation to generation of scholars, developed and modified. A knowledge of these conceptions is essential for understanding modern trends in the bourgeois sociology of revolution.

Among the more influential of theories in bourgeois sociology, especially in American sociology, are theories of a power elite. These theories are designed to directly counter the Marxist theory of classes and the class struggle, disprove the idea of the class basis of the revolutionary process, and substantiate the concept of the permanence and necessity of social inequality. The principal tenets of the modern theory of the power elite were developed in the early 20th century by Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Roberto Michels, who are known in the West as the classics of elitism. A central tenet of this theory is that of the impossibility of political administration by the majority of a society. Champions of elitism maintain that it is always some more or less organized minority that makes decisions obligatory for the society at large. Each of the three founding fathers of the elitist school of bourgeois sociology put his own name to this minority. Mosca talked about the "ruling" (or "political") class, while Michels, using Marxist terminology, referred to it as "oligarchy" in his "iron law of oligarchy".[1] The term elite, which is now among

[1] Under this law, the ruling "stratum" seeks to perpetuate

the most common ones in bourgeois sociology, was first introduced by Pareto (although in his earlier works he referred to this minority as aristocracy).

Vilfredo Pareto, a noted Italian economist and sociologist, is the author of perhaps the most thoroughly developed elitist theory of the revolutionary process. His theory regards revolution as a means of securing the "circulation" of the elite. What does this amount to? According to Pareto and other theorists of elitism, mankind has at all times been divided into elite and non-elite. By elite, Pareto implies all outstanding personalities who have made a name for themselves in the various branches of human activity. However, he points out, in societies as they actually exist, a person often qualifies for the elite not on the strength of his talents and abilities but because of his social status. In other words, the people at the top of the social hierarchy are not always the most deserving. If the majority of the elite is made up of truly gifted, active and competent persons, Pareto states, the society has a high degree of stability. But if the discrepancy between status and personal achievement is too great and the ruling elite proves insolvent, various forms and degrees of instability, up to revolution, may, and do, arise.

Pareto maintains that social stability must be secured by a constant "circulation" of the elite: new people from other social strata who measure up to a high standard must be constantly introduced into the elite, while incompetent persons must be ousted. Under this conceptual scheme, revolutions are treated as restricted phenomena which are not inevitable; they are assigned the function of a safety valve which makes it possible to avoid more formidable and sudden catastrophes that could threaten the very existence of society.

As a form of "circulation" of the elite, Pareto believes, revolutions perform a vitally important social function—that of clearing up the channels of social mobility. If this "circulation" is not made smooth and timely by peaceful

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its position of power and has a tendency to turn into a closed group.

or revolutionary action, the society will cease to exist, either through disintegration or loss of national independence.

Pareto gives an extremely narrow interpretation of the significance of revolution, viewing it as "elite circulation". In his opinion, revolutions, which represent an overturn effected through violence, act as a powerful medicine, or rather a surgeon's knife in the hands of the ruling top stratum to save the ruling class as a whole. In actual fact, this type of "revolution" is nothing but a military putsch. It was precisely this character that marked the fascist coups in Italy and Germany. Incidentally, some of Pareto's emotional monologues on the subject of revolution resound with the echo of Nietzscheanic ideas of national and racial superiority which gained such wide currency in the ideology of fascism. Pareto declares that the future will be willing to forgive terror and violence inherent in revolutions, since they supposedly herald the appearance of strong and vigorous personalities to replace the weak and irresolute.

This understanding of social revolution can hardly be considered sound. It distorts the essence of revolutions, which actually serve to promote the interests of the broad masses of working people, not of minorities. They are aimed at liberating the people economically, socially and culturally. In fact, in Pareto's conception revolution is replaced by a coup of the elite, inspired by the mentality and psychology of the ruling minority. By making no mention of social contradictions and conflicts and by concentrating on the processes of "natural circulation" within elite groups, Pareto hopes to deal a blow against the very core of revolutionary Marxism—its doctrine of the class struggle. He completely ignores the fact that in today's world restricted elite groups cannot possibly be conceived as the motive forces behind revolutionary processes. Revolutions are accomplished by classes, not personalities or groups of persons.

The elitist conceptions advanced by the first generation of researchers were carried further by the next generation, specifically, C. Wright Mills and Guido Dorso. They concentrated mostly on studying the nature of the political power of elites as the ruling sections of society. This issue was

hardly examined at all by the "classics" of elitism. Although Pareto used the concepts "power elite" and "nonpower elite", he did not elaborate them and in fact made no distinction between them. In Mills' view, Pareto shirked the issue of the elite's political functions altogether and therefore was incapable of separating the elite as one group which possesses political power and another which does not. According to Mills, Pareto failed to tie up the issue of society's political stratification with other forms of stratification stemming from social status and wealth. Thus, he concludes, Pareto's conception lacks many of the political links essential for understanding the mechanism of the revolutionary process. Obviously, Mills is not attempting to overturn the elitist theory but, on the contrary, is seeking to amplify and develop it for the purpose of finding practical ways to attain the targets set by bourgeois ideology: to protect and consolidate the capitalist system.

Taking a critical stand toward the elitist theories advanced by the older generation on the ground of their incoherent definition of the elite, Mills tried to single out the main social groups at the summit of the political pyramid of American society which, he believed, have a decisive effect on national decision-making, i.e., on the execution of political power. The results of his research provided the basis for his theory of the "power elite".[2]

Having analyzed the social power structure in the USA, Mills defined three main levels within it. The first, highest level incorporates a small group representing a political directory of sorts which governs the country and makes major political decisions. It embraces the top military brass, leading business tycoons and Washington bureaucracy. "The power elite," he writes, "is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences... For they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives. They

[2] C. W. Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 4.

direct the military establishment. They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure, in which are now centered the effective means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity which they enjoy."[3]

Members of Congress, politicians of nation-wide or local importance and leaders of influential mass organizations and associations, e.g., trade unions, make up the second, or middle level, which has a certain say in political decision-making. The rest, according to Mills, are just a politically powerless mass, an amorphous social stratum which comprises the third, lowest level, the bottom of the political pyramid. These are the three levels of Mills' stratification.

• Despite a number of sound and accurate observations and assessments of social and political developments under way in contemporary American society, Mills' conception of the power elite is far from objective. It conveys the ideology of the top ruling circles and regards society as divided not into classes but into the elite and the powerless masses.

Guido Dorso has devised another type of social stratification, although his point of departure is the same, i.e., the position of the various social strata in the power structure. Dorso's conception is marked by considerable eclecticism, attempting as it does to wed not only the elitist theories of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca but certain tenets of Marxism, e.g., that of class. He distinguishes two classes, the ruling and the ruled. It is interesting to note that in contrast to Dorso, Mills did not use the Marxist term of the ruling class, having replaced it by the "power elite". His reason is that Marx allegedly misused the term, failing to draw a dividing line between the concept "ruling" as having political meaning, and "class" as an economic term. However, it is a well-known fact that Marx never conceived of the term "class" as having a purely economic meaning.

Needless to say, Dorso's division of society into classes has nothing in common with the Marxist approach, which is based on the attitude to the means of production. The

[3] *Ibid.*

ruling class, as Dorso views it, is a power organization comprising political, intellectual and business leaders. However, Dorso does not specify the demarcation line which separates the ruling class from the ruled majority. He says nothing about which social groups make up this majority, nor what criteria are used to determine the social stratification. The use of Marxist terminology does not prevent Dorso's typology from ignoring the Marxist interpretation of classes. The economic core of the contradictions between the classes resulting in bitter class struggle that culminates in a social revolution is replaced by an idealistic treatment of these contradictions which are founded, as Dorso asserts, on the attitude to power. If an adequate mechanism of settling the power issue is found, Dorso maintains, the problem of revolutions will also be solved.

This is how Dorso sees the relationship between the two classes he has described. The first type of relationship implies that the most deserving members of the lower class have a sufficient number of channels for making their way into the higher, ruling class; in other words, the lower class is, in a manner of speaking, a reserve of the higher. The number of channels must grow all the time; otherwise, a breeding ground for revolution may appear. The second type of relationship presupposes that the traditional norms of relations between the two classes determine the hegemony of the ruling class; the latter regulates the vital functions of society so as to promote its interests and its advantage. This peaceful coexistence of classes lasts until the ruling class reaches a stage in which it becomes too restricted, a close corporation which is guided by its own selfish aims when administering society. In this case, too, either a revolution arises or the society degenerates.

Similar results, Dorso states, may also be produced by a split inside the ruling class itself, which comes to comprise a still more restricted group, the political class. This is that part of the ruling class which is directly engaged in the management of society and determines the current administrative policies. This group represents a political and administrative organization of the ruling class. What Dorso actually means by the political class is a "technical

instrument" of the ruling class. When this group ceases to represent the interests of the entire class and begins to act to its detriment, the latter is faced with the need to promptly modify its "instrument". If such a modification fails to produce results, a crisis situation may arise calling for the complete replacement of the "political class".

Under Dorso's theory, a revolutionary movement may arise when the ruling class displays its incompetence in management, or is unable to resolve a conflict in a way that would promote the interests of society at large. If even in a crisis situation the ruling class retains its ability to incorporate the best representatives of society, i.e., of the nascent elite from among the ruled class, the revolutionary situation that has evolved will be resolved in one way or another. In this case, members of the new elite are incorporated in the ruling class, infuse new life into it, consolidate society, and, what is most important, remove the "camarilla", which obstructs the smooth and efficient functioning of the political class. Guido Dorso calls this sequence of events a "political revolution". It is obvious, however, that what he really means is not a revolution but a political coup, since it implies not the replacement of the class at the helm by the one which personifies new production and social relations (the essence of any real revolution), but rather a banal reshuffle within the top ruling stratum. Dorso maintains that a social revolution arrives when the new elite is left outside the ruling class and rises against it.

Dorso's theory assigns the role of prime movers of progress and the motive forces of the revolutionary process to the elite, while the working classes are ignored. He refuses to recognize the class nature of revolutions, and thus the Marxist terminology used in his scheme is proved to be an alien element. The latter serves only to mislead the average reader, since in actual fact the bourgeois theories of the power elite are spearheaded against the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution.

One of the variations of the elitist approach that seeks to overturn Marxism is the theory of managerial revolution (or revolution of the managers) advanced by American

sociologist James Burnham.[4] This author professes to recognize the leading role of economic factors in the organization of social relations, but maintains that as the importance of control and management mounts in modern industry, producing even greater alienation of property from production, the capitalist era is fast approaching its end. Echoing Pareto and Mosca, he holds that the new society will be egalitarian, with the function of administration assumed by the new ruling class—the managers. The transition to this new, managerial society is termed the managerial revolution. In Burnham's view, it is not ownership in itself but actual control over production that is the strategic factor which allows any group to maintain political control over the life of society. In the period of capitalism, which, as Burnham believes, reached its peak a hundred years ago, the capitalists were truly the ruling class, being not only the propertied group but the one in control of the principal means of production and exchange. At present, as Burnham maintains, the capitalist class no longer controls production and, consequently, has ceased to be the ruling class. It has given way to a class of managers, persons who are managing things in the broadest sense of the word. Burnham's theory obscures the fact that in present-day bourgeois society, monopoly capital has retained its position of dominance by resorting to more sophisticated forms of control and management of production, fusing with the state apparatus, and employing new forms of exploitation. The bitter class antagonisms between labour and capital still exist. Consequently, the objective need for the class struggle of the working people against capitalist monopolies remains, and the working class has to retain its leading role in this struggle.

Even though Burnham's theory of the managerial revolution did not win universal recognition and is disputed by many scholars, his research into the role of technocracies in modern society strongly affected the shape of later elitist-technocratic theories of the most conservative brand,

[4] J. Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution. What Is Happening in the World*, New York, 1941.

such as Zbigniew Brzezinski's doctrine of the technotronic society and the conceptions advanced by Herman Kahn, Anthony Wiener and several other researchers concentrating on anti-democratic, totalitarian aspects of technocratism.

Elitist theories are widely used by bourgeois sociology, above all in the USA, to counter the Marxist teaching. Although American scholars had no part in the founding of elitism, it is precisely in the USA that its ideas gained the broadest recognition and development. It is there that elitist ideas found their most fertile soil, long cultivated by many of the trends in American philosophy. The greatest impact on modern American sociology was made by the philosophy of pragmatism and its later branch, instrumentalism. Founders of these schools (William James, John Dewey, and Sidney Hook) developed the conception of the personality as the maker of history and social progress, and attempted to revive the rather worn-out theory of "the hero and the crowd". The traits of the big entrepreneur, who in the 20th century has become the main hero in the life of American society, are clearly perceptible in the definitions "man of business" and "event-maker", whom Hook proclaims as the maker of human history. Ideas of pragmatism have provided the theoretical basis for modern American elitist conceptions.

Leaving intact the foundations of the elitist conceptions developed by their predecessors, modern researchers are working to sharpen their edge and make them more coherent from the point of view of bourgeois science. In particular, they object to the use of Marxist terminology and to the stratification schemes of dividing society into groups along the economic principle.

From a definitely conservative stand, Mark Hagopian has levelled criticism against Guido Dorso for his pseudo-striving to represent the political process as contingent on socio-economic factors. He states that Dorso's theory "underestimates the degree of autonomy of the political class or elite". ' Political power," he adds, "is an end in itself... We merely acknowledge that the struggle for power often assumes the aspect of a game played for its own stakes. That no revolution is completely explicable in these terms

is the substance of the distinction between simple coup d'etat and revolution, but to exclude them *a priori* would be to impoverish our understanding of the revolutionary phenomenon."[5]

Bourgeois scholars do not admit that power and power struggle in antagonistic societies have a class bias, and this leads them to ignore the objective material contradictions inherent in exploiter societies. Refusing to recognize the dependence of political processes on economic factors or material conditions, they have adopted an extremely idealistic stance by attaching overwhelming significance to subjective factors. The assumption behind this stance is that the development of human society is not an objective and law-governed process, and that the processes of revolution are not conditioned by history.

The conservative position adopted by Mark Hagopian accounts for his objection to the very use of Marxist terminology, even if authors of certain elitist conceptions are using it to make great play in the hope of disguising the anti-Marxist edge of these conceptions and making them attractive to the more radical section of society. Hagopian, a representative of the conservative circles, is seeking to eliminate even the slightest traces of radicalism in the elitist theories which have attracted considerable attention and gained wide currency in the West, to make them more "respectable" and suitable for use by the top strata of bourgeois society. With this end in view, he proposes to stop using Marxist terms altogether. The terms "ruling class" and "political class" which occur in the writings of Guido Dorso and several other authors, are to be replaced by "purer" terms, e.g., "political elite", "counterelite", "middle elite", "nonelite", etc. As he puts it, they "seem most likely to maintain the distinctions between the three modes of stratification".[6]

Opposition to the use of Marxist terminology has been voiced by another modern American sociologist, S. N. Eisenstadt. His suggestion is that the elitist theory

[5] Mark N. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, New York, 1975, pp. 94-95.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

should adopt the concepts "center" and "periphery" which he uses to divide society into two diametrically opposed groups: the rulers and the ruled.[7] Eisenstadt reduces social development in all historical epochs to the relationship between these two groups; not surprisingly, the issue of the class struggle is once again ignored.

The corrections and amendments made in the elitist theories show that they increasingly convey the ideology of the more conservative quarters of capitalist society. Their form may have been updated, but their foundations—apologia for bourgeois society and idealization of individualism—have been left intact.

Marxism-Leninism rejects the interpretation of the elite as an abstract category which Western sociology refuses to treat in class terms. Bourgeois theories of the elite clash with the Marxist-Leninist theory of classes; the class approach in the study of society is illegitimately replaced by its division into the elite and the masses. Western scholars have set out to substantiate the old and somewhat worn-out thesis that history is made not by the masses but by a certain chosen section of society, usually the ruling class or its top echelons.

The elitist theories are extremely idealistic, for they in fact assume that social relations rest on psychological factors. The different degrees of natural talent and standards of intelligence, they believe, lead to the emergence of the elite, aristocrats of the spirit and the mind. Viewed from this angle, the elitist theories have a close affinity with the fascist theories of the master race.

The idealistic quality of the elitist theories is clearly manifest in their subjectivist treatment of modern revolutionary processes, and in ignoring the class nature of social revolutions. These theories refuse to recognize the primacy of production relations with respect to the political superstructure. This approach produces a too narrow interpretation of revolution as the struggle for power between elite groups, with the working masses, the working class above

[7] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies. A Comparative Study of Civilizations*, New York, 1978, pp. 37-38.

all, allegedly having no part in the revolutionary movement whose anti-capitalist edge is thereby negated. Deep down, the elitist theories are aimed at vindicating capitalism and protecting the capitalist system.

An understanding of the mechanism of the revolutionary process is impossible outside the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of socio-economic formations, which is based on the analysis of the conflict between obsolete and new production relations as the chief motive force of social revolution. This conflict assumes the form of contradictions between classes culminating in bitter class struggle, the highest form of which is revolution.

The revolutionary process leads to the ousting of the old socio-economic system by a new and more progressive one. In the modern epoch it is not the elite but the working class, the most consistent and determined opponent of capitalist relations based on private ownership, that personifies the new socialist production relations. It is the working class in alliance with the peasant masses and other working strata that is the mainstay and prime mover of the modern revolutionary movement, which, headed by the communist and workers' parties, sets itself the goal of overthrowing the capitalist system and building socialism throughout the world.

The emergence in the 1950s-1960s of new universal bourgeois theories of social development has produced the need for the earlier elitist conceptions to adapt to them and evolve new modifications. In their turn, the elitist conceptions have had a very strong impact on the formation of these new "global" theories of social development.

By the early 1960s, bourgeois sociology, especially its American branch, had evolved and given wide currency to the so-called theory of modernization, the brainchild of a large group of researchers, including Cyril Black, Walt Rostow, Talcott Parsons and S. N. Eisenstadt. The assumption behind the theory is that at a certain point of its history each human society enters a period of transformation, i.e., transition from the traditional, predominantly agrarian structure to the modern, industrial one. While the first stage is fairly static and slow to develop, the second is

highly dynamic and swift-moving, and may entail unforeseen consequences.

According to bourgeois sociologists, the process of modernization is of a universal and comprehensive nature. In the past decades, it has taken great hold over the developing countries. In the opinion of American researcher Wilbert E. Moore[8], modernization incorporates the concept of total transformation of the traditional or pre-modern society, a phenomenon which engenders the type of technology and corresponding social structure that are typical of industrially developed, economically flourishing and politically fairly stable countries of the West. James S. Coleman gives a still broader interpretation of modernization as "changes in all institutional spheres of a society resulting from man's expanding knowledge of and control over his environment". This "major transformative process" develops in a variety of directions; typically enough, Coleman does not dwell on the causes of this process. Apart from "secularization; commercialization; industrialization and an accelerated social mobility" he also points at "restratification; increased material standards of living; diffusion of literacy, education and mass media; national unification; and the expansion of popular involvement and participation" in transformation as aspects of the modernization process.[9]

Certain bourgeois authors have tried to use modernization conceptions to substitute modernization for the need for social revolution. The idea is that the so-called "peaceful", step-by-step modernization introduced by the power elite (in other words, modernization from the top) will eliminate the need for revolution, making the very issue absurd. S. N. Eisenstadt maintains that, having carried out modernization, Western states have safeguarded themselves from revolutionary explosions.[10]

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[8] W. E. Moore, *Order and Change. Essays in Comparative Sociology*, New York, 1967, pp. 23-24.

[9] J. S. Coleman, "Modernization. Political Aspects" in: *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 10, New York, 1968, p. 395.

[10] S. N. Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, pp. 322-23.

As for the developing countries, with reference to which even the most staunch champions of the modernization theory do not dare to give full guarantees against revolutions, many authors believe that the lesser evil would be "a revolution from above", accomplished by the new elite formed in the course of the modernization process. Analyzing one of the versions of a "revolution from above" (one carried out by the military-bureaucratic elite) Ellen Kay Trimberger, an American sociologist, discerns in it the entire set of features of a revolution, engendered by the modernization process.[11] Revolutions from above, which are in fact military coups, are considered by some Western political scientists to be the most suitable alternative to revolution having a broad social basis. And this is only to be expected, since the latter, by the admission of the authors themselves, are fraught with much more extensive social changes[12] and, therefore, with much graver danger for the positions of the Western states in the Third World.

What is our comment on the theory of modernization? Marxist-Leninist science is quite willing to recognize that manifold modernization processes are always under way in the world. They are prompted by the growth of productive forces and the scientific, technological and social advances made by society. However, these processes have little in common with the way they are presented by the bourgeois conceptions of modernization, which avoid a class approach to the issue.

The treatment of the principal questions, i.e., by whom, how and in whose interests modernization along capitalist lines is introduced, exposes the limitations of these conceptions. They are strikingly elitist by nature, and betray the intention of monopoly capital to impose the capitalist pattern of development on the peoples of the Third World. Lying at the root of these conceptions is the assumption

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[11] E. K. Trimberger, *Revolution Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1978.

[12] J. A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation" in: *World Politics*, Princeton, April 1980, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, pp. 425-53.

that only the ruling top stratum, the elite, is able to lead, control and regulate modernization processes in society. "The traditional society," writes the Soviet researcher, Boris Starostin, "emerges from the majority of bourgeois conceptions of social development as a passive object of modernization, while the role of the subject or promoter is assigned to a small group of leaders termed the elite. The actual process of socio-economic development is represented as assimilation by the ruling elite of more 'up-to-date' value orientations, and its introduction of the 'universality of the modern West'."[13]

The authors of these conceptions disregard the fact that the modernization processes are only a consequence of more in-depth economic and social changes whose acceleration forcefully generates the need, not for partial modernization from above, but for drastic economic and social transformations, i.e., a social revolution.

A case in point is the anti-Shah popular movement in Iran in 1979, which clearly revealed the restricted and reactionary essence of the reforms introduced by the Shah regime to promote the interests of the ruling elite in disregard of those of the people. The wish of the Shah to modernize the country "from above" via the so-called White Revolution, i.e., the introduction of the latest scientific and technological advances in individual restricted branches of the national economy, determined the one-sidedness of Iran's national development. Given the obsolete political and social system, this course not only failed to genuinely transform the country and remove the grave domestic contradictions, but has even served to exacerbate them and produce a social explosion of immense force—an anti-monarchist and anti-imperialist revolution. However, the consequences of this anti-popular modernization were making themselves felt after the "White Revolution" was over and better proved to be fatal for the Iranian people. The attempt at Western-type modernization that compromised

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[13] B. Starostin, "Bourgeois Conceptions of Modernization and the Prospects for the Third World", *World Economics and International Relations,* Moscow, 1977, No. 7, p. 108 (in Russian).

itself in the eyes of the people was responsible not so much for the assimilation of the West's technological achievements as for the adoption of its social evils to be redoubled by the extant feudal and monarchist survivals. This modernization discredited the very idea of national revival and the remodelling of the society and brought about a strong reaction against the attempts to Westernize national culture, values and customs. The demands that a return should be made to the old moral principles and way of life culminated in the victory of the most rabid conservative forms of Muslim traditionalism. All this caused a tragic about-face in the evolution of the Iranian Revolution and its subsequent degeneration.

A number of modernization theories have been employed by bourgeois ideologists to distort the essence of social revolution and offer an anti-Marxist interpretation of the revolutionary process. One of the most popular conceptions which stand opposed to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of social revolutions is that of Samuel Huntington from the USA. His springboard is the universal theory of modernization; what he has to offer is a curious synthesis of this theory with elitist conceptions, specifically, the one evolved by C. Wright Mills.

Huntington defines revolution as a crisis of political modernization. Political modernization, according to his conception, is different from other forms of modernization, above all from the economic form, whose purpose is to turn society from agrarian into industrially developed. As for political modernization, it "involves the extension of political consciousness to new social groups and the mobilization of these groups into politics".[14] As a result, the groups and strata which have traditionally been ignored as politically unresponsive rise swiftly to an awareness of the fact that politics is a matter of vital concern to them and that the decision-making carried out by the central political authority has a direct bearing on their future. They

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[14] S. P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, 1970, p. 266.

become increasingly conscious of the need and ability to make a more or less constant contribution to this decision-making or otherwise affect it.

According to S. Huntington, political modernization is the main trend of this process and it involves the democratization of the political institutions of society and its political consciousness. In its turn, political modernization encourages "the creation of political institutions sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent to absorb and to order the participation of these new groups...". In the hands of the elite, these institutions turn into an important means of promoting social and economic change in the society. Huntington notes that although participation of new social groups in politics is determined by long-term social and economic factors, the problems involved in enhancing the vigor of these groups are purely political.

If the existing political institutions are flexible enough to stand up to the pressure exerted by the growing rate of participation of new social groups in political life, revolution, according to him, is impossible. Neither is it possible in a situation where the power elite is able to introduce timely reforms to adapt these institutions to the changing conditions.

Huntington seeks to restrict the boundaries of the contemporary revolutionary process to purely political change, naming the alteration of political institutions, democratization, etc., as the content and goal of revolution. Left outside these boundaries are the vital, profound social and economic changes, the true goals of any genuine revolution, which in the works of bourgeois researchers are overshadowed by secondary aims. The idea behind the substitution is clear enough: to cripple the efforts of the people of newly-free states and prevent them from hitting the target —the position of international imperialist monopolies in the Third World. Huntington's conception singles out the so-called absolutely traditional societies, which are not yet susceptible to modernization, and completely modernized societies in which the modernization of political institutions has gone so far that they are fully able to live up to the demands set by the epoch. In both these cases, he states,

there is little danger of revolution, since the revolutionary movement will be hard put to find breeding ground for itself.

The greatest probability of revolution, as Huntington maintains, exists in societies which have already launched modernization but have not yet completed it. They have reached a certain standard of social and economic maturity and, as a result, made certain headway in enhancing the political awareness of the masses, but the processes of political modernization there lag behind social and economic changes. In such cases, it seems, a revolution is called for to close the gap between the rising standard of political consciousness of a wide cross-section of the population and the relatively lower level of political modernization. According to Huntington, revolution is nothing but a swift, decisive and violent elimination of the gap which opens up in the process of the modernization of a developing society.

What is the actual process of revolution as a means of political modernization? To bridge the gap between the standard of society's political development and the level of its political modernization the revolution abolishes the traditional political institutions and laws and creates new ones, as well as new political values and norms. The basis of this process is the transition of power to a new, more dynamic political elite and the establishment of more up-to-date political institutions.

However, revolution, Huntington holds, is not merely disintegration or overthrow of the obsolete social institutions. As he put it, "A complete revolution ... also involves a second phase: the creation and institutionalization of a new political order... The measure of how successful a revolution is is the authority and stability of the institutions to which it gives birth."[15] In his opinion, the successful revolution creates political institutions which are able to withstand pressures that grow in the process of modernization, being caused by great participation of the masses in the political life of society.

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[15] S. P. Huntington, *op.cit.*, p. 266.

On these grounds, Huntington tries to persuade the reader that the capitalist world has been insured from revolution. He asserts that the Western countries, with their "democratic" system, are revolution-proof thanks to adequate political institutions adapted to the conditions of industrially developed society, which are supposed to open up broad opportunities for popular participation in political life and decision-making. These views are hardly acceptable as truth, since the real state of affairs in terms of the political and civil rights of ordinary members of society in capitalist states is somewhat different. However, let this remain on the author's conscience. We should like to draw the reader's attention to another element of his conception. Huntington is forced to admit that the socialist states, the Soviet Union first and foremost, have stable political systems obviously meeting the requirements of their peoples and having a broadly popular character. This is in fact a recognition of the political authority and solidity of the socialist world system, and the need for the capitalist countries to reckon with the might of socialism.

The main object of Huntington's research is the developing countries which have shaken off colonial dependence and are faced with the need to make a choice that will decide their future. His target is to fit the transformational processes under way there into the Procrustean bed of his conceptual structure. Modern revolutions, he warns, are most likely to occur in the developing or transitional societies, since it is precisely there that the crisis of "political modernizations" will supposedly reach its most extreme form.

Huntington seeks to focus the attention of the capitalist states' ruling circles on the Third World, this vast region which is exerting considerable influence on international developments. It is doubtful that this attention stems from a concern for the destiny of the peoples of the newly-free countries; rather, it arises from the anxiety for the future of the capitalist world system, whose interests are seriously threatened by the revolutionary and national liberation movements unfolding in that part of the globe. In this situation, bourgeois ideologists are trying to divert the

efforts of the peoples in the Third World from the work to effect drastic and extensive social and economic change, and to "blunt" the revolutionary processes afoot there. They are hoping to supply pro-Western local leaders in a number of developing countries with recipes for avoiding revolution or directing the revolutionary energy into other channels. It is patently obvious that these are the ends pursued by Huntington's conception.

As distinct from representatives of classical elitism, Huntington cannot close his eyes to the working people's growing political self-consciousness and the increasing role of the masses in contemporary revolutionary movements, while advocating the traditional bourgeois ideas on the leading role of the elite in revolution. This author is looking for a formula that would enable him to reconcile the role of the elite in revolution with the growing importance of mass revolutionary action. The accent on popular participation in political life is what distinguishes Huntington's conception from many others. "In theory," he writes, "every social class which has not been incorporated into the political system is potentially revolutionary."[16]

The edge of Huntington's conception, which attempts a fusion of these two elements, is turned mostly against the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the socialist revolution as the highest type of social revolution in the present epoch. He refuses point-blank to recognize that contemporary revolution is essentially proletarian. In his view, two classes, the middle class in town and the peasantry in the countryside, have the decisive say in the emergence of a revolutionary situation. Thus, the role of the working class as the principal motive force of contemporary revolutions is completely ignored, which amounts to a refusal to recognize the need for the effort to accomplish a socialist revolution, and the anti-capitalist tenor of the major revolutionary movements of our time.

Huntington's conception refers to a new social category devised by bourgeois sociologists, the so-called middle class,

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[16] S. P. Huntington, *op.cit.*, p. 276.

as a representative of the elite, while the peasantry supposedly represents the masses.

As Huntington sees it, the "middle class" incorporates a multitude of diverse social categories: scientific workers, civil servants, army officers, teachers, lawyers, engineering and technology specialists, students, entrepreneurs and managers. He believes that the "middle class" is, on the whole, inclined toward revolution, although certain groups within it are more revolutionary than others. ". . .The middle class is the focus of opposition within the city; the intelligentsia is the most active oppositional group within the middle class; and the students are the most coherent and effective revolutionaries within the intelligentsia."[17]

One of the purposes behind the concept of the "middle class" is to disprove the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolutionary classes and the class struggle. The introduction of this social category is designed to upset the idea of the leading role of the working class in contemporary revolutionary movements. Besides, it pursues clearly apologetic ends. These two aspects are closely related and serve to promote the same objective: protection of the capitalist system. Realizing that capitalism has long discredited itself in the eyes of many people, Western ideologists are trying to gloss it over. Moreover, they are hoping to convince the working people that even today the bourgeoisie has retained some of its revolutionary potential.

It is with this end in mind that Huntington includes the capitalists into the social category termed the "middle class", which is in fact not a class at all, having hastened to declare it the chief revolutionary force of the epoch with the idea of sowing confusion as to what capitalism really is. Since the middle class comes to incorporate a variety of groups which have little in common as far as their interests or social status are concerned it can hardly be the chief revolutionary force which Huntington proclaims it to be.

Marxist analysis has long noted the growing revolutionary role of both military and civilian progressive intelli-

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 290.

gentsia, who have been known to lead the struggle for independence in a number of developing countries. But this struggle has always had an anti-imperialist edge, this fact being avoided by bourgeois scholars. Marxists have arrived at the conclusion that the intellectuals' and students' movement against the monopolies is effective only when it develops on a broad social basis, having fused with the working-class struggle. The social interests of the intelligentsia link up with those of the working class, while its ambitions clash with the interests pursued by monopolists. This eventually turns the intellectuals into an important ally of the working class.

Describing the role of the peasantry in the modern revolution, Huntington writes that the cities in which the middle class constitutes the basis of revolutionary opposition are mere islands lost in a sea of rural population. The overwhelming majority of the world's population are still rural dwellers. Consequently, the dissatisfaction of the urban strata is a necessary but not sufficient condition for revolution. At the same time, he points out that while "the role of the city is constant: it is the permanent source of opposition. The role of the countryside is variable: it is either the source of stability or the source of revolution."[18] According to Huntington's conception, the cities may engender both revolution and coup d'etat. The urban revolutionary elements may overthrow the government, but for the revolution to develop further and be brought to a successful conclusion, an alliance with the peasant movement is required. The rural population, holds Huntington, if it has been infected with conservatism and is committed to the old traditions, may act as an obstacle in the way of the expansion of the revolution that has arisen in towns. The peasantry may even find it necessary to do away with revolutionaries sent down from towns to persuade the peasants to join forces with the urban revolutionaries, as more than once happened in the past. The situation is completely different, Huntington goes on to say, if the countryside has been affected by modernization, and the peasantry gets

[18] S. P. Huntington, *op.cit.*, p. 292.

drawn into the revolutionary process alongside with the urban strata. Only in this instance does the crisis reach the scope of revolution.

What are, according to Huntington, the basic causes of revolutionary moods that have lately spread among the peasant masses over a huge part of the globe? The unfinished process of modernization, he asserts, produces two grave consequences for the peasantry: first, the overall conditions of agricultural commodity production deteriorate, as does the peasant's situation; second, the traditional village commune crumbles.

Drawing a comparison between the conditions of the peasantry in the past and in the present, Huntington writes that deterioration in the peasant's living conditions is a recurring phenomenon. In the past, it was either tolerated or revolted against. However, a revolt is not a revolution. What, then, is needed for a revolutionary situation to evolve? The answer is as follows: the impact of modern means of communication on the rural way of life. They enable the peasant to realize that he is not only a passive sufferer, but that his situation could have been improved.

Of course, the significance of modern mass communications, which have reached the most out-of-the-way corners of the globe, are not to be disregarded. They promote, to an increasing degree, the growth of the people's political consciousness, including that of the peasantry. However, to consider the impact of mass communications as the sole cause of the emergence of a revolutionary peasant movement would mean to fail to attempt a scientific explanation of this process. It is not mass communications but mass destitution and oppression by the local landowners and bourgeoisie, compounded by an age-old backwardness —the heritage of the colonial period when Western monopolies did their best to plunder them—that are compelling the peasantry in the developing countries to take an increasingly revolutionary stand. Even today, world imperialism is doing its best to slow down these states' economic development and make them retain their position as a source of cheap labour and raw materials. It is imperialism that must take the blame for the poverty and suffering that

have always fallen to the lot of the peasant masses in the colonial and dependent countries and against which they have finally risen.

Lenin noted in an analysis of agrarian relations under imperialism that the peasantry was coming to play an increasingly important role in revolution. He particularly stressed that in the new situation, the peasant movement was directed against monopoly capital and constituted part of the world proletarian revolution.[19]

It is the campaign against exploitation by the TNCs, and for better conditions and a brighter future that is shaping the peasantry's revolutionary ambitions. Advances in the means of communication can only help the masses to reach an earlier understanding of the causes of their misfortunes; but these advances retain, nevertheless, a secondary role as accelerators of revolution. A very noticeable feature of the modern bourgeois sociology of revolution is its tendency to overrate the secondary factors contributing to the acceleration of revolutionary processes, while those which really count (and which, incidentally, expose the nature of international imperialism) are ignored.

One of the more important issues that has attracted the attention of Huntington is the possibility of an alliance between the rural and the urban revolutionary elements. Dissatisfaction among the peasantry, he asserts, may prove too weak an incentive for establishing a revolutionary alliance between rural population and urban intelligentsia. He believes that the peasantry tends to be too specific and concrete when defining its demands, by and large restricting them to bread, land and peace, while the intelligentsia is inclined to advance more abstract and universal slogans: freedom, equality, universal peace, the granting of constitutional rights, etc. As a rule, the peasantry resorts to revolutionary action only when the existing social order fails to meet its demands.

Among the major additional "precipitants" used by revolutionary leaders as a means of rallying both the rural and the urban population round the banner of revolution, Hun-

[19] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, 1977, p. 371; Vol. 9, 1965, p. 98; Vol. 25, 1972, pp. 279-80.

tington names nationalism and outside threat. "The common cause which produces the revolutionary alliance or revolutionary parallelism is usually nationalism and the catalyst is usually a foreign country."[20]

What we have here is an attempt to substitute the principle of nationalism for the principle of proletarian internationalism, one of the cornerstones of the contemporary revolutionary movement. Underlying it is the wish to split and cripple this movement by isolating its elements and obscuring its ultimate objective, abolition of imperialist domination. Nationalism has long been used by the bourgeoisie to poison the minds of working people fighting against capitalist exploitation. The revolutionary past has shown that nationalism can only weaken the revolutionary struggle and lead it into a blind ally.

It is true that in countries where the people are campaigning for national liberation and against the sway of foreign capital, the population's national identity can go a long way toward consolidating the heterogeneous social elements, especially at the initial stages of the national liberation struggle, and deciding its character and features. However, the attainment of national goals is not an end in itself; they must fuse with the social objectives of the revolution. The chief economic cause of national liberation revolutions is still the antagonistic contradiction between the needs of the nation's productive forces, which can develop successfully only under independence, and the rule of foreign monopolies, which economically plunder the developing states and seek to maintain their backwardness and the obsolete elements of their social and economic structures.

The key issue in the national liberation revolutionary movement is its anti-imperialist edge, the conflict between the working people of the exploited nations and the ruling classes of the imperialist powers, the intention to overthrow the domination of monopolies. The national liberation struggle has by now assumed an international aspect, and is spearheaded not against any one foreign country but the

[20] S. P. Huntington, *op.cit.*, p. 304.

imperialist system at large. By virtue of this, the targets pursued by the peoples in the developing countries objectively overlap with those of the working class and the working people throughout the world, and are essentially not only national but international as well.

This intrinsic orientation of contemporary national liberation revolutions against the overall system of capitalist exploitation becomes clearly manifest in the later stages of the revolutions, as political independence and socio-economic changes become consolidated. Life itself has toppled over the ideas of bourgeois ideologists concerning the motive forces of modern revolutions, specifically, Huntington's thesis on the alliance of the "middle class" and the peasantry and his assumption that the working class does not play a leading role in the revolutionary process. The entry of the national liberation movement into a new stage implies that a new and more advanced level of the class struggle has been attained, and that the political weight and significance of those socio-class and political elements whose action is objectively turned against capitalism is growing. A new basis of the alliance of progressive revolutionary forces is being formed. The social contribution of the working class, which is moving to the forefront of the liberation struggle, is growing, and its alliance with the toiling and more exploited sections of the peasantry is being consolidated.

The principal motive force at the present stage of anti-imperialist struggle is the bloc of revolutionary democratic classes and strata, including the working class, the exploited peasantry, radically-minded intelligentsia and petty urban bourgeoisie, a bloc which represents the interests of the vast majority of the working people.

A factor of particular importance in building up the revolutionary potential of the national liberation struggle is the presence of the socialist world system and the international working-class movement, which extend aid and support to the peoples fighting against imperialist neocolonialist policies. World socialism has changed, and continues to change, the correlation of forces on the planet in favor of progress by providing increasingly auspicious

conditions for the development of national liberation revolutions.

The transitional, revolutionary nature of the modern epoch, the new correlation of forces in the world arena and the unity of all anti-imperialist elements determine the international character and significance of the national liberation movements as a major link in the world revolutionary process leading to the emancipation of mankind from exploitation.

An analysis of the conception of Huntington reveals that vindication of and loyalty to conservative bourgeois ideology have been instrumental in shaping his position as a researcher. Despite individual well-justified observations and ideas, he has failed to build an objective picture of the contemporary revolutionary movement which has been launched by the Great October Socialist Revolution. Like other bourgeois ideologists, Huntington tends to obscure the class nature of the modern revolutionary process and avoid a scrutiny of the real goals of social revolutions, which have an overtly anti-imperialist character. The very idea of incorporating the concept of revolution into a bourgeois ideological system is essentially a new device invented to counteract the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology and disguise the anti-capitalist edge of the revolutionary process, thus rendering it harmless. This device is designed to ideologically disarm the working people and revolutionary leaders in the developing world who are fighting against imperialism and the domination of foreign monopolies. Under the guise of radical modernization of the obsolete political structure, the Third World is offered, as an example to be emulated, the same, albeit a slightly freshened-up model of "democratic" Western (i.e., capitalist.—*Authors*) society.

Huntington's conception is just one more attempt to convince the reader that the decisive say in the introduction of social changes belongs to the ruling classes. It serves to protect and perpetuate the capitalist system, and to combat the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the socialist revolution and the leading role of the working class in contemporary revolutionary movements.

Alongside the elitist theories, a growing impact on the formation of the conceptions of the revolutionary process has recently been made by the various theories of mass society, which are seemingly opposed to the elitist concept of social development. In actual fact, however, their authors are just as intent on promoting the interests of the bourgeois elite. Voicing their anxiety over the mounting crisis phenomena in Western societies, they try to protect the ruling circles and shift the blame and responsibility for them onto the masses. These authors maintain that it is the advancement of the masses to the forefront in political and social life that has produced social crises and upheavals, political instability and destabilization of the entire system of social relations. A good illustration of the impact made by the theories of mass society on the bourgeois science of revolution is the conception developed by Charles Tilly on revolution as collective or mass action, also known as the resource mobilization approach.[21] This conception has been developed as part of the research into the problems of political instability in society undertaken with a view to preventing it. Tilly's model is an attempt to wed the historical approach to the analysis of revolution with the sociological approach; it makes wide recourse to statistics. Collective or mass action, according to this author, leads to political instability and revolution, plunging society into disorder and violence after the peace and order it had enjoyed. Tilly makes an attempt, which is found in other research in the field as well, to mechanically dissect the complex and manifold revolutionary process into component parts, reducing it to a number of primary elements. By combining these elements in a variety of ways, Ch. Tilly hopes to be able to model situations fraught with instability and conflict. He produces statistical models of the revolutionary process built on the basis of quantitative indicators and making wide use of Max Weber's functional theory.

It is noteworthy that, according to Tilly, the transition

[21] Ch. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Reading, Massachusetts, 1978, pp. 7-8; Ch. Tilly, "Speaking Your Mind Without Elections, Surveys, or Social Movements" in: *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter 1983, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 461-77.

to violence is the outcome of mass action. He conveniently forgets that in Western states, violence, as a rule, originates in the actions of the ruling quarters and their repressive bodies, which resort to it to suppress the struggle of the people for their rights.

The purpose behind the bourgeois conceptions of revolution as mass action is clear enough: to ascribe to the latter such unattractive features of modern bourgeois society as the mounting tendency toward repression, the growing political extremism and anti-democratism, propaganda of aggression and militarism. In actual fact, though, all this is the natural outcome of the modern stage of development of state-monopoly capitalism. Using the talk about mass violence as a smoke screen bourgeois ideologists are trying to throw a scare into the public by describing the dangers and destruction that are supposed to be the inevitable result of the masses' growing political action; they are also urging the people to have no part in the country's socio-political life and administration and to leave the privileges granted by authority to the ruling elite, i.e., they are fostering a mood of public indifferentism and passivity.

Chapter Five

Determinism and Free Will

One of the much-favored devices used by American and British sociologists of revolution to take the bite out of Marxism-Leninism is to try to set Marxism against the Leninist doctrine on the ways and forms of revolutionary struggle and the relationship between objective and subjective factors in revolution.

Conceding that "the Marxian theory ... has been the most influential theory of revolution in the past hundred years",[1] A. S. Cohan insists, however, that inherent in it is an unresolvable contradiction pertaining to the correlation between the objective and the subjective factors in revolution, specifically, to the question of historical necessity and revolutionary initiative.

Having first twisted the real purport of Marx's doctrine, modern bourgeois critics then proceed to represent it as vulgar economic determinism. Marx is accused of "pure economism", of regarding revolution as almost a direct consequence of an economic crisis. Marx's and Engels's views of history are also declared deterministic. Ascribed to them is the opinion of revolution as an automatic process, as an event whose advent cannot be speeded up, since it requires definite conditions in which to mature, and the realization by the working class of the difficulty of its position and the need to overthrow the capitalist system via violent means, i.e., a revolution.

However, very little research would suffice to prove that the charges brought up against Marx are entirely unfounded. Engels levelled sharp criticism against those who asserted that he and Marx stood on positions of economic deter-

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[1] A. S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution: An Introduction*, University of Lancaster, 1975, p. 68.

minism. Marx never maintained that society's economic advance is in itself enough to bring about a socialist revolution. Recognition of the decisive role of material conditions in the progress of society does not at all imply that Marx and Engels ignored the significance of psychological factors and ideas in this process. Marx wrote that "theory becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses".[2]

Representing the Marxist theory in a crudely vulgarized way, bourgeois ideologists regard even recognition of objective necessity in history as mechanistic determinism and, vice versa, view any conscious activity of people in the historical process as an alternative to objective necessity. In fact, Marx and Engels never contrasted the one to the other; it is only bourgeois science that does this. Marx and Engels, just as Lenin later, considered man's conscious actions as a concrete manifestation of objective historical necessity and analyzed these two aspects of the same phenomenon as mutually related—as, in fact, a dialectical unity. Lenin wrote: "The idea of determinism, which postulates that human acts are necessitated and rejects the absurd tale about free will, in no way destroys man's reason or conscience, or appraisal of his actions... Similarly, the idea of historical necessity does not in the least undermine the role of the individual in history: all history is made up of the actions of individuals, who are undoubtedly active figures. The real question that arises in appraising the social activity of an individual is: what conditions ensure the success of his actions, what guarantee is there that these actions will not remain an isolated act lost in a welter of contrary acts?"[3]

Seeking to discredit Marxism, bourgeois ideologists have tried to present Marx's ideas as obsolete and inapplicable to the present period. Irving M. Zeitlin, an American researcher, stated that Marx's theoretical approach provides an explanation of the past, but fails when it comes to prediction. Pursuing the same idea, A. S. Cohan wrote: "...As

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[2] Karl Marx, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, 1975, p. 182.
[3] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, 1963, p. 159.

a way of predicting outcomes, it has not been validated with reference to industrial societies. Revolutions generally have not occurred in the societies of the West that were most advanced industrially and technologically... Instead, the great Marxist-orientated revolutions have occurred in the technologically less advanced societies where the bourgeoisie was barely developed, and the working class, where it was to be found, was small as well."[4]

Another American critic of Marxism, George Lichtheim, asserted that the interpretation of Marx is valid only when viewed in a certain social context, and that the need exists to bring it up to the standards reached by modern thought.

The facts of history, however, tell a different story. The most striking proof of the soundness and validity of Marxism was the October Revolution of 1917. Analyzing the material preconditions for a socialist revolution in Russia, Lenin referred to it as a country with a medium level of development of capitalism. He pointed to the considerable development in its economy of monopoly and finance capital and the presence of an advanced and consolidated working class. As concerns West European countries, bourgeois researchers apparently find it more convenient to forget that under the impact of tremendous suffering and privations, the outcome of the First World War launched by international imperialist quarters, and of the October Revolution in Russia, a revolutionary situation developed in quite a few European states. Already in 1918-19, the proletariat in a number of countries, led by Communists, followed in the wake of Russian workers and peasants. Bourgeois-democratic revolutions in Germany and Austro-Hungary, which overthrew the monarchies, threatened to grow into socialist revolutions. And it was only a sequence of unfavorable circumstances, as well as the treachery of social-democratic leaders, that enabled international reaction to smother the revolutionary movement in Europe. Convincing proof of the soundness of Marxist prediction is the existence of the powerful socialist world community, which embraces a number of economically advanced coun-

[4] A. S. Cohan, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

tries, as well as the growth of the international revolutionary movement, including that in the economically developed Western states. So why criticism of Marx?

In his book *The Phenomenon of Revolution* Mark Hagopian wrote in reference to the Marxist theory of social revolution that research had convinced him of the unsoundness of theories which, trying to embrace and explain the entire system of antagonisms lying at the root of revolution, concentrate on individual forms of conflict, e.g., the class struggle.[5] He claims to have discovered "fatal errors" in Marx's theory of revolution, which, he states, regards the class struggle as the prime mover of revolution. This tenet is supposed to have two weaknesses. First, Marx allegedly failed to explain just what he understood by the term "class"; second, he underrated the fact that the revolutionary situation and the struggle for power may have other than economic causes.

True, the author notes that to point to these weaknesses does not mean to completely reject the significance of economic causes or the class struggle in revolution. But he immediately betrays his chief intention by adding that the real target of his criticism is to even preclude an idea that the phenomenon of revolution may be better understood in these terms and expressions.[6]

Another bourgeois "critic" of Marx, A. S. Cohan, a British researcher, wrote that "ultimately, the major weakness of the theory that Marx propounded is that he was, first and foremost, a nineteenth century man".[7] He also spoke of the need to criticize the Marxist conception of classes based on property relations. Another "weakness" of the theory is Marx's idea of class consciousness.

Numerous conceptions advanced by Western sociologists try to prove that the Marxist theory of classes and the class struggle is oversimplified and even erroneous. Mark Hagopian, for one, energetically attacks Marxist researchers. "For some theorists," he writes, "any overt disharmony of

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[5] Mark N. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, New York, 1975, p. 116.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

[7] A. S. Cohan, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

interest between rich and poor, labor and management, owners and nonowners exemplifies the underlying dynamic of the class struggle. Such a comprehensive view, however, virtually empties the concept of any significance in the study of revolution."[8]

Even if bourgeois researchers concede that some part of Marx's teaching may be sound, it is only with reference to the past. Modern society, they hold, has no classes in the sense in which Marx defined them.

As proof of this they cite the process afoot in capitalist society in the course of which capital as property is dissociated from capital as a function. Ralf Dahrendorf was one of those who tried to prove that "a theory of class based on the division of society into owners and nonowners of means of production loses its analytical value as soon as legal ownership and factual control are separated".[9] In modern society, the managers are not necessarily the owners of means of production and, consequently, control over them depends on factors other than ownership. Hence the general conclusion concerning the nature of power and control. "Whoever tries, therefore, to define authority by property defines the general by the particular, an obvious logical fallacy. Wherever there is property there is authority, but not every form of authority implies property. Authority is the more general social relation."[10] This is also the idea propounded by the noted American economist, John Kenneth Galbraith, in his book *The New Industrial State*. He openly stated that since political authority is no longer concentrated in the hands of owners, socialization of the means of production under the conditions of working men's power is no longer a historical necessity.

By this warped interpretation of Marx's definition of class, bourgeois researchers want to show that his view of classes and, consequently, of what they ought to be, was rooted in the features of the times.

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[8] Mark N. Hagopian, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[9] R. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, Stanford, 1959, p. 136.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 137.

However, life as it is in the capitalist states has borne out the soundness of Marxian analysis of classes. Depersonification of capital, the process that *is* under way, has made property relations more complex but has by no means cancelled them. It has resulted in a stratification within the capitalist class, incorporation of big managers, as well as the merger of the upper crust of civil servants and monopolists. Although the role performed by managers and functionaries of the state apparatus at the stage of state-monopoly capitalism does gain in importance, the authorities continue to carry out the will of the ruling class—the bourgeoisie—when protecting capitalist ownership.

Summing up the views of his great predecessors, Lenin evolved a clear-cut Marxist definition of the concept of class as "groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation ... to the means of production, by their role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it".[11] He pointed out the major characteristic feature of the exploiter class—the ability to appropriate the labor of other classes "owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy".[12] Lenin's definition of class, just as Marx's and Engels's analysis of this conception, reveals the in-depth causes of the oppressed position of the working people in the system of social production under capitalism and the need to change it through class struggle and revolution. The Marxist conception of classes contains a scientific analysis of social relations and makes it possible to determine the place of each class in the life of society, as well as its essence, goals and interests. Bourgeois conceptions, on the contrary, offer a false idea of the concept of class, seeking to obscure the irreconcilability of class interests and disguise the exploiter nature of the ruling classes. The purpose of such theories

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[11] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, 1977, p. 421.
[12] *Ibid.*

is to prove that the capitalist system is still stable, and to gloss over class contradictions. Essentially, they are spearheaded against the Marxist theory of classes.

Marx's doctrine of the class struggle and antagonistic contradictions underlying it is set off against the various bourgeois theories of conflict which seek to paint the class contradictions of exploiter societies in less harsh colors than they deserve. Their authors, too, accuse Marx of vulgar determinism and of an oversimplified approach to the influence of economics on social life. Seeking to counteract Marx's theory, American sociologist T. H. Marshall distinguishes three types of conflict allegedly discovered in the framework of economic relations between people, which, in his view, upsets Marx's ideas. "First, there is competition where two or more persons offer the same service or desire the same object... Secondly, there is the conflict that arises out of the division of labour..." According to Marshall, the conflict at this level is neutralized by the community of the interests of the parties interested in their needs. For this reason this type of conflict has its own limits. And "thirdly, there is conflict over the system itself upon which the allocation of functions and the distribution of benefits are based..."[13] But even at this level, Marshall maintains, class relationships, just as other forms of relations in a society, are an intricate and involved system, marked by both contradiction and harmony. And only when the balance between harmony and contradiction is upset and the correlation shifts in the direction of conflicts of an antagonistic nature, does the class struggle, in the strict sense of the word, arise. In this case the community of interests that serves as a point of contact between competing groups gives way to conflict between them.

Charles Tilly, who deals with problems of political instability, has also attached the label "obsolete" to the Marxist class analysis which, in the 20th century, is supposed to be in need of modification. The key issue is, in his opinion, the

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[13] T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*, Garden City, New York, 1964, pp. 165-67.

realization that the category of social classes should be amplified by other categories, such as ethnic and religious groups. Proceeding from this idea, he suggests that Marx's concept "class interests" should be replaced by the one that is more diffused, simply "interests", which would incorporate the interests of the various groups and personalities. Plastic surgery of this sort performed on the class analysis, the core of the Marxist theory, would completely destroy it, making an abstract category out of this major concept developed from a class stand.

Bourgeois researchers are trying to replace the class struggle by a conflict of interests of the various groups and individuals inherent in human nature, which, they insist, is a "norm" of social relations. At best, they try to restrict the significance of the class struggle by saying that contradictions in society only very rarely result in class struggle and a revolutionary transformation of society, the latter being a chance occurrence, an exception to the rule. The objective character of the class struggle in exploiter societies as a tool of historical progress is denied, and an attempt is made to convince the public of its utter futility and of the expediency of maintaining the harmony of interests allegedly typical of capitalist society. Rejection of the class struggle is, in the long run, aimed at undermining the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of social revolution as the highest form of class struggle, and at denying the objective need for a revolutionary transformation of any society which is based on exploitation. Discussing the close connection between the two concepts, Lenin stressed that class struggle lies at the root of any revolution. "A revolution," he wrote, "differs from a 'normal' situation in the state precisely because controversial issues of state life are decided by the direct class and popular struggle to the point of armed struggle."[14]

While bourgeois science presents Marxism as "vulgar economic determinism," it regards Leninism as "voluntarism", the concept of "will" being its pivot. The idea is that Lenin

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[14] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, 1977, p. 203.

turned Marxism in the direction of voluntarism with special emphasis on the subjective factor. Lenin emerges from writings of this sort as a "typical Russian revolutionary", "conspirator" and "revisionist".

Bourgeois sociologists have tried to ascribe to him a "revision" of Marx's ideas, while they, paradoxically enough, have declared themselves to be the preservers and protectors of "pure", "genuine" Marxism. Not infrequently Leninism is postulated as an arbitrary modification of Marxism, which has produced, or so it is alleged, some of the gravest consequences for the Marxist doctrine.

In short, the prevailing assumption of bourgeois critics is that Leninism is not a sequel to Marxism but a restricted, "purely Russian doctrine"; and a call has been sounded to return to "genuine" Marxism as bourgeois social science interprets it. A. S. Cohan states that Leninism is usually approached from two standpoints. The first treats Leninism as flowing logically from Marxism, since Lenin "accepted the correctness of Marxian analysis, i.e., the Marxian model of society and revolutionary change".[15] However, A. S. Cohan goes on to say, "the second view does suggest that he was a revisionist: he converted Marxism in order to make it apply to the Russian situation, and the end result of this process may have been a betrayal of the views that Marx held".[16] Cohan sees the chief point of dissent between Lenin's theory of revolution and Marx's doctrine as lying in Lenin's idea that in a society where capitalism is not mature enough, but where the working class is growing a revolution led by the proletariat is possible under certain favorable circumstances, although to accomplish it, the proletariat is obliged to look for allies.

Proceeding from this assumption, which has nothing in common with what Lenin really thought, Cohan confronts Leninism and Marxism. "Had Lenin accepted the idea," he writes, "that a revolution could not occur until the productive forces reached their highest level of development, then the seizure of power that he led would never have

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[15] A. S. Cohan, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 80, 93.

happened."[17] According to him, Lenin assigned the Party the position of a vanguard which "coordinates the revolution" and leads the masses to its successful conclusion.

American scholars have been known to state that Lenin rejected the Marxist understanding of revolution, which supposedly held that its accomplishment was possible only in economically advanced capitalist societies, when he stated that it was possible in virtually any country where a revolutionary situation existed, and where there was a revolutionary party capable of leading society along the road to socialism.

But it is by no means justifiable to oppose Leninism and Marxism. The fact is that Leninism was a new stage in the development of Marxist theory. Marx's views of socialist revolution were evolved at a time when capitalism was developing fairly evenly and steadily, while Lenin and other Bolsheviks worked under different circumstances, at a time when capitalism had gone through serious change and entered into its highest and final stage—imperialism. Lenin demonstrated in his works that although the nature of capitalism as an exploiter system remained the same, at its new, monopoly stage it became a threshold of socialist revolution. Researching imperialism, Lenin discovered the law of capitalism's uneven development which at the new stage assumed a catastrophic aspect. Based on this idea, Lenin arrived at a decisive conclusion, i.e., that proletarian revolution and socialism could succeed in a number, or, at the least, in one capitalist country. He scientifically proved the possibility of the victory of a socialist revolution in Russia, the country which was the weakest link in the capitalist system and to which the centre of the world revolutionary movement had moved by the beginning of the 20th century. Obviously, Lenin's theory of socialist revolution was not rejection but continuation and development of the Marxian doctrine.

Seeking to set off the Marxist theory against the Leninist theory of revolution, American Marxologist A. James Gregor wrote that, as distinct from Marx, who is supposed

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

to have advanced the theory of "gradual revolution" accomplished through reform within the framework of the capitalist system and pointed to the need to gradually prepare the proletariat for assuming revolutionary responsibility, Lenin believed that only professional revolutionaries, i.e., the party cadre, are able to appreciate the proletariat's both immediate and ultimate interests.[18] Bourgeois ideologists maintain that in contrast to Marx and Engels, who regarded the working class as the principal force of the revolutionary movement, Lenin pinned hopes on a "party of the elite", with its core made up of professional revolutionaries submitting to strict discipline. This distortion of Lenin's view of the revolutionary party as an integral part of the working class, as its front-rank section, is not the last word in bourgeois sociology. Critics of Marxism-Leninism allege that unlike Marx Lenin in fact replaced the working class as the driving force of revolution by the party. An American expert in Leninism, Alfred G. Meyer, wrote: "To the party was given the task that Marx had envisioned as being fulfilled by the working class."[19] Almost twenty years later, a British professor of sociology, Zygmunt Bauman, brought up a similar charge against Lenin, accusing him of treating the party as a political force "tantamount to the people".[20] These assertions of bourgeois ideologists are groundless. Lenin developed the Marxian tenet on the leading role of the workers' party in the mass revolutionary struggle. It was Marx who wrote down the following in the Rules of the International:

"In its struggle against the collective power of the possessing classes the proletariat can act as a class only by constituting itself a distinct political party, opposed to all the old parties formed by the possessing classes.

"This constitution of the proletariat into a political party is indispensable to ensure the triumph of the social

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[18] A. Gregor, *A Survey of Marxism. Problems in Philosophy and the Theory of History*, New York, 1965, p. 251.

[19] A. G. Meyer, *Leninism*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957, p. 291.

[20] Z. Bauman, *Socialism. The Active Utopia*, London, 1976, p. 88.

revolution and of its ultimate goal: the abolition of classes."[21]

Lenin upheld the Marxian understanding of the historic role of the party as a supreme form of the proletariat's class organisation. He said: "The strength of the working class lies in organisation. Unless the masses are organised, the proletariat is nothing. Organised—it is everything."[22]

Trying to make an absolute distinction between Leninism and Marxism, Western ideologists state that Lenin substituted the concept of the dictatorship of the party for the Marxist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The more conservative bourgeois critics of Lenin go even further, advancing the idea that Lenin allegedly replaced the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the principle of personal dictatorship. Setting aside any claim to objectivity, A. J. P. Taylor, a well-known British Sovietologist, wrote: "...of course, he (Lenin.—*Authors*) believed, as Marx did, in the dictatorship of the proletariat. But he believed in this in a very simple way. The proletariat voiced its opinions through the Communist party, therefore the dictatorship of the proletariat meant the dictatorship of the Communist party. But how did the Communist party voice its opinions? It voiced its opinions through Lenin, therefore the dictatorship of the Communist party was the dictatorship, sometimes a little concealed, of Lenin."[23]

Taylor substitutes his discourse on Lenin's "personal dictatorship" for the disquisitions about his high personal authority in the Communist Party and the working class, about the general recognition of this outstanding leader and brilliant thinker. It is well known that Lenin had nothing in common with the slightest manifestations of *vozhdism* (a petty-bourgeois theory of worshiping a chief or a leader), or extolling his name, of the striving to subdue surrounding people to his will. He always insisted

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[21] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 2, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 291.

[22] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, 1965, p. 320.

[23] A. J. P. Taylor, "The First Red Revolution" in: *The Listener*, Vol. 100, No. 2573, 17 August 1978, p. 205.

on a strict observance of the standards of inner-Party democracy, on a collective discussion and elaboration of Party decisions. To put his ideas into practice he used persuasion as a sole method of polemics with his opponents. Once a decision was approved, he insisted on its implementation. Therefore, any talk about Lenin's "personal dictatorship" is yet another fabrication of bourgeois ideologists. On the other hand, Lenin enjoyed the highest revolutionary prestige among the Communist Party and the people at large. It is impossible to ignore or underestimate the significance of this authority in revolutionary struggle. In his speech of tribute to Yakov Sverdlov's memory on March 18, 1919, he said: "In that seething struggle that is revolution, at that special post which every revolutionary occupies ... of enormous importance is high moral prestige won in the course of the struggle, unquestionable and unchallenged prestige, the roots of which lie, of course, not in abstract morals, but in the morals of the revolutionary fighter, the morals of the rank and file of the revolutionary masses."[24]

Moreover, bourgeois ideologists try to prove that this form of party dictatorship is a "purely Russian phenomenon". In their view, the dictatorship of the proletariat could not possibly be the dictatorship of the majority in such a backward country as Russia was at the time. It could only represent the opinions of the ruling "Bolshevist elite", which imposed its will on the people.

The idea behind the distortion of Lenin's doctrine is to undermine the authority of Leninism and the international communist movement in the eyes of the working people fighting against imperialist exploitation. Bourgeois researchers are trying to prove that the importance attached by Lenin to the party stemmed not from the needs of the proletariat's historical development, but solely from Lenin's voluntaristic approach to the matter and from his interpretation of the special role of the subjective factor and the political situation prevailing in Russia. The Marxist revolutionary party of the type established by Lenin

[24] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, 1974, p. 92.

is supposed by them to be unsuitable for the West, since its formation was rooted in specifically Russian conditions.

Labeling the Communist parties "extremist", the ideologists of capitalism maintain that they have weight only in countries with a low cultural and economic level, while in industrialized capitalist countries they do not constitute a strong political force. Concealed behind this assertion is the wish to declare Leninism inapplicable in the modern epoch as a strictly Russian doctrine, for which the working-class movement in the Western world cannot possibly find any use.

Such statements are hardly justified. A subjectivist approach to revolution has never been a feature of Lenin's doctrine. Speaking up against arbitrary and ill-considered actions aimed at spurring the revolutionary process, he wrote that "revolutions *develop* from objectively (i.e., independently of the will of parties and classes) mature crises and turns in history".[25] Continuing the idea of Marx and Engels, he stated quite clearly that "revolutions cannot be made to order, or by agreement; they break out when tens of millions of people come to the conclusion that it is impossible to live in the old way any longer".[26] "The *only effective* force that compels change is popular revolutionary energy."[27]

These ideas do not contradict the idea of a working people's revolutionary party, no matter how hard bourgeois ideologists may try to prove the contrary. Marx and Engels, too, wrote about the need for such a party. The emergence of such parties was called forth by the objective needs of the working class.

Lenin wrote in this context: "...To enable the mass of a *definite class* to learn to understand its own interests and its position, to learn to conduct its own policy, that there must be an organisation of the advanced elements of the class, immediately and at all costs, even though at first these elements constitute only a tiny fraction of the

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[25] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, 1978, p. 240.
[26] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, 1977, p. 480.
[27] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, 1977, p. 213.

class."[28] It is the Communist Party that enables the proletariat to become aware of their class interests and directs their action in the class struggle.

To sum up. There are two main lines of attack launched by bourgeois ideologists against Lenin's doctrine of the socialist revolution and, above all, its conception of the party. First, "contradictions" are discovered in Marx's, Engels's and Lenin's treatment of the ways to accomplish a socialist revolution and of the role of the party in it, and, second, various conceptions are advanced which create an impression that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine can be interpreted in a variety of ways.

However, conscientious analysis of the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism dealing with the nature, functions and historical tasks of the proletarian party makes it abundantly clear that Marx, Engels and Lenin were quite unanimous on this issue, viewing the party as a major tool in the hands of the proletariat that performs its historic mission, and stressing its proletarian character and assigning it the function of the proletariat's vanguard.

Lenin conducted an extensive and in-depth study of the role of the subjective factor in the new historical epoch in the struggle for accomplishing a socialist revolution, i.e., the theory of the workers' party. But this by no means implies that he deviated from Marxism. In the new epoch, the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, he carried on Marx's and Engels's ideas on the revolutionary party of the working class.

The Marxist-Leninist theory of socialist revolution is an integral and coherent doctrine. It contains a deep analysis of both objective and subjective aspects of the revolutionary process in their dialectical interrelationship and with full regard for their intrinsic unity. Marxism-Leninism has always opposed the rigid idea of socialist revolution as an outcome of the mechanistic growth of productive forces. Considering socialist revolution as an objective regularity, it emphasized that the process of revolution and its outcome depend on the actual correlation

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[28] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, 1977, p. 409.

of forces and on how ready the revolutionary classes and parties are to tackle the goals they have set themselves. It also pointed to the fact that, besides objective conditions, a revolution requires that the subjective factors, too, reach a certain degree of maturity. And the more fully the subjective factor represents the objective needs of social development and the long-term and vital interests of the broad masses, the more influence it exerts on the course of events. To win in a socialist revolution, the working class and all the working people, led by an active Marxist-Leninist party, must possess a high level of political awareness and considerable revolutionary vigor and determination. The party in this case coordinates and directs the action of the people.

Lenin's advancement and competent application of the Marxist doctrine of revolution decided the success of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, an event whose lessons have universal and lasting significance.

Chapter Six

The "Cost" of Revolutions and Social Progress

American and British sociologists often concern themselves with the relationship between revolution and progress, and the "cost" of revolution. "Revolution," says Raymond M. Momboisse, "seeks triumph at all costs, regardless of the consequences. Victory demands the total, relentless commandeering of mind and body and the elimination of all obstacles, all groups, all individuals who stand in the way."[1]

The talk about the high "cost" of revolutions is designed to instil the idea that the revolutionary way of changing society is not efficient and profitable one, entailing as it does tremendous material and human losses, and that as a form of social development, it is in all ways inferior to evolution. The sacrifices that revolutions demand, are, as bourgeois scholars maintain, too high a price to pay for the results that get achieved; social progress can best be promoted by means other than revolution.

But history shows that capitalist development brings with it such enormous costs and has such a big "price" that render inevitable the advent of a socialist revolution and the seizure of power by the working class. Marx drew a bright picture at what "price" progress is made in capitalist society, and this picture is still valid today. He wrote: "Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and overworking it. The new-fangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want. The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. At the same pace that mankind masters

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[1] R. M. Momboisse, *Blueprint of Revolution. The Rebel, the Party, the Techniques of Revolt*, Springfield, Illinois, 1970, p. 8.

nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force. This antagonism between modern industry and science, on the one hand, modern misery and desolation, on the other hand; this antagonism between the productive powers and the social relations of our epoch is a fact, palpable, overwhelming, and not to be controverted."[2]

In complete disregard of the real state of affairs, i.e., the fact that real socialism has long become the way of life for hundreds of millions of people inhabiting a substantial part of the globe, bourgeois science stubbornly insists that even today socialism remains an inattainable social utopia. This is an idea that has recently been played up a great deal. A large number of works have appeared that counterpose the "social utopia" to real socialism, the way it exists in the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries.

"A number of socialist revolutions having been accomplished, directly affecting the lives of about half the human race, and indirectly those of all mankind, at great cost in suffering, blood and treasure, the just society failed to appear," wrote a British professor, Edward Hyams, in his book intended for a broad readership.[3]

A favorite trick employed by Western ideologists is to contrast the bourgeois and the socialist revolution. The citing of the French Revolution of 1789 as the yardstick against which others are to be assessed has become so common that Crane Brinton has ironically referred to this as the "French slant". Investigated by Western researchers, bourgeois revolutions are turned into classic examples of revolution and declared more progressive than socialist ones. Hannah Arendt has even refused to grant the so-

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[2] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 1, 1976, pp. 500-01.

[3] E. Hyams, *A Dictionary of Modern Revolution*, London, 1973, p. 9.

cialist revolutions of the 20th century, including the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the status of revolution, since they have "abused" the idea of freedom. She stated that the "Marxist revolutions" tend to forget that the goal of revolution is the struggle for greater freedom rather than an effort for material well-being and economic progress.[4] Other researchers have expressed themselves in much the same vein. Barrington Moore wrote: "It is clear beyond all shadow of doubt that the claims of existing socialist states to represent a higher form of freedom than Western democratic capitalism rest on promise, not on performance."[5]

What is all this if not an attempt to put things upside down? Bourgeois revolutions, which merely replace one form of oppression by another, are declared "revolutions of freedom", while the October Revolution in Russia, which heralded the abolition of all forms of social oppression and exploitation of man, is supposed to have warped "the idea of freedom". What sort of logic is this? Marx and Engels fully revealed the following essence of freedom which the bourgeoisie had brought in its train and which the bourgeois sociologists of revolution keep extolling: "The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors', and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, that callous 'cash payment'.... It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that *single*, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation."[6] Socialist revolutions are accused of con-

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[4] H. Arendt, *On Revolution*, New York, 1963.

[5] B. Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston, 1966, p. 506.

[6] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, 1984, pp. 486-87.

centrating exclusively on attaining material prosperity and economic growth, which is a crude vulgarization, if not intentional falsification, of the truly noble goals of socialist revolutions. The building of a reliable material and technical base for communist society is a necessary first step toward giving man an opportunity to attain full spiritual emancipation and develop all his abilities. A certain level of material prosperity is surely necessary before the whole emphasis can be shifted to man's intellectual and spiritual advancement.

Another important fact is that the process of reshaping man's consciousness is a lengthy and complicated one. It does not proceed all of a sudden, but is effected gradually alongside the changes that occur in man's social environment. The shaping of a new, communist world outlook begins with the disappearance of relations of exploitation prevailing in capitalist society and the growth of socialist social relations. At the time of the building of a socialist society this process involves a profound change in all spheres of the person's inner life and a rapid development of his potentialities. This is genuine emancipation of the human personality from all forms of oppression and suppression both in the material and the spiritual spheres, which constitutes one of the major targets of socialist society. However, to make this possible, the first step must be abolition of the exploitation of man by man, the unfair distribution of income and the split of society into the wealthy and the poor, i.e., of all things that capitalism breeds every moment of its existence. To put an end to injustice, to eliminate capitalist exploitation and to build a socialist society—these are the goals of a socialist revolution.

The implication of the bourgeois ideologists' stress on reform as opposed to revolution is that revolutions should better be avoided as causing tremendous losses. Very often, the October Revolution in Russia is cited as proof of this idea. The ideologists of imperialism have long maintained that it was an outcome of the subjective ambitions of Lenin and other Bolsheviks and that its consequence for the Russian people was suffering and terror.

Certain bourgeois researchers go even further in their

attempts to prove that the October Revolution put grave difficulties in the way of Russia's subsequent industrial development. A statement to this effect has been made by Prof. Alexander Gerschenkron of Harvard University, whose theory is rather in disagreement with what his colleagues, the champions of the modernization conception, assert.

The idea behind such statements is to undermine the attractiveness of socialism and socialist revolution as a way of attaining social justice by presenting a distorted picture of the October Revolution. Bourgeois scholars are trying to compromise the very idea of social revolution as a form of social development. However, what they have failed to do is to attach convincing proof to their allegations. Facts speak for themselves. The fact that the Soviet Union has been able to build an advanced socialist economy and turn from a backward agricultural country into an advanced state with highly developed science and technology that has blazed the trail into outer space is proof enough of the decisive impact of the October Revolution on its economic development.

As concerns human losses, they were definitely not the result of the October uprising itself, which, as is known, was practically bloodless, but of the stubborn resistance put up by the ruling classes which refused to surrender their position of leadership to the revolutionary classes that had stepped in to replace them, and to give up their age-old privileges which had allowed them to rob and exploit the peoples of Russia. Revolution is above all a manifestation of the class struggle in its most acute form, and it has to entail some losses for which, however, the moribund classes are chiefly responsible. "Coercion," wrote Lenin, "is effective against those who want to restore their rule."[1]

The fiercest attacks have been launched in the West against the Marxist-Leninist conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The prevailing trend is to represent it as a means of coercion, an assumption that distorts the nature and purpose of this component part of the theory

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[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, 1977, p. 457.

of socialist revolution and ignores the crucial fact that the emergence of the dictatorship of the proletariat was promoted by the need to suppress the resistance of the reactionary classes, specifically, the bourgeoisie. Consequently, revolutionary coercion is an enforced form of the class struggle against the resistance of the counter-revolutionary classes.

Another trick that is used to discredit the idea of social revolution is to represent any action or phenomenon introducing chaos into the prevailing order as a revolutionary one. This approach obscures the deep progressive purport of revolution as a way of drastically restructuring and renovating all spheres of the life of society, while the very concept of revolution gets lost among others, e.g., "coup d'etat", "counter-coup", "economic crisis" and such like, and is stripped of its real meaning. Raymond Momboisse, whom we have already mentioned, has termed it "an explosive upheaval", a definition which emphasizes the destructive aspects of social revolution and plays down its social significance.[8]

Bourgeois authors who offer definitions of this sort usually depict revolution as a force that has a negative impact on the future of mankind. This tendency is most easily traceable in works that develop the conceptions of mass society and totalitarianism.[9]

The theorists of mass society refuse to recognize the role of the popular masses in the revolutions of the past, and maintain that the revolutionary movement is a phenomenon peculiar to the 20th century alone and that it is generated by industrialization, progress in the means of communication and by other characteristic features of modern society which have pulled down the traditional barriers separating the social strata and protecting the elite from the non-elite.

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[8] Raymond M. Momboisse, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[9] Carl J. Friedrich, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, New York, 1956; Hans Buchheim, *Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature and Characteristics*, Middletown, Connecticut, 1968; William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1959.

Bourgeois scholars assess the transition to mass society as a negative phenomenon, which has in their view given the development of certain countries an anti-democratic turn. The authors of this theory contrast mass societies with the so-called Western model of pluralistic society, based on pluralistic democracy, with "the American model of democracy" as the most typical example.[10] William Kornhauser, one of the champions of this theory, has advanced the idea that the preservation of the vital values, above all freedom, requires that the social strata in society should be isolated. The class purport of this idea is easy to fathom. It is nothing but a direct apology for the so-called "free society" designed to deceive the people and pursue propaganda ends.

The theories of mass society have served as a breeding ground for the conception of totalitarianism which maintains that the mass revolutionary movements of the modern epoch are essentially totalitarian and anti-democratic, and can only take place in mass societies. Champions of this conception consider totalitarian societies to be the result of the mass movements that are under way in the world today; they are supposed to be marked by the striving to oppress and by the large-scale use of violence. Slighting the testimonial of history, bourgeois ideologists draw unwarranted parallels between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in a hypothesis about two types of totalitarian state, the Nazi and the communist one.

Using it as a starting point, certain Western researchers have likened the revolutionary movement in Russia to the Nazi movement in Germany. Eric Voegelin wrote that the need for party dictatorships in both Germany and Soviet Russia stemmed from the lack of opportunity for accomplishing a democratic revolution. ". . .We come, therefore, to the conclusion that the revolutionary tension was regained

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[10] The ideas of pluralistic bourgeois democracy date back to the early 19th century. They were first voiced by the American political and public figure James Madison and popularized by Alexis de Tocqueville, the French 19th-century sociologist who had spent part of his life in the USA.

on the level of necessity but not on the level of freedom."[11]

Bourgeois researchers turn a blind eye to the popular character of the Great October Revolution in Russia and the leading role of the working class in it, which have made possible the formation of a broad democratic basis for revolutionary changes in Soviet Russia. The October Revolution met the interests of a large section of urban and rural population, and not of those of the ruling minority. It is with this in view that Lenin talked about the vast expansion of democracy, "which *for the first time* becomes democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the money-bags. . .".[12]

This is the decisive difference between the October Socialist Revolution and the elitist coups d'état and putsches, and this is precisely the reason why it cannot have anything in common with the fascist putsch in Germany, which gave power to a handful of fanatics and adventurers who had no intention whatsoever of changing the prevailing social and economic relations and overthrowing the capitalist system but who, on the contrary, were an obedient tool in the hands of the more reactionary aggressive circles of German militarism and imperialism, and did their best to perpetuate the most atrocious and ugly forms of imperialist rule.

The conception of totalitarianism, just as the theory of mass society closely associated with it, has a clear-cut anti-communist thrust. Authors of such theories skilfully manipulate the errors and limitations of the immature petty-bourgeois theories of socialism. They paint a sombre picture of the socialist future, a picture of society where the strict intellectual and spiritual conformism will prevail, where the "interests of the stomach" will reign supreme, and where everything will be subjugated to the blind "tyranny of the majority". A close scrutiny of this caricature of socialism reveals, however, that it bears a much closer resemblance to capitalist society at the stage of the preva-

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[11] Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, Durham, North Carolina, 1975, p. 252.

[12] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, 1977, p. 466.

lence of state-monopoly tendencies and the bureaucratization and fascistization of the life of society.

The chief purpose pursued by these theories is to blacken the socialist system and its impact, scare the peoples by the grave consequences allegedly produced by social revolutions, and make them give up the struggle for revolutionary changes. These theories call in question the progressive character of modern revolutionary movements and therefore their significance and necessity in history. The Western pluralistic society is advertized as the only means of social progress.

However, recent events and the mounting instability in the capitalist world have substantially moderated the emotions prompted by bourgeois pluralism. The energy and monetary crises, inflation and the skyrocketing unemployment that have shaken the capitalist world in the 1970s and 1980s have dealt a perceptible blow to the official optimistic ideology of liberal progressism and given rise to pessimistic attitudes as concerns the perspective development of pluralistic democracy. In many advanced capitalist countries, above all in the USA, Great Britain and the FRG, the liberal tradition has been supplanted by neo-conservatism with its authoritarian ideology which sometimes displays an inclination for openly totalitarian, profoundly anti-democratic conceptions of political power, since conservative political mentality is closely associated with criticism of parliamentarianism and preference for authoritarian and dictatorial forms of government.

The livening up of neoconservative tendencies has generated technocratic and elitist conceptions, including the extreme right-wing technotronic totalitarian theory propounded by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Technocratic ideas have served to somewhat update the conservative ideology by giving it a semblance of modernity and scientific soundness. Champions of technocratic conservatism, Herman Kahn, Anthony Wiener et al., lay emphasis on a strong state, on more solid positions for the technocratic bureaucracy in the state apparatus, and on greater opportunities for ideologically manipulating the masses. They maintain that owing to the growing complexity of political decision-

making, this process gets increasingly concentrated in the hands of the technocrats who are not professional politicians but who wield real power in the state. For the same reason, the "incompetent masses" are not in a position to affect the process of reaching responsible decisions and exercise their democratic rights. This is how the conservative ideologists try to substantiate the need for rejecting the democratic forms of government, and for completely subjugating the masses to the state-monopoly elite.

The West German Marxists Manfred Buhr and Robert Steigerwald point to such elements of the conservative mentality as their wish to belittle the role of the masses and to highlight the profoundly elitist views of leadership and order. Another important principle of the conservative outlook is the thesis that organic, step-by-step evolution has an advantage over a sudden and radical change. It is basically hostile to the idea of revolution, its motive forces and representatives, as well as to all movements and ideologies promoting social progress.[18] Thus capitalist society today is no champion of social progress; rather, it is its stubborn opponent.

Another noteworthy point is that the Western ideas of the futility and regressive character of social revolution as a form of social development go against the facts of history. Marx referred to revolutions as "locomotives of history" and "progressive epochs" in mankind's development. It is during social revolutions that the transition to new, progressive forms of social and economic development is effected which saves mankind from stagnation and regress and gives impetus to its advancement along the road of progress and social justice.

The degree of progressiveness of this or that socio-economic formation cannot be assessed by subjective and arbitrary criteria, as is often the case with bourgeois researchers. Of paramount importance here is a sound, scientif-

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[18] Manfred Buhr, Robert Steigerwald, *Verzicht auf Fortschritt, Geschichte, Erkenntnis und Wahrheit. Zu den Grundtendenzen der gegenwärtigen bürgerlichen Philosophie,* Frankfurt am Main, 1981, pp. 58-59.

ically substantiated approach. The ideologists of capitalism usually restrict themselves to operating with secondary and limited criteria, such as the level of production or consumption, living standards, etc. We are not going to diminish their significance, but it would be fallacious to consider them, and them alone, the only indicators of progress and the state of society. The most comprehensive and revealing criterion which gives an objective idea of the state of things has been suggested by Marxist-Leninist theory, and that is the character of production relations inherent in a socio-economic formation. The soundness and effectiveness of this criterion has been borne out by practice.

Apologists of the capitalist system make a habit of referring to the fact that in a number of fields the leading capitalist countries have overtaken the socialist ones as proof of the overall superiority of capitalism over socialism. But what they fail to realize is that this is a temporary and historically transitory situation. And they keep deliberately silent about such things as the sharp and increasing social inequality in these supposedly prosperous societies, mass unemployment and poverty, and the economic and monetary crises which are shaking the capitalist system and reflecting its general crisis. The source of all these phenomena is the character of the capitalist production relations. Concentrating on secondary indicators, such as the volume of production of certain goods and services and the level of consumption, bourgeois ideologists hope to obscure the deeply-rooted contradictions that tear capitalist society apart, and disguise the reactionary character of capitalism and its historical doom and irreconcilability with social progress.

Oddly enough, bourgeois theorists who maintain that revolution has no part in promoting social progress sometimes refer to Marx's authority for substantiation. Many of them try to represent Marx as a champion of abstract humanism who opposed all forms of violence in the process of changing society. In his book *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, Shlomo Avinery advanced the idea that Marx regarded the movement of human society along the road of progress as a self-propelling process,

in the course of which transition from one socio-economic formation to the next one and the change of social and economic institutions proceed smoothly and do not involve any revolutionary leaps, violent actions, and the class struggle. "Recourse to terror is, according to Marx," writes Sh. Avinery, "an ultimate proof that the aims the revolution wishes to achieve cannot be achieved at present."[14] According to Avinery, this is a clear indication that, in Marx's view, only evolution can secure historical progress. Theories of this type, which are circulated under the heading of "neo-Marxism", in fact empty Marxism of its true meaning and serve to dissociate it from the process of revolutionary transformation of society as it really proceeds, and from the targets set by the modern contemporary working-class movement.

The growing interest in Marxist theory displayed by the broad public in capitalist states is used by bourgeois sociologists to promote their own ends, i.e., popularize theories that, while claiming to be Marxist, in fact distort Marxism, and to direct mass dissatisfaction into channels that do not threaten the position of the bourgeoisie. However, Western sociology is hard put to find ways to maintain the stability of the capitalist system. Its difficulties stem from the determination of the bourgeoisie to represent capitalism as the pinnacle of social progress and from its inability to hear the voice of the epoch.

Since the time of Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Auguste Comte and Max Weber, bourgeois sociology has refused to recognize the connection between revolution and progress. Auguste Comte considered revolution to be an anomaly in the life of society. Herbert Spencer maintained that revolutions produce a functional disorder in the entire social organism and introduce chaos and destruction into the life of society. Emile Durkheim equated revolution with crime. Contemporary sociologists never tire of saying that revolution cannot be analysed in terms of progress, that it has never been anything but a form of deviating

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[14] Shlomo Avinery, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, Cambridge, 1969, p. 188.

behavior, only on a larger scale. Raymond Momboisse, just as many other bourgeois scholars who investigated the field before him, plays up the thesis of the "illegality" of revolution: "A revolution occurs when a faction in the community, without sanction of law, resorts to armed hostilities in the attempt to constitute itself the governing force in society."[15] Another of his definitions reads: "A revolution is an attempt to seize power in defiance of authority and to use such power without the consent of those over whom it is exercised. The purpose of a revolutionary war is to destroy the existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new state structure."[16]

Social revolution as a form of social progress is opposed to evolution, which the Western countries are supposed to be following and which, in the opinion of bourgeois sociologists, is the only means of attaining social progress. Professor Karl A. Wittfogel insists, for instance, that progress is attainable only through "property-based civilizations". The drive should be not toward socialism but toward "multicentered and democratic society".[17] He maintains that while the feudal societies of Western Europe could develop toward capitalism, the "Asian bureaucracies", with tsarist Russia being one of them, were entirely unfit for progressive development. As a result, the new political structures created in the former Oriental despotic empires, e.g., Russia and China, were in fact a replica of the traditional Oriental bureaucratic regimes which have preserved the trend toward exercizing absolute power and applying terror.

These statements are so absurd that even bourgeois researchers subject them to criticism. The Dutch sociologist W. F. Wertheim referred to Wittfogel's theory as the worst specimen of evolutionism. He wrote that "the most unconvincing part of Wittfogel's doctrine is the denial of the truly modern aspects in the social structure of the Soviet

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[15] Raymond Momboisse, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism. A Comparative Study of Total Power*, New Haven, 1957, p. 447.

Union or the People's Republic of China... A refusal to see the numerous accomplishments and progressive elements in those countries, not only in the field of technology but in that of human organization and motivation as well, amounts to wilful blindness."[18]

W. F. Wertheim prefers the more moderate evolutionist theory expounded by Jean Romein, which has won many followers in bourgeois science. Romein maintains that "centers of human civilization or political power" shift from one region to another. While initially these are the more industrially advanced countries, subsequently "a new step in human evolution" is more likely to occur in backward countries, where resistance to social change (with Romein, as with all evolutionists, this term is tantamount to social revolution.—*Authors*) is weaker. Romein shows that leadership in human evolution perpetually shifts from one society to another, after overspecialisation has led yesterday's leader into a blind alley.

As represented by bourgeois scholars, the Western capitalist world has blazed the trail for progress and has been at the roots of modern civilization. Denying the legitimacy of the revolutionary way, ideologists of capitalism are trying hard to find an acceptable alternative to it and develop evolutionary versions whose recipe for dealing with crucial social problems is the lengthy road of petty concessions, compromises and half-hearted reforms.

Social revolution as a means of attaining social justice and welfare for all the working people is declared by some ideologists unacceptable and unrealistic, and so their emphasis is shifted wholly to the improvement of production, scientific and technological factors, such as the rational organization of production and the accelerated growth of labour productivity that stems from scientific and technological advances, etc. Moved to the forefront are the technocratic and elitist theories. Attempts are made to discover a panacea in the technological revolution, which is developing in the USA and other Western states under the

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[18] W. F. Wertheim, *Evolution and Revolution: The Rising Waves of Emancipation*, p. 65.

strong impact of the elite. Such phenomena as classes, the class struggle and ideology are declared a thing of the past, sunk into oblivion by scientific and technological progress. The expediency and efficacy of this way is supposed to be proved by contemporary capitalist society, where property and economic management have actually been separated and capitalist exploitation has given way to other, more advanced and refined relations of production.

It is claimed that modern capitalist society, with its high standard of living, makes it immaterial to the working class who actually owns the means of production. This brings the possibility of revolution down to zero. Consequently, bourgeois sociologists conclude, the assumption that capitalism acts as a break upon social progress is obsolete, true only of the past. There is hardly any difference, it is asserted, between modern capitalist and socialist societies; the former is allegedly able to realize the ideals of socialism without resorting to revolution. "If socialism is defined as 'ownership of the means of production by the workers'," writes the noted American sociologist and philosopher Peter F. Drucker, "...then the United States is the first truly 'Socialist' country...".[19] He terms the changes that have occurred in American society "the unseen revolution" which has allegedly taken place in the USA without any human losses and brought a great deal more advantages to the workers than some of the revolutions in the socialist countries. "In terms of socialist theory," he says, "the employees of America are the only true 'owners' of the means of production."[20] Their pension funds are supposed to make them true capitalists owning, controlling and managing the country's capitals.

What Drucker fails to mention is that the supposed participation of workers in the management of production and in distribution is a cynical fraud designed to foster social illusions and faith in the possibility of class collaboration. He also omits to mention that the real masters of America

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[19] Peter F. Drucker, *The Unseen Revolution. How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America*, London, 1976, pp. 1, 2.

[20] *Ibid.*

are still the Wall Street and Californian money-bags, Texas multi-millionaires and heads of transnationals, who are controlling the entire economic and political life of the country and extract profit worth of millions of dollars from their businesses and whose influence is felt in the most out-of-the-way corners of the capitalist world.

The majority of bourgeois ideologists are working to create an impression that the Marxist doctrine of the revolutionary role of the working class is rooted in the theory of "impoverishment". This kind of conception is nothing more than oversimplification. In actual fact, Marx spoke about the fact that the realisation by the working class of the need for revolutionary change was consequent from its downtrodden, subordinate position in the system of social production under capitalism. At the early stages of capitalist development the brutal exploitation of workers was closely accompanied by abject poverty and privations. Nowadays as well the working class continues to be exploited despite the relative growth of its living standard. The forms and methods of exploitation have changed, but its essence remains the same. In the conditions of external material welfare and comfort, the workers experience in many cases the psychologically more cruel, sophisticated and exhausting methods of exploitation than was the case one hundred years ago. The workers are threatened with the lot of becoming robots, a mere appendage or a faceless cog in the complex production system of capitalist monopolies. Unemployment that brings about social and civil rightlessness and the spiritual degradation of the individual assumes disastrous proportions.

The growing awareness of the discrepancy between the worker's role in social production and the share of his rights helps him to realize that he must fight for a drastic change in his position and the abolition of the capitalist system itself. Today, the class struggle is expanding and assuming the scope of a resolute offensive against capitalism.

The much-advertized improvement of living standards in the capitalist society does not signify integration of the working class by capitalism, as bourgeois sociologists are apt

to maintain, even if it does sometimes provide a breeding ground for reformist and opportunistic moods and ideas.

Bourgeois ideologists examine the issue of the "cost of revolution" as completely isolated from the objective conditions and historical processes of society's development. Social revolution, which stems from the contradictions inherent in the old social system, is always directed against this system and the reactionary classes which defend it. Naturally unwilling to scrap the old social relations, the moribund classes resist the new tendencies. Counter-revolution arises as a reaction to social revolution, and it is the counter-revolution of the outgoing classes, motivated by their desire to reverse the course of history and revive the obsolescent social system, and not the revolution itself that leads to human and material losses. Counter-revolution sometimes proves capable of temporarily holding back social progress but in the final analysis it is doomed.

This goes to show that the issue of the "cost of revolution", which seems to be a hobby-horse of so many bourgeois sociologists of revolution, can be legitimately raised only with reference to counter-revolution. "Attempts to blacken the revolution," writes Yu. A. Krasin, "provide Western sociologists of revolution with an excuse to develop a theory of counter-revolution of sorts," which is designed to evolve reliable recommendations to the governments on how to deal with uprisings.[21]

Particular vigor in the field has been demonstrated by the US conservative political forces. Their position is probably expressed most succinctly by President Ronald Reagan, who has made it the cornerstone of American domestic and foreign policies. In this connection, let us have a look at his foreword to Raymond Momboisse's *Blueprint of Revolution*, from which we have already quoted. Ronald Reagan wrote it in 1970, long before he was elected President, but even at the time his political credo had already been clearly formulated and unequivocal: to fight revolution and revolutionary movements both within and outside

[21] Yu. A. Krasin, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

the country by all available means. "The great contribution of *Blueprint of Revolution*," he wrote, "is that it exposes the tactics of disruption and revolt. It pierces the veil of duplicity and false propaganda in which the revolutionist shrouds his plans and actions."[22] The book, he proceeded to say, provides the foundations of knowledge and perspective goals of revolution. He also pointed out that "long-range protection against revolution must come as a result of well-prepared, well-trained, and highly effective public agencies". Reagan in fact called for the mustering of all the conservative and counter-revolutionary potential in bourgeois society in the struggle against revolution. Thereby he was laying a foundation for his subsequent counter-revolutionary policies which are now pursued not merely at the Californian but at the national and international level.

Ronald Reagan appealed to the American nation to "sustain its heritage of freedom and democratic government" and stated that "our success in meeting this challenge will depend upon the ability of alert citizens to make responsible decisions based on a thorough knowledge and understanding of the threat which faces us".[23]

The literature in the category to which Raymond Momboisse's book belongs is usually very welcome to a certain section of the US ruling quarters who are frightened by the possibility of revolution. This fear, as well as the wish to poison the people's minds by counter-revolutionary propaganda and falsify the real meaning of revolution as the prime mover of progress find the most striking expression in the final paragraphs of the book. "Revolutions are violent and brutal," writes Momboisse. "They are cruel to friend and foe. They bring suffering and death to the innocent, as well as to the guilty."[24] Revolution is counterposed to reform, which, according to the author, "is the natural, practical, peaceful method of improving human society". "The great danger is," he concludes, "that democracy will be destroyed and on its ruins will rise a dictator-

[22] Raymond Momboisse, *op. cit.*, pp. VIII-IX.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. X.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

ship that will suppress dissent, will stamp out all freedom."[25]

The *Blueprint of Revolution* is a most graphic specimen of counter-revolutionary mentality typical of the modern bourgeois sociology of revolution. Its representatives are doing their best to influence the consciousness of the masses in the capitalist countries. What is dangerous about this activity is that, pretending objectively to analyse the revolutionary process, its real purpose is to instill the idea of the ruinous consequences and horrible "cost" of revolution.

However, recent history has proved that it is through revolutions that people gain happiness and prosperity. In the words of Engels, revolution is "a powerful agent of social and political progress".[26] Revolutions highlight the role of the masses as history-makers. "Revolutions," wrote Lenin, "are festivals of the oppressed and the exploited. At no other time are the mass of the people in a position to come forward so actively as creators of a new social order, as at a time of revolution. At such times the people are capable of performing miracles, if judged by the limited philistine yardstick of gradualist progress."[27] It is for this reason that the revolutionary epochs produce a manifold increase in the rate and potentiality of social development and serve as the prime mover of progress.

On the other hand, contrary to what bourgeois propaganda asserts, it matters a great deal to Marxists-Leninists at what cost mankind advances along the road toward progress. This is clear from the fact that Lenin's principal behest to us is the policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, to which the Soviet Union has unswervingly adhered for 70 years and which has been adopted by the other socialist community countries.

True Marxists-Leninists have always opposed the idea of the "exporting of revolution", as well as the adventurist

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[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 308, 309.

[26] Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, 1979, p. 32.

[27] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, 1972, p. 113.

views propagated by the various ultra-leftist groups and factions. They have always rejected in a most inambiguous fashion the theory of revolution at all costs, including thermonuclear war, which was given currency in China in the not-so-distant period of the "cultural revolution", as well as the hegemonist ambitions for world supremacy. Communists resolutely dissociate themselves from the senseless terrorist actions of leftist groups which result in the futile loss of human lives and wanton destruction. All this has nothing in common with the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the revolutionary process.

"As distinct from imperialism," said Mikhail Gorbachev at the 27th CPSU Congress, "which is trying to halt the course of history by force, to regain what it had in the past, socialism has never, of its own free will, related its future to any military solution of international problems. ... Today, too, we are firmly convinced that promoting revolutions from outside, and even more so by military means, is futile and inadmissible.

"The problems and crises experienced by the capitalist world arise within its own system and are a natural result of the internal antagonistic contradictions of the old society."[28]

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[28] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Moscow, 1986, pp. 13-14.

Part Two

The Great October Socialist Revolution as the Summit of Social Revolution and its Bourgeois Critics

Chapter One

Sociology of Revolution and Bourgeois Historiography of the October Revolution

The socialist revolution is the highest type of social revolution. Being a means of transition from the capitalist to the socialist system, it differs radically from other social revolutions. It signifies not just a transition to another socio-economic formation but ushers in the highest phase in the development of mankind, a society without exploitation. While the preceding revolutionary epochs merely replaced one form of exploitation by another and the old ruling class by a new one, the socialist revolution puts an end to all forms of exploitation and ultimately results in the building of a society that has no exploiter classes and in the emancipation of working people from all forms of oppression.

The most representative example of this type of revolution is the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia. It was not only the first socialist revolution; it also incorporated the typical features of the socialist revolution in modern times. *"The Great October Socialist Revolution became a landmark in world history, determined the general direction and main trends of world development,"* reads the new edition of the CPSU Programme adopted by the 27th Party Congress, *"and initiated the irreversible process of the replacement of capitalism by the new, communist socio-economic formation."*[1]

[1] *The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A New Edition*, Moscow, 1986, p. 8.

The October Revolution in Russia was the first in a series of socialist, proletarian revolutions. It has given rise to a whole range of new major theoretical and methodological problems involved in the revolutionary process which no other revolution has posed before.

An analysis of the lessons of the October Revolution makes an important contribution to the revolutionary transformation of society which has gained momentum and which increasingly affects all areas of the globe. It has blazed the trail and set the landmarks which are followed by millions of participants in the revolutionary movement everywhere. Lenin wrote that "certain fundamental features of our revolution have a significance that is not local, or peculiarly national, or Russian alone, but international. . . . It is the Russian model that reveals to *all* countries something—and something highly significant—of their near and inevitable future."[2] It is this circumstance that engenders the ever-present fear of and the continuing hostility toward the October Revolution on the part of its ideological opponents. "Since the Great October Revolution in Russia and the split of the world on the social-class principle," said Mikhail Gorbachev, "fundamental differences have emerged both in the assessment of current affairs and in the views concerning the world's social perspective.

"Capitalism regarded the birth of socialism as an 'error' of history which must be 'rectified'. It was to be rectified at any cost, by any means. . ."[3]

Being forced to admit the exceptional importance of the ideas of the October Revolution, the Sovietologists have to study its lessons. In their struggle against the revolutionary movements of today they are joined by Western researchers specialising in the sociology of revolution. There is a close link between the two groups of bourgeois ideologists. As a rule, the numerous conceptions of the October Revolution evolved by Sovietologists are significantly affected by the more general, "global" sociological theories and po-

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[2] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, 1977, pp. 21-22.

[3] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, p. 12.

litical doctrines which have sprung into existence in the postwar period and then disappeared with equal promptness. One can safely say that each time the subject of contemporary revolutionary movements and the ways of combating them is brought up, bourgeois ideologists resurrect the grossly distorted assessments of the October Revolution. These are used not merely to illustrate individual tenets but above all to substantiate anti-Marxist theories. A number of conceptions that distort the essence of the present revolutionary process and lay claim to universality have been evolved on the basis of warped interpretations of the October Revolution. The latter is that touchstone which has been used to shape many of the modern anti-Marxist theories of social revolution. In their turn, these serve as the ideological source of the bourgeois conceptions of the October Revolution, as their theoretical and methodological foundation. This is where the close mutual dependence and community of goals of the various trends in bourgeois ideology are revealed.

Let us have a look at the "theoretical" foundation of the bourgeois interpretations of the October Revolution, at the more general sociological doctrines which are closely related to the major trends in bourgeois historiography of the October Revolution and the critique of Marxist-Leninist theory by Western researchers. A number of major trends can be identified. One of the earliest anti-Marxist interpretations of the October Revolution which has been widely circulated in the West, mostly in the USA and Great Britain, back in the 1930s was the conception based on the so-called "tidal wave of revolution", or the issue of Thermidor. This theory, which was introduced by Crane Brinton and Lyford Edwards, maintains that revolutions run through three different phases. According to Brinton, the Russian Revolution proceeded after the pattern of classic Western revolutions, the French Revolution in the first place. Just as the preceding revolutions, it has moved through a closed cycle: from moderate to increasingly left groups, and then back again. Referring to the revolutions of the past, Brinton states: "We may say then that in all our revolutions there is a tendency for power to go from

Right to Center to Left, from the conservatives of the old regime to the moderates to the radicals or extremists. As power moves along this line, it gets more and more concentrated, more and more narrows its base in the country and among the people, since at each important crisis the defeated group has to drop out of politics."[4] All this determines its weakness and paves the way for Thermidor, i.e. the reverse process.

Drawing ill-considered parallels between the October Revolution of 1917 and the French Revolution of 1789, bourgeois historians usually associate the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy and the advent of the Provisional Government to power in February 1917 with the first phase of the revolution, and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin in October of that year, with the second phase of the revolutionary wave. According to Brinton, it signified the establishment of a Jacobin dictatorship, which was to be followed by the Thermidorian coup, the return to a point of departure.

The October Revolution was viewed as a typical Jacobin coup at the top of the power structure, which had a restricted social base. The fallaciousness of Brinton's model, which likened the revolutionary process to a malaise, is particularly noticeable in his conception of Thermidor, which is essentially subjective and tends to crumble when coming in contact with reality. The accomplishment of the proletarian revolution in Russia served to expand the social base of Soviet revolutionary power. It rested in the support of a broad section of the population, including workers, peasants and other urban and rural toiling strata. The decisive significance and strength of this support became strikingly clear at the time of the Civil War and foreign intervention, when only popular support allowed the Red Army to score a final victory over the well-armed and trained White Guards and foreign armies. The Thermidorian interpretation of the October Revolution bears little resemblance to the socialist revolution accomplished by the working class, an event that was epoch-making in its scope, goals and con-

[4] C. Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, New York, 1965, p. 123.

tent and that has made possible the building of a fundamentally new society, a society without exploitation. The October Revolution was much more than a sequel to the February 1917 events. It was a qualitatively new type of social revolution, in which the working class of Russia rose against the bourgeoisie, its class antagonist and not its ally, as the champions of the Thermidorian theory assert. The Thermidor that Brinton considers inevitable and that was impatiently awaited by the reactionary quarters did not occur in Russia. The October Revolution did not terminate in Thermidor and the decline of the revolutionary process but, on the contrary, ushered in an epoch of great revolutionary change not only in Russia but all over the world.

Obviously, the theory of "inevitable Thermidor" applied to the socialist revolution in Russia mirrored the moods of ruling circles in the capitalist countries in the period between the two world wars, who for a long time had cherished hopes that the revolutionary social changes in Soviet Russia would come to naught and that a gradual restoration of the old order would begin. But their hopes did not come true. History has exposed the unsoundness of the Thermidor theory. The lid on it was finally closed by the illustrious victory of the Soviet people over Nazi Germany, which demonstrated to the world the stability of the socialist system.

The new situation that has evolved after the Second World War, specifically the consolidation of world socialism, has engendered the need to revise the old and ineffectual conceptions of the October Revolution. They were replaced by new ones, rooted in the sociological doctrines of mass and totalitarian society. One of the more anti-Soviet versions of this trend, which was formed against the background of cold war and anti-communist hysteria fanned up in the USA and other capitalist countries, is the theory of "Soviet (or communist) totalitarianism", developed by many bourgeois sociologists and political scientists, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carl Friedrich, Hannah Arendt, and Hans Buckheim. In many ways these theories have mirrored the consternation and fear of the ruling quarters of Western states in the face of the growing might

and stability of Soviet society, the monolithic unity of the Soviet people and their dedication to the Communist Party's ideas and principles. These theories, amplified by various versions of elitism, have been used as the basis for the numerous highly anti-Soviet interpretations of the October Revolution as an anti-democratic, totalitarian overthrow allegedly responsible for the "totalitarian" character of the Soviet state system.

Hannah Arendt counterposed the October Revolution to the "real emancipatory revolutions", such as the English Revolution or the French and American revolutions of the 18th century.[5] From sociological works, this estimate has made its way into the works of bourgeois historians writing about the October Revolution. American researcher George D. Jackson also opposes the October Revolution to the French and American revolutions, assessing them as revolutions of emancipation.[6] Champions of the totalitarian conceptions of the Russian Revolution tend to assert that it was "illegitimate" and irrational by nature. They counterpose the "democratic" February revolution in Russia to the "totalitarian" October Revolution and enter into lengthy discussions about the "elitist" and "conspiratory" tactics used by the Bolshevik Party. In the 1950s-1960s the most vigorous champions of this trend were Hugh Seton-Watson, Professor of the University of London, and Richard Pipes, Honorary Professor of Harvard University, formerly one of the US President's leading advisers on relations with the USSR. Other prominent personalities in the field are Leonard Schapiro, Merle Fainsod, John Keep and Henry L. Roberts.

The new situation that evolved in the mid-1960s and the first half of the 1970s was marked by detente, a certain alleviation of anti-Sovietism and the mounting of realistic tendencies in the policies pursued by Western states. This served to somewhat curtail the impact of the totalitarian conceptions of the October Revolution that had an overtly anti-Soviet thrust and were hostile to the spirit of coopera-

[5] H. Arendt, *On Revolution*, New York, 1963, pp. 2, 3.

[6] *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 86, No. 2, April 1981, p. 430.

tion. At that time, when socialist democracy continued to make headway in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and a number of newly-free states in Asia, Africa and Latin America chose the non-capitalist path of development, it became particularly clear that the ideas of "Soviet and communist totalitarianism", as well as the conceptions of the "anti-democratic", "totalitarian" character of the October Revolution had little to do with reality. Many peoples saw the Russian revolution and the building of socialism in the Soviet Union as a pattern to be followed to attain real freedom and justice. Besides, anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies were making themselves felt in the capitalist world, above all in the USA. Against that background, the old totalitarian conceptions were subjected to sharp criticism by the theorists of modernization.

Ever since the second half of the 1970s, primary importance has been attached to bourgeois conceptions of the October Revolution based on the modernization theory, which rests on the idea that in the process of their development all nations are bound to pass from the traditional, i.e., mostly agrarian, to the new industrial society.

In its turn, the process of industrialization produces the need to renovate all aspects of the life of society. Since these processes have a universal character, they are expected to eventually produce the convergence of the different social systems. While in the West modernization was gradual and provided an opportunity for peaceful evolution, in the backward countries which embarked on this road later modernization processes were compressed in time and became explosive, since society was not allowed enough time to adapt to the changing conditions. Bourgeois researchers name Russia one of the first countries to have fallen victim to modernization. The most prominent theorists of modernization, Walt Rostow, Cyril E. Black and S. N. Eisenstandt, saw the Russian Revolution of 1917 as a classic example confirming the soundness of their model of contemporary backward societies. Their views strongly affected the evolution of bourgeois historiography of the October Revolution. Professor Cyril E. Black of Princeton University wrote that the model of social change widely known as

modernization yields good results when used to interpret developments occurring in Russian society after 1861. He regards the October Revolution and its consequences as a specific form of the global evolution of modern industrial society. Accordingly, in his book *The Dynamics of Modernization* he referred to the revolution in Russia as part of global modernisation.[7] The modernization theory was also applied to the study of the revolutionary process in Russia by S. N. Eisenstadt. He numbered 18th and 19th-century Russia among the feudal societies of the type that existed within the Roman Empire in the first five centuries A.D., in the Ottoman Empire between 1451 and 1788, in China up to 1911, and in the European absolute monarchies during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution in England.[8]

According to the modernization theory, the chief goal and content of the October Revolution and the subsequent history of Soviet society was industrialization. It originated in tsarist Russia in the late 19th-early 20th centuries but was futile at that time. Advocates of this theory maintain that Lenin and the Bolshevik Party did not try to adhere to Marxist tenets, setting themselves, for the most part, purely practical goals. The determination to build a strong state, they claim, took precedence each time the Bolsheviks had to choose between theory and practice. This is supposed to indicate that the type of revolution to which the October Socialist Revolution belonged is legitimate in the backward countries alone and cannot be regarded as acceptable elsewhere. According to Cyril Black and Thomas Thornton, the communist revolutionary doctrine cannot be considered universal, and the experience of the October Revolution has only a limited significance.[9] The socialist

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[7] C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization. A Study in Comparative History*, New York, 1966.

[8] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies. A Comparative Study of Civilizations*, New York, 1978, pp. 74-75.

[9] *Communism and Revolution. The Strategic Uses of Political Violence*, Ed. by Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964.

revolution in Russia is represented as one of the first revolutions in backward countries, a revolution within the modernization process. In the 1960s, this idea was propounded in the works of the American historian Theodore von Laue. A similar stand was occupied by Lionel Kochan and Dietrich Geyer, and later Paul Dukes of the University of Aberdeen, William Rosenberg of the University of Michigan, Marylin B. Young et al. However, history has failed to confirm modernization theories, just as it has refuted the totalitarian theories of the October Revolution before them. The history of contemporary social development begun by the October Revolution shows that the objective foundation determining its law-governed character is not the process of modernization, which is devoid of a class content, but the transition from the capitalist socio-economic formation to the communist one. Not without reason some bourgeois researchers have taken a sceptical view of the link between the victory of the October Revolution and the modernization issue. "In any case," wrote Robert V. Daniels, "the modernization role has nothing to do with the Bolshevik victory in 1917 and little to do with their successful tenure of power in the early years. In their doctrine and program the Bolsheviks were completely unprepared for the modernizing role."[10] In actual fact, the revolution accomplished by the Russian working class led by the Bolshevik Party pursued entirely different and a great deal more ambitious ends than those ascribed to them by bourgeois modernization advocates—the building of a new, just and comprehensively developed society without exploiter classes, based on the principles of equality and democracy.

Neither research within the "totalitarian" trend nor the modernization theory of the October Revolution have ever existed as independent doctrines. In many cases they fuse and amplify each other. As Soviet historians have justly noted, the conceptual structures that have grown out of the "totalitarian" doctrine not only coexist with the conceptions

[10] Robert V. Daniels, "The Bolshevik Gamble", *The Russian Review*, Stanford, California, Vol. 26, No. 4, October 1967, p. 334.

of "convergence" and the "modernization" theory but also combine to produce intermediate "theoretical models" of the revolutionary process in 20th-century Russia.[11] In the 1960s, Theodore von Laue and other scholars who considered modernization the principal feature of Russian history proceeded from the "totalitarian" model when defining the role of the Bolsheviks in this process. Similar estimates have recently been made by other bourgeois researchers. William Rosenberg and Marylin Young state that while the overall situation in Russia, i.e., its socio-economic backwardness, made an overturn of some sort the inevitable outcome of the striving for individualization and modernization, the advent of the Bolsheviks to power was neither necessary nor inevitable.[12] Hence the conclusion about the coercion resorted to by the Bolsheviks during the Revolution, who are alleged to have rejected democratic methods of government and acted as a "totalitarian" force. Lenin and his associates turn out to have possessed an authoritarian mentality—at least this is what T. H. Rigby asserts, When in 1917 the Bolsheviks seized power, he writes, they considered themselves the vehicles of an inexorable historical process and believed in their right to set up a regime of unrestricted power in order to attain their goals. That was the dictatorship of the proletariat.[13] The author's bias is apparent; it is a fact that the October Revolution was a truly popular one. Led by the Bolsheviks, the working class of Russia accomplished it in alliance with the other working strata of the population. That was not a voluntaristic and violent act staged by the Bolsheviks, as bourgeois ideologists are trying to represent it contrary to the known facts: it was precisely a socialist revolution that had made possible the country's democratic development

[11] B. I. Marushkin, G. Z. Joffe, N. V. Romanovsky, *Three Revolutions in Russia and Bourgeois Historiography*, Moscow, 1977, p. 225 (in Russian).

[12] William Y. Rosenberg, Marylin B. Young, *Transforming Russia and China; Revolutionary Struggle in the Twentieth Century*, New York, 1982.

[13] *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR. Essays Dedicated to Leonard Schapiro*, Ed. by T. H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway, London, 1980, p. 193.

and allowed it to carry through the principles of government by the people in all spheres of social life. The Revolution produced Soviets, the most democratic bodies of people's authority. The profoundly democratic character of the new socialist state that came into being as a consequence of the October Revolution became abundantly apparent from the very first decrees and actions of the young state and from the broad popular support enjoyed by the new government.

Another popular myth about the October Revolution is the one about its elitist character. Basing themselves on the theory of the ruling elite, bourgeois ideologists maintain that political power can belong only to a minority, the so-called elite, which seizes political leadership and exercises rule over the non-elite thanks to certain qualities naturally inherent in it. This approach reduces the revolutionary struggle between classes to a power struggle between conflicting groups within the elite, and social revolution to a coup d'état. While the February Revolution in Russia, as Western Sovietologists maintain, was truly "popular" and accomplished "from the bottom", the October Revolution was a revolt carried out by a handful of conspirators standing high above the masses. The Bolshevik Party is portrayed as a caste that has nothing in common with the majority of the population and is rooted in Narodism (Russian populism), Blanquism and in the specific evolution of Russian intelligentsia.

The organizational structure of a party is also viewed from the elitist stand as the embodiment of the elitist ideal. However, this oversimplified approach is so vulnerable that even Western researchers have critically commented on this. They have pointed out the discrepancy between the conceptions refusing to admit that the October Revolution involved the broad masses who supported the Bolsheviks, and the evidence of the stability and viability of the Soviet system. Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod state that once the social forces which had given rise to the Bolshevik revolution are ignored (as is often the case with the general writings on the Soviet system), this system is bound to appear as an entirely alien phenomenon. In that case, what

are the sources of strength that enabled the USSR to stand up to the hardships that had fallen to its lot?[14] To elucidate this point, wide currency in the West has recently been given to updated elitist schemes borrowed from the most recent models of revolution devised by sociologists and political scientists. They recognize that the October Revolution had a broad social base, but the masses played a passive role. For example, Mark Hagopian divides modern revolutions into urban and agrarian on the basis of the strategy they are supposed to follow. Talking about the strategy of modern urban revolutions, he gives pride of place to the so-called Blanquist and Leninist strategies, which also embrace the strategy of the urban guerrillas and the general strike. While the Blanquist strategy is essentially elitist and conspiratorial and culminates in an elitist coup effected from above, Lenin's strategy, as Hagopian views it, combines elitism of the Blanquist brand with protestations about closer contacts with the masses. "The party, which leads and 'educates' the masses, acts like the general staff of an army... During and before the Russian Revolution of 1917 Lenin organized the Bolshevik party according to this strategy."[15]

Following in the steps of sociologists, Western historians applied themselves to the study of the mass base of the October Revolution, producing a number of more objective appraisals. The American historian Ronald Grigor Suny writes that conclusions about "the artificial, unorganic, manipulated nature of October" and that "great revolutions, like more modest acts of political protest, are the creations of outside agitators" are "unwarranted".[16]

The fact that the advocates of the elitist conception of the October Revolution have taken up the study of "the masses in revolution" has, however, failed to work any changes in their basic attitudes toward this event. They

[14] Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978, p. 39.

[15] Mark N. Hagopian, *Regimes, Movements and Ideologies*, p. 281.

[16] Ronald Grigor Suny, "Toward a Social History of the October Revolution", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 88, No. 1, February 1983, p. 43.

interpret the notion of masses as tantamount to that of crowd without putting any class content into it. The masses are represented not as an active agent in revolution but as an amorphous passive crowd totally devoid of class self-awareness and easily manipulated and cheated by the elite. In the final analysis, this amounts to a refusal to recognize the class essence of the October Revolution and the leading role of the working class in it, and signifies the absence of clearly defined views on the attitude to the Revolution and participation in it of the other urban and rural working strata. The character of the October Revolution is thus misinterpreted, which fact facilitates the consolidation of the more conservative views on it: it was a sway of uncontrollable forces that had risen against law and order. By and large, the elitist conceptions of the October Revolution deny its significance as a socialist, proletarian and popular revolution, do not recognise the fundamental unity of the Bolshevik Party and the Russian working class, and underrate its impact on the working masses.

The late 1970s witnessed the mounting campaign waged in the West, and above all in the USA, against the ideas of detente, and the livening up of neo-conservative tendencies. Against this background, the interest in various versions of the "totalitarian" theory was revived. Appeals were sounded to continue applying it against the USSR.[17] Another factor that operated at that time was the complete fiasco of the theories of convergence of the two systems. Attempts were undertaken to bring the old schemes back to life by somewhat modifying them. The result was the emergence of new models—"dynamic totalitarianism", "totalitarianism with a new face", "democratic totalitarianism", etc., which were opposed to the old models of "traditional, or static totalitarianism". While the old versions were based on the idea of Soviet society as a united and monolithic one, the new conceptions incorporated elements of a pluralistic model, i.e., recognized the existence of independent groups

[17] George Urban, "A Conversation with Leszek Kolakowski. The Devil in History", *Encounter*, Vol. LVI, No. 1, January 1981, pp. 14-15.

pursuing their own ends. The interpretation of the October Revolution made from this stand was also amplified with some of the elements of the pluralistic approach. Over the past few years, bourgeois historiography of the October Revolution has displayed enhanced interest in the role of the various social groups in it. True, this interest has certain limits. It concerns above all the army and the navy,[18] and to a less extent, the working class.[19] Increasing attention is being given to the national aspects of the Russian Revolution.[20] A number of works point to the presence of several currents in the revolutionary process in Russia, and the strife among the various factions within the Bolshevik Party.

On the whole, however, the revision of the old "totalitarian" conceptions of the October Revolution circulated at the time of the cold war has not made bourgeois political scientists and Sovietologists blunt their anti-Soviet edge but, on the contrary, rendered them even more conservative. A whole series of recent works in the field are marked not only by extreme anti-Sovietism but even open hostility to the Russian people at large and to their history. The philosophical foundation for this approach has been provided by New Conservatism, the political and ideological trend among certain quarters of the bourgeoisie which has recently prevailed in the West, especially in the USA,

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[18] Allan K. Wildman, *The End of the Russian Imperial Army. The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt (March-April 1917)*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1980; George Katkov, *Russia 1917. The Kornilov Affair. Kerensky and the Break-up of the Russian Army*, London, 1980.

[19] S. A. Smith, *Red Petrograd. Revolution in the Factories 1917-1918*, Cambridge, 1983; Diane Koenker, *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1981; David Mandel, *The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime. From the February Revolution to the July Days, 1917*, London, 1983.

[20] Ronald Grigor Suny, *Nationalism and Social Class in the Russian Revolution: The Cases of Baku and Tiflis*, Conference on Nationalism and Social Change in Transcaucasia, Oberlin College. Co-sponsored by Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center and American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, April 24-25, 1980.

Britain and West Germany. The conservative mentality does not recognize the role of laws and regularities in history but attaches great importance to the divine Providence. It is hostile to revolution, its motive forces and champions as a matter of principle; it entertains overtly elitist, authoritarian ideas of power and the strong state, and underrates the role of the masses in history. It gambles heavily on tradition and customs and is wary of the consequences of progress.

All of these features have come to the fore in the treatment of the October Revolution by Sovietologists. Faced with the fact that the advancement of Soviet society along the road of democracy and progress upsets their ideas of its "totalitarian" character allegedly determined by the October Revolution, the champions of this approach began a search for more ancient historical roots of "communist totalitarianism" in the hope of finding more convincing facts to fit their conceptions. M. Hirszowicz asserts that the prototype of modern totalitarian regimes is to be found in the so-called ancient Asian "hydraulic societies" with their traditionalist structure.[21] With reference to Russia, the roots of totalitarianism are to be sought both in long-term factors, such as the Russian Orthodox tradition, centralized bureaucracy and the obligation of the subjects to serve the state introduced back in Muscovy Russia, and in more recent features of spiritual, political and intellectual life of tsarist Russia in the 19th-early 20th centuries.[22] This viewpoint found the most coherent expression in the works of Richard Pipes written in the 1970s. His contention is that totalitarianism in Russia is rooted, not in Western ideas but in Russian political institutions. "Between 1878 and 1881 in Russia," he writes, "the legal and institutional basis was laid for a bureaucratic police regime with totalitarian overtones that have not been dismantled since. The roots of modern totalitarianism, one may well argue, are

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[21] M. Hirszowicz, *The Bureaucratic Leviathan: A Study in Sociology of Communism*, Oxford, 1980.

[22] *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 85, No. 3, June 1980, p. 687.

sought more properly here than in the ideas of a Rousseau or Hegel or Marx."[23]

Richard Pipes associates the final establishment of the bureaucratic-totalitarian system with the October Revolution which has allegedly paved the way for the notorious "Soviet totalitarianism". Actually, he refuses to recognize the obvious fact, i.e., that the October Revolution opened up a fundamentally new stage in Russian history. To replace the unsound and too odious totalitarian model, which was applicable to both the German fascist state and the Soviet Union that selflessly put itself in the way of the former's thrust toward world domination, a new and no less cynical parallel is drawn between the people's government and tsarist autocracy. The democratic gains of the October Revolution are simply ignored, and the world's first socialist state that has emancipated a huge mass of the population from all forms of exploitation and oppression is declared an heir to tsarist despotism. Even setting these considerations aside, the theory of Richard Pipes clashes with the facts of history. The October Revolution and the seizure of political power by the working class put the lid on the survivals of the feudal and landowner system in Russia, thus removing the threat of the restoration of the monarchy. Uprooting the remnants of tsarist despotism and feudal oppression was a major goal of the Revolution. It is unnatural and senseless, to say the least, to look for points of contact between the Russian absolutism and the Soviet system.

Another follower of this theory, Professor Richard Hellie of the University of Chicago went even further by advancing one of the most extreme military-technical conceptions of Russian history, that of a "garrison state". "The basic continuous elements of Russian history," he writes, "are a people, the Great Russians, surrounded by real or imaginary enemies in a country without suitable natural frontiers and without adequate resources—material or human—for their own defense. The solution has been called a garrison

[23] Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime*, London, 1974, pp. 298-99.

state."[24] According to Richard Hellie, it has taken shape as a result of the "three service class revolutions", the evolution of the autocratic-bureaucratic form of government, serfdom, and some philosophical synthesis, an ideology that vindicated unquestioning obedience of the subjects to the authorities for the sake of defense from foreign invasion and was unaware of Western values. Hellie names the "middle service class" the social and political basis of such a state—the class that had gone through three revolutions: under Ivan III and his successors, under Peter the Great, and as a result of the October Revolution under collectivization and industrialization.[25]

Hellie's conception is the logical outcome of the doctrinaire approach carried to absurdity, typical of bureaucratic-totalitarian conceptions of the October Revolution and Soviet society. This lop-sided approach is not only extremely biased; it is marked by deeply-rooted hostility toward Russian history and the Russians, who are presented as having primitive ambitions and a warped nature. Russia emerges from such writings as a militarized state, while the economic, political and cultural aspects of its life and development are ignored. Just as Pipes before him, Hellie turns a blind eye to the drastic progressive turn effected in the country's history by the October Revolution. And this is not surprising, since otherwise the rickety theories of Russian history would collapse like a house of cards.

The bureaucratic-totalitarian conceptions of the history of the Soviet state and the October Revolution which convey the ideas of New Conservatism, have recently been raised to the status of the ruling quarters' official ideology in a number of Western states, above all the USA and Britain. Their overall tendency is toward rabid anti-Sovietism and anti-communism. The ideas of New Conservatism have become a banner of sorts in the struggle against the revolutionary movements. The log-

[24] Richard Hellie, "The Structure of Modern Russian History: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Russian History/Historie Russe*, Vol. 4, Part 1, 1977, p. 3.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-7.

ical outcome of the biased position which is overtly hostile to the Soviet state and the progressive movements, which in ideology is represented by the escalation of neo-conservative ideas, is Reagan's well-known concept of Russia as "the evil empire". As we have seen, this concept has not appeared out of the blue. The way for it has been paved by political programme; it is a direct consequence of the ambitions and ideas of political conservatism adopted by the ruling circles of the USA and other imperialist states, which are used, among other things, to combat the ideas proclaimed by the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Chapter Two

Prerequisites and Causes

The ideologists of capitalism are conducting a vigorous offensive against the ideas of the October Revolution in the hope of checking the course of history. They have never concealed that there is a difference of principle between them and the Marxist scholars. Their ultimate objective is to prove that the October Revolution was not a natural outcome of a sequence of events. By admission of the American historian George Jackson, the majority of US Sovietologists specializing in the history of the October Revolution are doing their best to prove that it was an accident, and not a logical outcome of the operation of social laws. The British historian Graham Stephenson warns against giving an affirmative answer to the question whether the October Revolution was historically determined. Such ideas, he maintains, signify a surrender to Marxist determinism in historiography.

Proceeding from this stand bourgeois ideologists try to deny the world historic significance of the key tenets of the Marxist-Leninist theory of socialist revolution tested and borne out by the October Revolution, such as the issue of the prerequisites of socialist revolution, the hegemony of the working class and its alliance with the non-proletarian strata, the role of the Communist Party, i.e., the ideas that are of paramount significance for the contemporary world revolutionary movement. Let us consider each of these issues in turn.

Seeking to belittle the significance of the October Revolution in the eyes of the peoples who have shaken off the fetters of colonialism and embarked on the road of independent development, the bourgeois ideologists try to misrepresent the causes that finally produced the socialist revolution in Russia.

The idea instilled in the public consciousness is that Russia was not objectively ready for revolutionary change and, consequently, did not really need it. The implication is that revolution was imposed on the country by the Bolsheviks, who pursued their own selfish political ambitions when they discarded the way of peaceful gradual reform that was supposed to lead the country to prosperity and adopted an "adventurist" plan of putting the huge and backward country onto new rails within the shortest time. Incidentally, this line of reasoning is not new; it is what bourgeois and reformist propagandists have been repeating ever since the first days of the new state. The discourse on the subject of sacrifices and suffering of the Russian people, this supposed tool of the Revolution, is used by bourgeois ideologists to oust the idea of the struggle against imperialism from the minds of the working people in the capitalist and developing countries, and of the need to effect a revolutionary transformation of society by obscuring and scaring them with fabricated stories about the "untold suffering and sacrifices" that fell to the lot of the Russian people allegedly through the fault of the Bolsheviks. But what about the privations and the suffering the working people of Russia had had to go through over the centuries of serfdom and later capitalist exploitation aggravated by police persecution and the despotism of the tsarist authorities? These "experts" in Russian history also conveniently forget that the bloodshed and human losses were produced not by the Revolution itself but by the bloody Civil War and foreign intervention sponsored and financed by the international bourgeoisie with the direct participation of the leading capitalist states.

Another idea that frequently crops up in the bourgeois studies of the prerequisites of the October Revolution is that it was not a socialist revolution at all. The Western ideologists cite a variety of arguments, the principal one being that Russia did not have the objective conditions for a socialist revolution. Another assumption is that the socialist revolution in Russia was in fact an anomaly, and that the only factors that gave rise to it were essentially sub-

jective, e.g., the incompetence and weakness of the government and the "voluntarism" displayed by the Bolsheviks.

Another thesis that is supposed to help prove that Russia was not ripe for socialist transformations is that of its backwardness (or underdevelopment). Bourgeois sociologists, economists and historians maintain that this decided the specific features of the Russian revolution which, in their opinion, differed from those inherent in revolutions in Western states. The American George Lichtheim wrote that "alone among the major European countries, Russia was ripe for revolution precisely because of her backwardness".[1] Of course, the difference of principle that is to be found between socialist and bourgeois revolutions is not mentioned. What is more, bourgeois authors reiterate their statements about Russia's economic backwardness and the rudimentary state of its capitalist economy, which allows them to arrive at the questionable conclusion that Russia was not yet ripe for socialist revolution. The American scholar Robert H. McNeal quotes A. F. Kerensky as saying that the level of development of productive forces in the Russian state in 1917 was not high enough for a socialist revolution—a statement that is regarded as an historical archaism.

In utter disagreement with Lenin, who believed that the country had the material prerequisites for a socialist revolution (the fairly high level of capitalist development in the early 20th century), the bourgeois ideologists look for the roots of the October Revolution in the chiefly agrarian system, refusing to view it as a proletarian revolution aimed at the overthrow of the capitalist system. The essentially agrarian Russian economy, they hold, determined the agrarian, peasant character of the October Revolution. "The movement of revolt had many causes," states Lionel Kochan of the University of Edinburgh, "but one of the most fundamental was without a doubt the poverty of most of the Russian peasants."[2]

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[1] George Lichtheim, *Marxism. An Historical and Critical Study*, New York, 1961, p. 357.

[2] Lionel Kochan, *The Russian Revolution*, London, 1970, p. 9.

Basing themselves on the concept of Russia's backwardness, certain Western researchers insist that the October Revolution has upset, just as other socialist revolutions of our epoch have done, many theses and views propounded by Marxist theory. "Revolutions generally have not occurred in the societies of the West that were most advanced industrially and technologically in spite of the early expectations of Marx and Engels," writes A. S. Cohan. "They have not happened in Great Britain, Germany and the United States... Instead, the great Marxist-oriented revolutions have occurred in the technologically less advanced societies where the bourgeoisie was barely developed, and the working class, where it was to be found, was small as well." "No country was more ready for a revolution than Russia, but it would be stretching Marxian analysis to assume that Russia was ready for a socialist revolution."[3]

A study of the economic development of Russia must have been undertaken to formulate and prove the conception of its backwardness as a prerequisite of the October Revolution. This accounts for the growing interest displayed by bourgeois scholars in the economy of tsarist Russia. The base for the elaboration of this conception was provided by the modernization theory.

Its champions recognize, in their fashion, the presence of prerequisites for the revolutionary cataclysms in Russia. "What, in fact took place in the Soviet Union," wrote Zygmunt Bauman, "was a modernising revolution, complete with industrialisation and urbanisation, nation-building, construction of a modern state..."[4] "In Russia's tangled history," said the American sociologist James C. Davies even earlier, "it is hard to decide when began the final upsurge of expectations that, when frustrated, produced the cataclysmic events of 1917. One can truly say that the real beginning was the slow modernization process begun by Peter the Great over two hundred years before the revolution... We may nonetheless date the final upsurge as beg-

[3] A. S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution*, pp. 68, 78.

[4] Z. Bauman, *Socialism. The Active Utopia*, London, 1976, p. 90.

inning with the 1861 emancipation of serfs and reaching a crest in the 1905 revolution. . ."[5]

The interpretation of the October Revolution proceeding from the "backwardness" conception is associated with attempts of bourgeois sociologists to minimize its significance and discredit the Marxist revolutionary theory at large in the eyes of the working people in the leading capitalist countries of the West, or at least to restrict its applicability to backward societies.

Western researchers insist that the lessons of the Russian Revolution are obsolete and can no longer have any practical significance for the capitalist world. "The communist revolution. . .," wrote Robert C. Tucker, "is a revolution of underdevelopment, and this in two senses:

"(1) the revolution typically comes about in the setting of underdevelopment as just described, and (2) it becomes, after the achievement of power by the communist movement, a long-term effort to overcome the country's underdevelopment, a revolution of modernization."[6] The modernization theory categorically rejects the idea that Leninism and the socialist revolution in Russia have a world-historic significance, and proclaims the Western bourgeois society the only acceptable model of development. Its champions have repeatedly stated that the Bolshevik Party headed by Lenin adopted the Marxist theory of building socialism, proceeding solely from short-term considerations, above all the fact that the "overall backwardness" of Russia had made modernization a must. Consequently, they maintain, Marxism should be viewed as "the ideology of the early industrialization period", and the October Revolution as just one way of dealing with the problems posed by the country's backwardness.

In short, Western sociology refuses to admit that socialist revolution is a natural and inevitable event, and treats Marxism-Leninism as a means of overcoming economic

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[5] James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", *The Sociology of Revolution*, pp. 82-83.

[6] Robert C. Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea*, London, 1969, pp. 137-38.

backwardness which does not aim at emancipating the working people and building socialism. Moreover, bourgeois sociologists of revolution have been known to assert, quite absurdly, that it is only recently that conditions for a truly industrial (i.e., bourgeois.—*Authors*) revolution have matured in Russia under the impact of technical and scientific advances. The implication is clear: Leninism is a theory of social revolution valid for pre-capitalist societies.

The treatment of the October Revolution from the standpoint of the "backwardness" conception has a broader addressee than just the leading capitalist countries. Its other edge is turned toward the developing countries which are faced with the need to decide what their path of development is going to be. Arthur E. Adams, an American Sovietologist, wrote: "In the present era, the question of whether or not the revolution could have been avoided is far from being academic... Viewed in today's international context, this probability has very real significance and applicability, particularly for the underdeveloped nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia that are seeking to modernize themselves as Russia so desperately struggled to do before 1917..." Rejecting the need for the October uprising, he concludes that the Russian people could achieve greater gains in all spheres of life without recourse to this revolution.[7]

An explanation of the causes of the October Revolution within this theory has been offered by Stanley P. Wagner, another American Sovietologist. He proceeds from a thesis of the modernisation theory, that of urbanization, which is supposed to be a necessary stage in the development of newly-free states. To all intents and purposes, Wagner's conception is a variant of Walt Rostow's theory of "stages of economic growth". The summit of urbanisation, Wagner maintains, can be found only in mature civilizations, by which he means mostly the leading capitalist countries of the West. He recognizes only three revolutions in world

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[7] *Imperial Russia After 1861. Peaceful Modernization or Revolution?* Edited with an Introduction by Arthur E. Adams, Boston, 1965, p. XIV.

history as great ones, which had taken human societies through three stages in their development, from the primitive-communal system to the nomadic way of life, then on to agricultural civilization, and, finally, to the universal urbanism of the modern epoch. Proceeding from this conception, Wagner looks for the causes of the October Revolution in the need to pass on from the agricultural to the urbanist stage. He writes: "This extended revolution demanded the transfer of population from rural to urban areas and from very primitive traditional mentality based on mysticism and magic to one that was based entirely upon science."[8]

Trying to intimidate the peoples of the developing countries by using the "tragic example" of Russia, Wagner has devised another version of the theory of its not being ripe for revolutionary change. "Born in war, starvation, ... and extremely primitive conditions of livelihood, all change toward the new ... would still have been paintful."[9] The "compassion" voiced by the American professor is not quite disinterested. It stems, most likely, from the wish to convince the peoples in the newly-free states who are going through a time of upheaval and change that the October Revolution was not the greatest feat of the Russian people but their "mistake" and tragedy brought about by voluntaristic decisions of Bolshevik leaders.

Naturally enough, Wagner does not mention that for the Soviet Republic suffocating in the grip of imperialist blocade radical change was the only way out and that it had either to effect the prompt industrialization of the country and catch up with the industrialized capitalist states or perish. His intent is clear enough: to persuade the working people in the newly-free countries to give up the idea of revolutionary change in society, reject the experience gained in the Soviet Union in building socialism, and strike along the capitalist path. The façade of urban civilization built by Wagner in fact conceals nothing but

[8] Stanley P. Wagner, *The End of Revolution: A New Assessment of Today's Rebellions*, South Brunswick and New York, 1970, p. 33.

[9] *Ibid.*

the stone jungle of the capitalist West. "The primitive state of the Russian system before the revolution," Wagner goes on to say, "is often ignored in examining the logic of the Soviet revolution. The Russians had practically no urban base to which they could return psychologically... Thus they did not have their agricultural civilization based on reason, logic, or common sense which is more compatible with science."[10]

It is hard to say what prevails in this statement: ignorance, complacency or malevolence toward the Russian people who, incidentally, have cultural and scientific traditions that are among the richest in the world. It is clear, however, what the author is driving at: the example of the October Revolution has shown that revolution as such is painful and unnecessary; progress had better be attained through reform. Thus, although Wagner uses the term "revolution", he emasculates it of all revolutionary content. He falsifies the objective causes of the October Revolution, offers his own explanations (all falling under the Bolsheviks' voluntaristic intention category), and, in short, does his best to minimize its significance for the modern epoch.

He betrays the intent and goals of his conception by drawing a comparison between Russia and capitalist Japan: "This, of course, does not mean," he writes, "that the time span from the agri-provincial to the urban-universal Revolution has to be in keeping with the West. It depends upon the level of collectivization and science already in existence. Take Japan, for example, that was able to make the transfer in a very short period of time."[11] Wagner asserts that the Soviet leaders, in an attempt "to speed up" the process of revolutionary transformation, forced the Western statesmen to show suspicion toward the revolutionary process. The implication is clear: the developing world had better follow in the wake of Western states. Thereby bourgeois science promotes the campaign of the imperialist states' ruling circles to entangle the newly-free

[10] Stanley P. Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

countries in the web of neo-colonialism. However, life has shown that this way not only leads to economic and financial dependence but, what is most important, directly threatens the national independence of the developing countries and dramatically restricts their opportunities to decide their own future. Convincing proof of that is furnished by scores of Asian, African, and Latin American countries covered by a network of American military bases whose domestic and foreign policy is directly dependent on the USA.

Stanley Wagner, the professor of the Oklahoma City University claims that the Soviet Union has isolated itself from the West. On the contrary, the capitalist states sought to create a "cordon sanitaire" around the Soviet Union and pursued the policy of isolation and economic blockade in an attempt to obstruct the building of socialism in the Soviet Union. However, their calculations failed. The Soviet Union has turned into a powerful socialist state with advanced economy and outstripped many of the industrialized states of the West.

The bourgeois sociology of revolution has not evolved a coordinated scientific approach or a single methodology, which is very apparent when it comes to the question of the causes behind revolutionary processes. This circumstance accounts also for controversial interpretation by Sovietology of the prerequisites of the October Revolution in Russia. Side by side with the "underdevelopment" conception, and sometimes going directly against it, there exist other theories, some of which are still current even today.

One of the most venerable doctrines is that of the October Revolution being a natural reaction to the political conservatism of the Russian system, which acted as a brake on the progress of Russian society toward democracy of the Western brand. This doctrine rests on political factors. Drawing on the idea of Alexis de Tocqueville that revolution is produced, not by extreme misery, but by prosperity and progress, Crane Brinton advanced a theory back in the 1930s under which Russian society was on the whole making good headway, even though certain groups in it did not have enough scope for economic activity. "In com-

parison with the West," he wrote, "Russia was 'backward' in 1917, but it was progressing rapidly toward economic maturity."[12]

Brinton's conception ignores the issue of the October Revolution's objective prerequisites, implying that, as things stood, the revolution accomplished in 1917 in Russia was unnecessary and senseless. An analysis of the objective causes that had engendered it was replaced by the argument of the alleged prosperity of tsarist Russia, an argument so patently untrue and going so much against the real state of affairs that even bourgeois scholars have time and again criticized it.

Brinton's conception had paved the way for bourgeois interpretations of the October Revolution that explained its advent by the operation of subjective factors, and sometimes even declared it a chain of accidents. Such theories were not long in making an appearance. Walt Rostow, a noted American economist and sociologist, refused point-blank to recognize that the October Revolution was a natural event produced by the operation of objective historical laws.[13] Basing himself on the theory of the stages of economic growth, he stated that by the time of the Revolution, Russia had been going through rapid industrialization and modernization typical of all developing countries. From his point of view, Russia was not an exception to the rule of the overall progress of mankind. "The Russian take-off", as he put it, which "was under way by the 1860s", was completed by the First World War. Therefore revolution was not essential as a means of securing industrial growth. His idea is that it was an accident which has left no appreciable trace in history. The author obviously tries to discredit the very idea of socialist revolution and underrate its significance.

Another well-known American sociologist, James C. Davies, who carried on Brinton's "optimistic" conception, gave his own account of the causes of the October Revolution. In his view, it can hardly be regarded as an immediate

[12] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, p. 32.

[13] W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge, 1960, pp. 93-97.

consequence of prosperity and progress; rather, it was an outburst of mass despair caused by the collapse of hope after the heartening upsurge of the previous years. He wrote: "... 1861 to 1905 was the period of rising expectations that preceded the 1917 revolution..." "The years from 1905 to 1917 formed an almost relentless procession of increasing misery and despair."[14] Davies's interpretation of the genesis of the October Revolution is overtly subjectivist, stressing the psychological factor as the crucial one. He believes that the events of 1917 were the revolution of despair; had tsarism not brought the country to the brink of disaster, it would not have taken place. According to him, it was a purely psychological phenomenon.

The very logic of the subjectivist approach to the genesis of the October Revolution has necessarily produced concepts of the Revolution as an accident, which, of course, fails to account for its real origins. One of the ideas is that the decisive factors giving rise to revolution are so-called "accelerators". This conception has won broad recognition not only within the framework of the sociology of revolution but provided a starting point for many bourgeois historiographers of the October Revolution. The author of this conception, Chalmers Johnson, cited the defeat of tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese war which, in his view, produced the Russian revolution of 1905-07, as a classic example of an accelerator. He also reduced the conjunction of factors that had engendered the February and the October revolutions of 1917 to the serious defeats sustained by the Russian army in the First World War. He associated with accelerators the "fatal" chain of events that produced the Russian revolutions.[15]

The impact of the conception of accelerators is particularly noticeable in the works of Sovietologists belonging to the "optimistic" trend, including Hugh Seton-Watson, George Katkov and David Footman from Britain and Jacob

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[14] James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", *The American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, No. 1, February 1962, pp. 11, 12.

[15] C. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, London, 1966, p. 99 ff.

Walkin from the USA who asserted that Russia had an opportunity to attain progress and avoid "the revolutionary catastrophe". John Walkin, one of the authors who held an "optimistic" view of the prospects of the tsarist Russia's development, estimated the advances made by industrialization as evidence of the ability of the old regime to introduce modernization. The First World War, he maintains, rudely interrupted the dynamic modernization process and prepared the ground for fresh social and political conflicts.

David Footman also believes that were it not for the war, there would have been "a chance to build up a freer and happier Russia by legal means".[16]

Many Western researchers share the opinion that were it not for the war, the crisis which Russia had been going through could and would have been resolved without social upheaval by more or less peacefully realizing the old demands to set up truly Western parliamentarian institutions advanced by the liberal elements in the Russian society.

Thus, the conception of accelerators was a logical continuation of the subjectivist approach of bourgeois researchers to the October Revolution's prerequisites. It refused to recognize the historically determined character of the socialist revolution in Russia but declares it an accident which was not rooted in objective necessity. One of the ends pursued by this theory is to vindicate the capitalist class of Russia and represent Russian capitalism as a progressive force capable of overcoming the country's backwardness. Apart from the sense of class affiliation and solidarity, the Western researchers are motivated by the wish to save the prestige of the capitalist world system at large, and to demonstrate its soundness and efficiency as a social system.

History, however, has upset many of the theories advanced by bourgeois ideologists. In the early 20th century Russia proved that weak link in the chain of world capitalism where exceptionally favorable conditions had evolved

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[16] David Footman, *The Russian Revolutions*, London, 1962, p. 24.

for the seizure of political power by the proletariat, and the necessary prerequisites for accomplishing a state and socio-economic organization of socialism had been created.

Lenin also noted that the capitalist development of Russia had by that time "reached a certain level".[17] Its industrial growth rates were higher than in the advanced Western states, production had reached a high degree of concentration, and gigantic industrial centers had been formed. Not only in industry, but in finance, too, tsarist Russia was evolving advanced forms of capitalist organization, which provided the base for the emergence of monopoly associations. Industry and the banks began to merge. All this testified to a fairly high level of capitalist development which was the crucial condition for a socialist revolution.[18]

But the country's economy had also substantial disproportions; the numerous survivals of serfdom in the agrarian system hampered the development of capitalist economic forms. The capitalist evolution of the various regions of Russia proceeded unevenly, and the political superstructure of society no longer matched the rapidly changing economic basis.

To sum up, by the early 20th century Russia was a country with a medium level of capitalist development and a tendency toward growing into imperialism. The high level of capitalist socialization of production in a number of industries, the expansion of monopolies and the growth of monopoly into state-monopoly capitalism provided the required minimum of socialism's material prerequisites, to which Lenin pointed. The exacerbation of contradictions and a bitter class struggle provided the objective foundation for the centre of the world revolutionary movement to be shifted to Russia, which happened at the beginning of the century.

One of the major factors which paved the way for the revolution in Russia was the First World War. As Lenin wrote, "...the war has stepped up capitalist development,

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[17] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 266.
[18] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, 1964, p. 106.

which has moved forward from capitalism to imperialism, from monopoly to state control. All this has brought the socialist revolution nearer and has created the objective conditions for it."[19] But the attempts of bourgeois researchers to represent the war as the sole cause of revolution can hardly be regarded as justified. A new revolutionary upheaval in Russia began as far back as the spring of 1912, after the shooting of workers from the Lena goldmines, two years before the First World War. In the words of Lenin, "that year saw a great, historic change in Russia's working-class movement."[20] The scope of the movement and the combination of economic with political demands reminded people of the year 1905. The upheaval was caused by deep internal factors, chief among them being the large gap between the productive forces and the production relations in the country. This gap could be bridged only by replacing the old production relations by the new, socialist ones. In Lenin's estimate, it was an "all-powerful 'stage manager'" and "mighty accelerator".[21] The war itself, just as tsarist Russia's involvement in it, was produced by deeply-rooted objective contradictions. It was an imperialist war. Having undermined the country's economy and carried the social, economic and political contradictions to the extreme, it accelerated the ripening of conditions for a successful socialist revolution.

A conscientious scientific analysis of the objective prerequisites of the October Revolution easily exposes the unsoundness of the concept of Russia's "backwardness" as the principal condition of this revolution. But subjective factors, too, to which Soviet researchers attach a great deal of importance, have little in common with the "accidents" and "phenomena" invented by bourgeois sociology, such as psychological outbursts, military defeats, or "the tsar's errors". The subjective factors that lay at the roots of the October Revolution were also historically conditioned. They were prepared by the Bolshevik Party headed by

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[19] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, 1980, p. 240.
[20] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 450.
[21] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, 1981, p. 299.

Lenin. Basing their work on Marxist-Leninist theory, the Bolsheviks managed to develop the strategy and tactics of the struggle which met the needs and aspirations of the working people at all stages of the revolutionary movement. They consciously set themselves the goal of accomplishing a socialist revolution, and it is the reckoning with objective historical laws when pursuing their revolutionary policy that has allowed the Bolshevik Party and the working people of Russia to attain success.

Chapter Three

The Makers of Revolution

The issue of the motive forces of the October Revolution is treated in the West in a way designed to refute its socialist character. Realizing that even today it remains a school of revolutionary action, the bourgeois ideologists are trying hard to misrepresent its essence and objectives, and to discredit it in the eyes of the public.

Bourgeois science usually ignores one of the major tenets of Marxist-Leninist theory that socialist revolution is the highest type of social revolution and that it differs drastically from all revolutions of the past. One of these differences is the proletarian character of the October Revolution that ushered in an epoch of socialist revolutions.

The proletariat made its entrance onto the historical scene as a revolutionary class of a new type. While before the revolutionary forces overthrowing the old system had been headed by exploited classes and the outcome of revolution was replacement of one exploiter class by another, in the October Socialist Revolution, the leader was a toiling class which represented the interests of all the working strata of the population. The motive forces of socialist revolutions, the revolutions of the modern epoch, are the masses led by the working class and its vanguard, the Communist party.

This is one of the real facts that bourgeois science refuses to acknowledge, declaring that the view of the working class as the leader of the world revolutionary and liberation movement is the principal error of Marxism. Many Western researchers have tried to represent the October Revolution as an elitist one, thus implying that no difference of principle exists between bourgeois and socialist revolutions, and that these differences are just a "Marxist invention". Their contention is that the distinctive features

of a revolution are shaped solely by the historical epoch, national characteristics, and the scope of change. "Revolutions are too complex and too unique," writes Mark Hagopian, "to be reducible to a facile formula such as bourgeois or proletarian revolution."[1] ". . .An interpretation [of revolution] in terms of a single overthrow first of the aristocratic class by the bourgeoisie and, later on, of the latter by the working class, would too much simplify, if not actually distort, the picture," says W. F. Wertheim.[2]

Following the example of sociologists, the same sort of assertion has been made by bourgeois historians of the October Revolution.[3]

The quoted statements make it apparent that bourgeois ideologists cannot accept the view of the October Revolution as a proletarian one. The elitist conceptions they advance, which are counterposed to the Marxist-Leninist treatment of this issue, serve to negate the leading role of the working class and the popular masses in socialist revolutions and in the modern revolutionary process generally.

The idea of the elite as the principal force behind the revolution in Russia is vigorously played up by bourgeois science when dealing with the motive forces of the October Revolution. The role of the revolutionary elite in the history of Russia is usually assigned to the opposition groups made up of intellectuals. Robert C. Tucker of Princeton University states that part of the educated elite tends to strive toward a revolutionary transformation of society, as was the case in Russia. Radical intelligentsia is supposed to have led both the revolutionary movement in Russia in the 19th century and the revolutionary government that had come to power in October 1917. His conclusion, however, is extremely biased. The action of the intelligentsia in this capacity, he goes on to say, is a feature of slowly developing countries. George F. Kennan, a prominent American political figure and publicist, also stresses the

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[1] Mark N. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, p. 52.

[2] W. F. Wertheim, *Evolution and Revolution*, p. 165.

[3] David Mandel, *The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet Seizure of Power. From the July Days 1917 to July 1918*, London, 1984, pp. 417-18.

major role of the intelligentsia in the Russian revolutionary movement. This "might well be viewed as the most deep-seated and ominous of all the weaknesses of the autocracy," he writes. "This was the extensive alienation from its spirit and purposes of large parts of the intelligentsia generally, and of the student youth in particular. This situation was not of recent origin. The disaffection of these elements had been a prominent feature of Russian political life for at least a half-century. From the standpoint of the prospects for survival of the autocracy, its importance could scarcely be exaggerated."[4] This estimate is quite accurate as concerns the role of progressively-minded intelligentsia in the struggle against the autocracy and its participation in the Russian revolutionary movement. But the thing is that bourgeois researchers tend to overlook the fundamental point, i.e., that only by fusion with the revolutionary working-class movement was the revolutionary intelligentsia able to assume a truly effective character and to bring the revolution to victory.

Many recent bourgeois conceptions of revolution associate the concept of elite with that of a broader social group, the so-called middle class which is supposed to incorporate the intellectuals, office workers, petty bourgeoisie, army officers, and some other urban strata. Protagonists of the modernization theory associate the emergence and growth of this group with industrialization and the transition from the traditional agrarian to a modern industrial society. Against the background of rapidly advancing modernization in the developing countries, this social stratum, as it is asserted, forms an opposition to the political regime. The concept "middle class", although containing the term "class", has no class content and is used by bourgeois theorists to disguise the anti-capitalist direction of the revolutionary movement and obscure the fact that the motive forces of modern socialist revolutions have a class character.

This artificially devised extra-class category is also em-

[4] George F. Kennan, "The Russian Revolution—Fifty Years After. Its Nature and Consequences", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967, Vol. 46, No. 1, p. 3.

ployed to explain the nature of the motive forces behind the revolutionary process in Russia. Back in the early 1960s, the American sociologist James Davies used it to describe the motive forces of the February 1917 Revolution. In that event, he maintains, the rising middle class played an important part which tended to gain in importance due to its economic development in the earlier period. However, in the October Revolution, it was pushed into the background by other revolutionary elements. He makes no mention whatsoever of the anti-capitalist thrust of the October Socialist Revolution but merely states that later in 1917 this bourgeois stream was swept over by a much more powerful revolutionary wave of the masses arising both in town and the countryside, for whom the prewar economic growth had done nothing.[5] So it appears that the "middle class", including its capitalist section, was not overthrown but swept away. This statement throws light on the edge of the concept of "middle class"—refusal to recognize the socialist character of the October Revoltuion and the proletariat as its principal motive force.

George Fischer, an American historian, admitted that the category of "middle class" is extensively and constantly used in bourgeois historical science. It is employed, among other things, to investigate the question of the motive forces of the Russian Revolution (as a rule, no demarcation is made between the February and the October revolutions).

Samuel Huntington maintains that the urban "middle class" (for the most part, intelligentsia) made the decisive contribution to the Russian Revolution together with the peasantry. Like many other bourgeois researchers, Huntington uses this category to disguise the reactionary features of the bourgeoisie of the period of imperialism by "dissolving" it in a broader social group, which is supposed to have inherent revolutionary leanings. Objectively, the conception of the "middle class", similar to other elitist theories, is designed to prove that the revolution is not the outcome of the operation of objective historical laws.

[5] James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

The mounting world revolutionary movement, the growing vigor of the masses fighting for their rights cannot but affect the frame of mind of the bourgeois scholars. Ideologists of capitalism are no longer able to ignore the involvement of a broad section of the population in the revolutionary process. Defining the main factors which determine the nature of modern revolution, Mostafa Rejai has been forced to admit: "Political revolution requires a mass movement. Although it is difficult if not impossible to be precise about the meaning of 'mass', the intention here is to distinguish political revolution from other forms of violent action —say coup d'etat or peasant rebellion... The component of mass makes revolution a modern phenomenon."[6]

The need to take heed of the realities of the day has made bourgeois sociology play up the conceptions that are based on recognition of the role of the masses in the revolutionary process. However, making this "concession", bourgeois researchers still treat this question from their class position, seeking to "organically" introduce it into their theories, which necessitates falsification of historical facts. This is the goal pursued by the the widely spread theories of mass society, totalitarianism, etc., which have made a great impact on the views of Western Sovietologists concerning the motive forces of the October Revolution. Their main objective is to minimize the significance of the October Revolution; one of the contentions is that the involvement of the masses in that revolution had from the start determined its anti-democratic character. According to them, the Bolsheviks used the masses as a kind of a situational device with the purpose of seizing political power. They claim that the involvement of the masses made it possible to reject the democratic methods of administration and to replace them by demagogic slogans attractive to the people. Back in the 1950s, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who developed the theory of "communist totalitarianism", stated that this phenomenon was rooted in the anti-democratic nature of the October Revoltuion,

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[6] M. Rejai, *The Strategy of Political Revolution*, New York, 1973, p. 8.

whose source was to be sought in the history of the Russian people.

While recognizing, to a degree, that the masses had a say in the October Revolution, many bourgeois ideologists still refuse to admit that it was a proletarian one. A. S. Cohan writes that "the great Marxist-oriented revolutions have occurred in the ... societies where ... the working class, where it was to be found, was small...".[7] This viewpoint has made its way into Sovietology. John L. Keep, Professor of Russian History at the University of Toronto, insists that "as a historical fact ... the 'proletarian revolution' may be consigned to the realm of revolutionary mythology."[8]

Facts, however, show these statements for what they are—falsification is used to negate the proletarian hegemony in the October Socialist Revolution, which has highlighted the world-wide emancipatory mission of the working class.

By the First World War, the Russian proletariat was a mature class ready for determined revolutionary action. It was not very numerous, but owing to its unprecedented concentration at major enterprises and in industrial centers, its class consciousness was developing rapidly, and its unity consolidated in the day-to-day struggle for its rights. It had a large share of "hereditary" workers, men who came from working-class families. A feature of the industrial proletariat in the period of imperialism was the growth in the number of workers employed in heavy industry, i.e., the most advanced and conscious section. The substantial qualitative changes and shifts that had taken place promoted its class self-awareness and cohesion. All this decided the leading role of the working class in the revolutionary struggle. Lenin wrote: "The strength of the proletariat in any capitalist country is far greater than the proportion it represents of the total population. That is because the proletariat economically dominates the center and nerve of the

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[7] A. S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution, op.cit.*, p. 68.

[8] John L. H. Keep, *The Russian Revolution. A Study in Mass Mobilization*, New York, 1976, p. XV.

entire economic system of capitalism, and also because the proletariat expresses economically and politically the real interests of the overwhelming majority of the working people under capitalism."[9]

A revision of old views on the role of the working class in the October Revolution has recently begun in bourgeois historiography. Many authors have been forced to admit that the working class was the most active social force in the events of 1917, and that the October Revolution could not have been accomplished without working-class support. But while acknowledging their great contribution to the victory of the Revolution, they claim that the losses sustained by the Russian workers in their historic struggle played a fatal role in the subsequent history of their country. It is asserted that, since it was exhausted by the Revolution and the Civil War, the proletariat ceased to be an independent political force and was unable to resist the alleged degeneration of the Soviet state.[10]

Thus, the true meaning of the recognition of the proletariat's role in the October Revolution amounts to the negation of the unity of interests and aims of the working class and its party, which are set off against each other. Moreover, Bolsheviks are accused of "transformation", a departure from the initial aims. Such accusations testify to the failure to understand the objective essence of the workers' party. The building of a socialist society could not but lead to serious qualitative changes. There were mistakes, sometimes tragic ones, and violations of the standards of inner-party life and democracy. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union speaks about them with resolution and straightforwardness in order to prevent their repetition in the future. But serious trials and changes that have taken place during socialist construction, far from changing the essence of the Communist Party, demonstrated, on the contrary, its fidelity to the ideals of the socialist revolution, its unity with the working class and its constant advance forward.

Even though they admit that the Russian proletariat

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[9] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, 1974, p. 274.

[10] David Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 417-18.

took an increasingly active part in the three Russian revolutions, some bourgeois authors maintain that, unlike the working class of the Western states, it was incapable of organizing and leading the masses. They claim that the Russian working-class movement was spontaneous and backward, and semi-peasant by nature, that it was immature and lacked consciousness, and that it was the primitive conditions of the Russian worker that incited him to rebellion. No doubt, the spontaneous revolutionary quality contributed to the scope of the revolutionary movement, but the success of the struggle was determined by the consciousness and organization of the masses led by Communists. The latter guided the actions of the mass revolutionary organisations and through them influenced the masses' political moods and directed their revolutionary energy.

Another argument used to bolster this theory is that the idea of revolution is not inherent in working-class mentality but imposed upon the workers by the elite groups, which pursue their own ends. Eric Voegelin writes: "The idea of the man without a country who finds his fatherland in the revolution does not arise among the workers, it is rather a projection into the workers of the attitude of the homeless intellectual who becomes the leader of masses which for various reasons are ready to be formed..." The discrepancy between the idea of international revolution typical of the revolutionary intelligentsia, on the one hand, and the social realities of the working class and, to a larger extent, the peasantry, on the other hand, was revealed with utmost clarity in the October Revolution, which, in his opinion, was permeated with nationalism.[11] In Diane Koenker's words, the October Revolution, although "mounted in the name of the workers", was not proletarian.[12]

In an attempt to substantiate the completely unsound assumption that the idea of socialist revoution is alien to working-class mentality, bourgeois authors do not hesitate

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[11] Eric Voegelin, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

[12] Diane Koenker, *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution*, p. 3.

to take out of the mothballs and circulate fruitless ideas of a petty-bourgeois nature, like the long-forgotten postulates of the notorious Polish anarchist Waclaw Machajski. In 1898, he arrived at the following conclusion: "Socialism, for all its 'proletarian' protestations, was the ideology of the rising new middle class of intellectuals, professionals, technicians and white collar workers, and not of the manual workers."[13]

Clearly, the ideas used by bourgeois ideologists today are not new, having been borrowed from a variety of sources. Western scholars want to use the entire store of available means and methods that can help them in any way at all to undermine the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution and rally all opponents of this doctrine under their banner.

The tenet on the absence of class revolutionary self-awareness among the workers is designed to call in question the very foundation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the proletarian revolution. "That Marx was mistaken about the readiness of the worker to revolt should be no mystery," wrote A. S. Cohan.[14] The same idea is used with reference to the October Revolution.

Western researchers insist that the idea of socialist revolution was forcefuly introduced into the working class by the Bolsheviks. Some even declare that Lenin and the Bolshevik Party had intentionally deceived the workers. The American Marxologist, James Gregor writes: "The proletariat was not mature to responsibility, it was to be marshalled to it. It was not to take up its tasks, its tasks were to be imposed upon it. It was not to come to know, it was to be told its purpose. It might come to appreciate its *immediate* interest, but only the revolutionary cadre could understand its *ultimate* interest."[15] The distortion of the relationship between the Bolshevik Party and the working class is so crude that comment is hardly necessary.

It is a proven fact that Lenin and the Bolsheviks resolutely opposed efforts to impose revolutionary ideas on the

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[13] See: Max Nomad, *Aspects of Revolt*, New York, 1959, p. 99.
[14] A. S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution: An Introduction*, p. 70.
[15] A. James Gregor, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

workers. They launched a popularization campaign to help the workers realize that tsarism and the bourgeoisie would never emancipate them of their own free will, that a determined struggle is necessary to attain freedom, but they had always based their action on the really prevailing conditions and an objective estimate of the situation. But they also had faith in the revolutionary energy and determination of the Russia's working class. Not ideological inoculation but the real condition of the workers in Russia—merciless exploitation by Russian and foreign capitalists aggravated by survivals of serfdom, backwardness and the arbitrary rule of the tsarist officials and the police—that was what had prompted the workers to rise up in arms against the old system and make a socialist revolution.

"The people learned by experience, having suffered torture, executions and wholesale shootings, and it is nonsense for the butchers to assert that the Bolsheviks, or certain 'dictators' are responsible for the revolt of the working people,"[16] wrote Lenin. The advanced revolutionary self-awareness among the Russian working class was a major factor contributing to the victory of the socialist revolution in the country. "The Bolsheviks were victorious," wrote Lenin, "first of all because they had behind them the vast majority of the proletariat, which included the most class-conscious, energetic and revolutionary section, the real vanguard, of that advanced class."[17]

In the postwar years, the mounting national liberation and revolutionary movements in the developing countries have compelled Western researchers to concentrate on the role of the agrarian strata in the revolutions of the present epoch. Falling back on some of the ideas, and sometimes the terminology, of ultra-leftist petty-bourgeois theorists, they have proclaimed the peasantry "a leading revolutionary force", and even talked about handing over to it the "revolutionary mandate" which used to be held by the working class. In this context, some bourgeois authors advance the idea that it was the October Revolution that

[16] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, 1964, p. 440.
[17] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, 1977, p. 257.

had opened up the cycle of agrarian revolutions, supposedly typical of underdeveloped countries. This line of reasoning serves to prove that the so-called Marxist revolutions were essentially agrarian ones and can occur only in backward states. Consequently, they claim, the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution does not meet the interests of the modern working-class movement in the West.

This viewpoint coexists with another, diametrically opposite one, which conveys the contradictions inherent in the bourgeois "sociology of revolution". A number of Western sociologists, who insist that the majority of contemporary revolutions in the developing countries are peasant ones both by their nature and motive forces, use this theory to combat communist ideology.

In the mid-1960s, Barrington Moore published an ambitious comparative study devoted to the role of the peasantry in the various types of revolution. He believes that rural conditions play a crucial role in defining the social and economic development trend in a country launching industrialization. He associates a special type of modernization with the needs voiced by the peasantry. According to his conception, the development trend of each society depends on how closely the basic classes of the old formation identify themselves with the movement toward a new system. Moore regards the Western way as the classic one, i.e., the fusion of capitalism with Western democracy through revolution. According to him, democracy is an abstract concept devoid of any class content. Given the old classes' willingness to make way for the new system, modernization does not encounter any particular opposition on the part of the conservative elements.

The second way of development can be analyzed, in the opinion of Moore, by using Germany or Japan as an example. There, even after industrialization had been accomplished, the non-revolutionary character of the bourgeoisie contributes to the preservation of the pre-industrial social forms, which results in the establishment of totalitarian regimes. A case in point is German fascism.

Russia, according to Moore, furnishes an example of the third way of development. There, the revolution paved the

way for the "communist version" of industrialization from above. The author treats the October Revolution as a predominantly peasant one. Its principal motive force, he believes, was the peasantry, which abolished the old ruling class comprising by 1917 mostly landowners. The economic prerequisite of the revolution was, in his view, the inability of the old ruling classes to adapt to the demands of the developing agricultural commodity production. As a result, they were swept away by the peasant revolution led by the communist elite. "The peasants have provided the dynamite to bring down the old building," wrote Barrington Moore.[18]

Recognizing the peasantry as the decisive revolutionary force, Moore regarded it, at the same time, as a class devoid of perspective. It has spent its force, writes Moore, as soon as the aim of revolution—modernization through industrial development—is achieved. The result of the modernization process is, in his opinion, the annihilation of the peasantry as a class.

A short survey of Moore's theory shows that he places the three trends within the world modernization process (democratic-capitalist, conservative-totalitarian, and communist) on an equal footing. In point of fact, he makes no distinction between bourgeois and socialist revolutions. Objectively, his theory is directed against the idea of socialist revolution as the highest type of social revolution. The Marxist-Leninist thesis of the leading role of the working class in the modern revolutionary process is opposed by the thesis of the peasantry as the principal force in a revolution.

Moore's theory gained wide acceptance and was developed further, specifically, in works of Theda Skocpol. Her contention is that the revolutions of the modern epoch are predominantly peasant ones led by the elite, and that they can take place only in underdeveloped countries; her example is the October Revolution. She maintains that it was rooted in the contradictions between the peasant community,

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[18] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston, 1966, p. 480.

which she views as a vehicle of revolutionary energy, and the top landed stratum. The peasantry was, in her opinion, the main force in the Russian Revolution.

Basing their research on the Marxist-Leninist writings on the agrarian and peasant question, Soviet scholars have shown that the peasantry cannot be the leader in a revolution due to the objective conditions prevailing in the countryside and in agricultural production. Being scattered and unorganized, the peasantry cannot act as a monolithic force at the head of a revolutionary movement. Both economically and politically, its different sections side either with revolution or counter-revolution. Lenin and the Bolsheviks neither entertained petty-bourgeois illusions concerning the peasantry as a homogeneous class, the main revolutionary and even socialist force in Russia, nor underrated the revolutionary potentialities of the toiling peasantry, especially its poor section, in the three Russian revolutions.

An interesting point in Moore's theory is "the annihilation" of the peasantry as a class. It is directed against the Marxist-Leninist thesis of the need for an alliance of the working class and the peasantry. Bourgeois ideologists are trying to intimidate the peasants with tales of their being swallowed up as victim of communist industrialization, as is supposed to have happened in Russia as a result of the October Revolution. However, the building of socialism in the Soviet Union exposes the absurdity of these allegations. The peasantry as a class has not disappeared in the USSR as a consequence of the socialist revolution and the transformation of society but have retained its specific features and place in the economic and social life. It is still a producer of goods on which the life of society depends.

The view of the October Revolution as an agrarian one has been taken up and is being energetically developed by contemporary Sovietologists. Many of them interpret the October Revolution as a peasant war, or make up stories about the inherent rebellious spirit of the peasantry and the sway of anarchy and chaos in Russia, using this to substantiate the idea that the Bolsheviks rose quite accidentally on the crest of the peasant revolt.

David Walkin insists that the peasant movements of 1905 and 1917, and the uprisings headed by Stepan Razin and Yemelyan Pugachev are identical occurrences. Graham Stephenson states that the Bolsheviks "wrote a lot of nonsense afterwards about a 'proletarian' revolution. In fact, the essence of 1917 was a peasant revolution."[19] Lionel Kochan voiced much the same idea. His belief is that the movement of revolt had many causes, but one of the most fundamental was the poverty of most of the Russian peasants. The same purpose, i.e. to undermine the Marxist-Leninist theory of the hegemony of the proletariat in the socialist revolution, is served by the conception of autonomous streams in the October Revolution, evolved by bourgeois Sovietology. According to this conception, there were operating in the socialist revolution in Russia a number of independent movements unconnected with one another. They consisted of workers, peasants, soldiers, and national minorities, with each pursuing its own ends which were not always the same.

Western historians have recently been giving more attention to the role of these forces (especially the army and the navy in the February and the October revolutions) with a view to representing them, and not the working class, as the prime mover of the October uprising. Bourgeois ideologists refuse to acknowledge that the basic condition of the victory of the October Revolution was the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, as well as concerted action of all revolutionary elements led by the proletariat and its vanguard, the Bolshevik Party.

Thus, the theory of "autonomous streams" questions the possibility of an alliance between the workers and the peasants in the modern revolutionary process, and the ability of the proletariat to win over to its side a broad mass of the working population. The idea behind these efforts of international imperialism is to split the revolutionary movement and take the edge off the working people's struggle for their rights.

In the meantime, honest research shows that prior to

[19] Graham Stephenson, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

the October armed uprising an alliance of the principal political forces, which secured the victory of the socialist revolution, had formed in the country. Soviet studies have proved that the Revolution could not have been accomplished but for the concerted action of all elements fighting against capitalists and landowners. The leader of this struggle was the working class headed by the Bolsheviks. The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union states: "The Party brought together into one powerful stream the proletarian struggle for socialism, the peasants' struggle for land, the national liberation struggle of Russia's oppressed peoples, and the nationwide movement against imperialist war and for peace, and directed that stream towards overthrowing the bourgeois system."[20]

The Russian working-class movement exerted a strong revolutionizing influence on the peasantry and the army. Worn out by the war, the soldiers were beginning to understand that only a revolution, in which the army and the people must cooperate, can put an end to it. The principal condition of the success of the socialist revolution was the alliance of the working class and the poor peasantry. Marxism-Leninism substantiated the need for such an alliance, making it clear that the working class and the toiling peasantry were natural allies in the struggle for a revolutionary transformation of society.

This alliance promoted the interests both of the peasantry, for which it was the only way out of the desperate situation, and of the working class, whom it helped attain a victory of the proletarian cause. The role of the leader in this union belonged to the working class. The Bolsheviks' action confirmed the possibility of forming such an alliance while getting ready for and carrying out the socialist revolution.

Using the worker-peasant alliance as the base for its campaign, the Party managed to unite all the revolutionary movements and channel them into the effort to overthrow imperialist rule. Lenin stressed that as the main con-

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[20] *The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A New Edition*, p. 8.

dition of victory of the socialist revolution: "We have the following of the majority of a *class,* the vanguard of the revolution, the vanguard of the people, which is capable of carrying the masses with it".[21]

The October Revolution has proved that concerted action of all working people is possible, and this is part of its substantial contribution to the theory and practice of the world revolutionary movement.

[21] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works,* Vol. 26, Moscow, 1972, p. 24.

Chapter Four

The Subjective Factor and the Communist Party

In modern times, when the general objective preconditions for the replacement of capitalism by a new social system have been maturing, the ideological struggle on the issue of the subjective factor in revolution has become more acute. Bourgeois ideologists are particularly alarmed by the enhanced importance of the international communist movement and of the Communist parties as the vanguard of the revolutionary movement. Bourgeois social science is desperately trying to upset or at least smear the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the revolutionary proletarian party. One of the trends in this campaign is distortion of the role of the Communist Party in the October Socialist Revolution in Russia; its purpose is to behead the working class and restrain its revolutionary potential.

Bourgeois critics of Marxism-Leninism attempt to represent Lenin's theory of the revolutionary party as a logical manifestation of "voluntarism" displayed by Lenin when dealing with the issue of socialist revolution, which was allegedly a purely Russian phenomenon. This is in fact an effort to minimize the international significance of the experience accumulated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a party of the Leninist type.

Analysing the role of the revolutionary proletarian party in the socialist revolution, bourgeois ideologists try to counterpose Leninism and Marxism. Lenin is frequently referred to as "a renegade from Marxism" and accused of having "adapted Marx" to Russian conditions, which has allegedly signified a betrayal of Marxist principles. "To deal with the Russian problem," writes A. S. Cohan, "Lenin was forced to reject certain Marxian propositions that had been considered articles of faith by the majority of Marxists. These propositions were concerned largely with the stages of revolution, the degree of proletarian participation

at the early stages, and the role of the vanguard party."[1]

Several trends exist in the bourgeois critique of Lenin's doctrine of the revolutionary party. Above all, Lenin is charged with stressing the subjective factors of revolution to the detriment of the objective ones, a point on which he is supposed to have quarrelled with Marxism. Proof of this is allegedly furnished by Lenin's approach to the issue of the revolutionary party. In the opinion of Herbert Marcuse, the American Marxologist, the subjective factor of revolution has long been monopolized by the Communist Party.[2] Similar accusations against the Marxist-Leninist party have long formed the foundation of many Western conceptions of revolution that lay claim to universality.

One of the leading American sociologists of revolution of the 1950s-1960s, Chalmers Johnson, views the activities of a revolutionary party as an artificially fabricated subjective factor whose existence is not called for by objective necessity and does not fall in with the objective situation. Using his conception of accelerators of revolution, he puts the activities of revolutionary parties in the same category as the triggers used by extremist groups to launch revolution when it is not yet ripe. Everywhere and at all times, he writes, the purpose of the organizational activities of a revolutionary party is to create a rebellious infrastructure so as to make it easier to provoke a mass armed action.

It is quite correct that Lenin's doctrine of socialist revolution attaches primary importance to the Communist party as the vanguard of the working class, as its most advanced section. He considered the presence of such a party the principal subjective condition of the modern revolutionary process, the decisive, vital factor of the success of revolutionary struggle. However, contrary to what his bourgeois critics asserted, Lenin never made a fetish of the role of the Communist party in revolution. "Tens of millions of people," he wrote, "do not make a revolution on the advice of a party... Tens of millions of people will not make a revolution to order, but will do so when

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[1] A. S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution*, p. 93.

[2] A. Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism*, New York, 1958, p. 30.

driven to it by dire need, when their position is an impossible one, when the joint pressure and determination of tens of millions of people break down the old barriers and are actually capable of creating a new way of life."[3]

Another thesis of bourgeois sociology is that Marx and Lenin differed in their understanding of the correlation between spontaneity and consciousness in the working-class movement, which had allegedly given rise to differences of opinion on the role of the Communist party in the revolutionary process. As compared to Marx, Lenin is alleged to have exaggerated the role of the party in revolution out of all proportion. The party, as these authors assert, had never been regarded by Marx and Engels as a decisive means of accomplishing a revolution; the crucial role in it was assigned to the working class itself, and to the enhancement of its self-awareness.

Mark Hagopian has given a summary of the approaches adopted by bourgeois authors to the problem of the alleged difference between Marx and Lenin on the issue of the party. "Marx," he writes, "maintained that the development of revolutionary class consciousness was only a matter of time—a kind of spontaneous combustion that would bring down the old order and allow the new one to develop according to its own logic. Lenin, however, came two generations later when such expectations seemed unrealistic... In other words, Lenin doubted that the transition from merely economic class action to political class action would occur in the semi-automatic sense of Marx."[4] This led Lenin, Hagopian believes, to the idea that revolutionary self-consciousness can be introduced into the working-class environment from the outside, by an effort of a vanguard party.

To accomplish this task, the author goes on to say, Lenin provided for the establishment of a party as the vanguard of the proletariat, i.e. as a well-trained elitist group of well-educated professional revolutionaries, who were politically

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[3] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, 1964, p. 503.

[4] Mark N. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, pp. 83-84.

to attack the government, train the proletariat in the art of revolution, and oversee its political and economic activities. Agitation and propaganda, Hagopian concluded, would enable such a party to achieve the position of authority required to push the proletariat into revolution.[6]

In his other, more recent work—*Regimes, Movements, and Ideologies*—Hagopian has carried his argument further, putting the Leninist revolutionary strategy into a separate category which is opposed to other revolutionary strategies.

This understanding of the role of the Communist party, bourgeois researchers state, is what distinguishes Leninism from Marxism. This is an open distortion of the views of Marx, who attached considerable importance to the role of the Communist party in revolution. This is also an attempt to call in question the integrity of Marxism-Leninism, and to undermine Lenin's doctrine of the party of a new type. In point of fact, Lenin's work to organize the revolutionary party of the working class was based on the practical experience and theoretical legacy of Marx and Engels. The major principles which they had formulated and along which such a party should be organized and function were used and further developed by Lenin. His thesis on the leading role of the revolutionary party was based on the Marxian understanding of the objective conditions of the working class under capitalism. The proletarian struggle needs to be guided by a revolutionary party. This thesis is in full agreement with the Marxist doctrine of the historic mission of the working class. To give up an attempt to guide and direct the workers' movement would mean betraying the proletarian cause and its revolutionary goals.

Depicting the Bolsheviks as a strictly organized and "militarized" group, some kind of intellectual elite which manipulates the masses, the bourgeois ideologists are trying to set off their fabricated theory against the ideas of Marx, who was alleged to have advocated another way, that of expanding democratic workers' organizations.

However, contrary to what Western sociologists assert, Lenin has never stood opposed to Marx either on the issue

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

of the organizational principles of a revolutionary party, or on the question of its role in socialist revolution. The Leninist principle of democratic centralism as the fundamental one for a truly revolutionary party of the working class has been developed by the Rules of the Communist League written by Marx and Engels.[6]

Attempts by Western scholars to represent the Bolshevik Party as an elitist group so as to counterpose it to the working class are fully untenable. The Bolshevik Party was a section of the working class, and the most aware and organized one. Statements to the effect that it consisted entirely of intellectuals are groundless. On the eve of the October Revolution the Bolshevik Party consisted mostly of workers. According to the 1927 Party census, in 1917 the workers constituted 60.2 per cent of the Party's total membership.[7] Even Mensheviks admitted that "the nucleus of the Bolshevik Party was represented by the flower of the Russian working class, the most conscious, steadfast and gifted part of it".[8] However, the principal argument against bourgeois allegations concerning its elitist character is its close ideological unity with the workers, and the community of its interests and goals with those of the proletariat. Lenin wrote: "It is to enable the mass of a *definite class* to learn to understand its own interests and its position, to learn to conduct its own policy, that there must be an organization of the advanced elements of the class."[9] The Bolshevik Party was precisely the type of organization that allowed the advanced elements of the working class to unite and muster strength. It also included that part of the Russian democratic intelligentsia who went over to the position of the proletariat. Led by Lenin, the Bolshevik Party was a truly revolutionary political party of the working class, the highest form of its class organization.

Apart from attempts to set Marx versus Lenin, Western

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[6] Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, 1976, pp. 633-38.

[7] I. I. Mints, *The History of the Great October Revolution*, Vol. 2, Nauka Publishers, 1978, p. 579 (in Russian).

[8] *Novaya zhizn*, October 25, 1917.

[9] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, 1977, p. 409.

ideologists make use of other approaches. On the whole, they convey the contradictory character of bourgeois ideology, which represents diverging interests of the various groups within the capitalist class. However, this does not prevent them from serving the same end: protecting the interests of capitalism.

When drawing a comparison between Marx and Lenin, certain sociologists discover not the differences between them but their common features, the fact that Leninism is actually a return to genuine Marxism. In this connection, statements have been made to the effect that Lenin's work had exposed the dangerous nature of Marxism aimed, as they assert, against law and order. "Lenin's attitude toward the Kautsky wing of Social Democracy," wrote Eric Voegelin, "resembles very closely that of Marx toward the English trade union movement. The rejection of democratic cooperation, the rejection of sluggish socialist mass parties, the shaping of an elite, disciplined organization of professional revolutionaries . . . all this certainly indicates the return to a genuine revolutionary tension."[10] We must agree that both Marxism and Leninism, like their continuation and development, have always been and will be "dangerous" for the bourgeoisie. In point of fact, they are always and everywhere aimed against the unjust bourgeois law and order. And no wonder that bourgeois scholars are well aware of this common unity.

Bourgeois ideologists have been stubbornly playing up the idea of the anti-democratic nature of the Bolshevik Party which stems, allegedly, from the specific conditions of Russian public life and the long-standing traditions of the Russian revolutionary movement. The roots of Lenin's doctrine of the revolutionary party are usually sought in the ideas of Russian Narodism—not in the views of Chernyshevsky and Pisarev but in the views of Bakunin and Nechayev, who adhered to conspiratorial tactics. Lenin's doctrine is labelled anti-democratic and elitist, and so inapplicable to the contemporary revolutionary movement.

One of the favourite tactics of bourgeois researchers is

[10] Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, p. 249.

to counterpose the "democratic nature" of the social-democratic parties of the West and the "anti-democratic nature" of the Bolshevik Party. Whereas the Western democratically-minded parties applied to the people for the mandate so as to act in the name of the people, writes Zygmunt Bauman, the Bolshevik Party usurped the function of the people's leader and imposed its will on them, being quite certain that it was acting in their interests. To Lenin, Bauman stresses, "the party was the people, or it was not a party at all".[11]

According to this author, the "anti-democratic nature" of the Bolshevik Party accounts for the fact that, having seized power, it began to oppress the masses, although, in his opinion, "the premonition that such a party may in turn become an oppressor of the masses hardly ever occurred to Lenin... To be sure, the masses achieved freedom *qua* masses only; but then, their freedom *qua* individuals was never put clearly on the agenda of Russian history."[12]

The spirit of the above statements is that of bourgeois individualism; their purpose is to vindicate bourgeois society and uphold the bourgeois idea of freedom and democracy. Their authors reject without hesitation the right to the existence of the ethical values of socialist collectivism, the natural standards of socialist democracy where the individual's freedom of expression is combined with the understanding of common weal. This is also an attempt to call in question the outstanding contribution made by the October Socialist Revolution to the progress of mankind and the genuinely democratic nature of its goals, and to minimize the significance of the work conducted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a new type party, a party of the Leninist type. Distorting facts, the bourgeois ideologists try to paint a warped picture of the Soviet experience of building a democratic society which was initiated by the October Revolution.

In actual fact, the revolution in Russia and the victory of socialism have not only proclaimed but also secured

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[11] Z. Bauman, *Socialism. The Active Utopia*, p. 88.
[12] *Ibid.*

the rights of every working man of any nationality, the rights of millions upon millions in a way that no capitalist country has ever been able to do. Today the further democratization of the socialist society, the extension of the social and civil rights of the Soviet man, the creation of an atmosphere of openness are becoming major conditions for the society's readjustment and the acceleration of the country's socio-economic development.

The thesis of the anti-democratic leanings of the Bolsheviks has gained the widest currency in the works of Zbigniew Brzezinski and other bourgeois ideologists developing the conception of "communist (or Soviet) totalitarianism". Brzezinski traces the sources of this phenomenon to Lenin, who allegedly determined the totalitarian nature of the revolutionary party by his doctrine. In the opinion of Brzezinski, the repeated purges of Party ranks were one of the instruments which Lenin used to uphold "totalitarian rule" in the revolutionary party. He wrote that they had created the necessary dynamism and fear without which the efforts to realize major social change would be wrecked and that this had given rise to the primary situation that enabled the totalitarian leadership to wield power.[13] By regarding the party as a revolutionary vanguard and assigning it the primary role, Lenin, as Brzezinski maintans, turned it into an essentially military body with a strict discipline and a soldier-like dedication to the cause. "In this army," he writes, "only one mind and one will would prevail. There would be no room for negotiation, divergences, or compromise."[14] Such statements can only serve to bring down and vulgarize the standards Lenin set the revolutionary party and its role as a leader. His approach to the party that was formed in Russia implied consistent application of revolutionary Marxism to the new epoch, and the development of Marx's doctrine of class struggle and of the role of the subjective and objective factors in history. Lenin acted on the fact that the

[13] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge. Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956, p. 169.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

vanguard of the working class must set itself the task of accomplishing a socialist revolution. It was impossible to break down the resistance of tsarism and capitalism without building a well-thought-out and disciplined organization, without involving in it the most advanced workers and other progressively-minded members of society. That is why Lenin wrote: "We must strive to raise the title and significance of a Party member higher, higher and still higher."[15] This idea has not only retained all of its significance until the present but has assumed added urgency now, as the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress have shown.

Brzezinski also insists that the policy advocated by Lenin after 1917 has promoted the expansion of totalitarianism. "Perhaps the most enduring achievement of Leninism," he writes, "was the dogmatization of the Party." Eager to distort the essence of the relationship between the Communist Party and the people in the Soviet Union, he resorts to overt falsification. One of his contentions is that "the phase of Leninism after 1917 can be said to have involved primarily the consolidation of the Communist Party's rule over society and the internal transformation of the Party from a revolutionary vanguard into a more disciplined ruling elite".[16]

However, the unsoundness of the totalitarian conceptions became obvious already at the time of their emergence in the mid-1950s. It was then that the Communist Party was working to expose the "personality cult" and overcome its consequences, and to strengthen the Leninist norms of Party and state life.

The charge of "totalitarianism" against Lenin and the Bolshevik Party has been made by many Sovietologists specializing in the history of the October Revolution and the Soviet Union. They insist that Lenin thrust his will up on the party, turning it into an obedient tool. "The victory, though won under the slogan 'all power to the

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[15] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Moscow, 1977, p. 502.

[16] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, London, 1962, p. 69.

Soviets' ", writes the British historian Edward Hallett Carr, "was a victory not only for the Soviets, but for Lenin and the Bolsheviks. Lenin and the party, the man and the instrument, were now indissolubly one. The triumph of the party seemed almost exclusively due to Lenin's consistent success in stamping his personal will upon it and in leading his often reluctant colleagues in his train."[17]

Some of the Sovietologists have recently been trying to revive the conception of "Soviet totalitarianism", which somewhat wilted in the 1970s, declaring that Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution is its ideological foundation. Leninism has become an object of fierce attacks. Its theory and practice are represented as the original subjective factor at the roots of a certain "degeneration" process. Accusations of "voluntarism" and "authoritarianism" allegedly displayed by the Bolsheviks can again be heard from the West. Sovietologist T. H. Rigby, who has "discovered" that Lenin and his fellow-revolutionaries had an "authoritarian mentality", stated that when the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 they came to regard themselves as agents of an inexorable historical process entitled to setting up a regime of unlimited power which was named "the dictatorship of proletariat".[18]

The tales spread by bourgeois ideologists about sort of personal dictatorship and totalitarian methods of rule which Lenin had allegedly thrust upon the party are groundless. They are a logical sequel to the general offensive against Lenin's theory of socialist revolution. In the meantime, it is a generally known fact that democratic centralism was the basic organizational principle of the Bolshevik Party developed by Lenin.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks have always stressed the need to unswervingly adhere to this principle in Party activities. They had to rebuff numerous attempts to use the Party as a debating society, a conglomerate of factions and

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[17] Edward Hallett Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923*, Volume One, New York, 1951, p. 99.

[18] T. H. Rigby, "Some Concluding Observations". In: *Authority and Power in the USSR*, Basingstoke, 1980, p. 193.

groups. They believed, and with justice, that the strength of the Party lay in the unity of its ranks, and considered it inadmissible to undermine its solidity and relax the discipline.

A revolutionary proletarian Party has to be a closely-knit organization. That is the only thing that enables it to preserve and build up its efficiency, organize the working class and competently direct the masses taking part in the revolutionary struggle. The community of principles shared by the Party members must be bolstered by its organizational unity. Lenin wrote in his work *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*: "Now we have become an organized Party, and this implies the establishment of authority, the transformation of the power of ideas into the power of authority, the subordination of lower Party bodies to higher ones."[19]

But Lenin's understanding of the principle of democratic centralism on which the Bolshevik Party's work rested has always left ample room for the expansion of inner-Party democracy which ensures the Party's advancement and protects it from stagnation and dogmatism.

Allegations concerning the Bolsheviks' anti-democratic and totalitarian leanings are closely associated with accusations of cruelty and violence supposedly characteristic of their methods of introducing revolutionary changes. Many bourgeois authors state that having found themselves in the minority in the Constituent Assembly following the 1917 elections, the Bolsheviks "seized power without any democratic legitimation and defended it by terrorist means, scorning all the principles of Soviet democracy while making use of its institutions". They maintain that there is clear evidence "of the terrorist 'Jacobin rule' resting on the 'abolition of democracy' ". This statement is illustrated by "the abrupt liquidation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, the first and only parliamentary body to be freely and democratically elected in Russia. . .".[20]

This sort of approach is necessary for the bourgeois

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[19] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, Moscow, 1961, p. 367.

[20] *Marxism, Communism and Western Society. A Comparative Encyclopedia*, New York, 1973, Volume VI, pp. 136, 137.

ideologists to discredit the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the leader of Soviet society in its work of building socialism. This is designed to emasculate the revolutionary traditions of Bolshevism in the international working-class movement and to convince the peoples that the goals mapped out by the Communist parties and the progress of mankind are incompatible. This strategic line, followed by bourgeois social science is most clearly traceable in the works of the British professor Edward Goodman, permeated with the spirit of anti-communism. He writes with reference to the Bolshevik Party: "Dictatorship and parties of violence can achieve power; that is undeniable. Possibly they may also be able to implement some of the first batch of their promises, but after that they cannot... they become more and more the victims of their own arbitrary nature, of their leaders' own fears and their party's imperatives to survive."[21] Similar pronouncements concerning the "undemocratic" and "violent" nature of the October Revolution and the practices of the Bolshevik Party have been made in later years. Sovietologists Stanley Rothman and George W. Breslauer have stated, for instance, that as opposed to the February Revolution, which had opened by opportunities for the emergence of a pluralistic society, the Bolshevik Revolution set itself the task of abolishing democratic pluralism.[22]

One of the main charges made against Lenin and the Bolsheviks is still the "anti-democratic" character of their policies, which, as the ideologists of imperialism maintain, decided the "violent" and "undemocratic" character of the October Revolution and later gave rise to undesirable consequences. Lenin and the Bolsheviks are accused of mistrusting the workers, underrating their revolutionary potential, and trying to "substitute" the Party for the working class. This is nothing but an attempt to smear Lenin's theory of the revolutionary party of the working class. However,

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[21] Edward Goodman, *A Study of Liberty and Revolution*, London, 1975, p. 235.

[22] Stanley Rothman, George W. Breslauer, *Soviet Politics and Society*, St. Paul, 1978, p. 212.

none of these accusations have been able to stand up against the test of time and practice.

Quite contrary to what is being ascribed to him, Lenin considered it a highly dangerous delusion to believe that revolutionary ideas or Party will could be imposed on the masses. He spoke of the need for the Party to vigorously popularize its ideas among the people and to educate them using its own experience, so as to help them realize that a socialist revolution is historically inevitable.

Lenin dealt with the issue of spontaneity and consciousness on the assumption that social being plays the determinative role with respect to social consciousness. "The working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness," he wrote. Thus, since this is an essentially bourgeois type of consciousness, it is incapable, on its own, of putting an end to capitalism.[23] To remove the exploited position of the working class, it is essential to introduce revolutionary consciousness into its struggle, and this is where the guidance of a revolutionary party is required.

Lenin has also emphasized the closest link between the drive for a socialist revolution and the drive for democracy: "One should know how to *combine* the struggle for democracy with the struggle for the socialist revolution, *subordinating* the first to the second. In this lies the whole difficulty; in this is the whole essence."[24] Lenin also wrote that "victorious socialism must necessarily establish a full democracy."[25]

Sovietologists have been forced to acknowledge that the Bolsheviks enjoyed all kinds of support on the part of the working people, and that their ideas and goals were shared by the masses. It would seem that this should make bourgeois authors recognize that there is a community of interests between the people and the Communists, and that

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[23] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1977, p. 376.

[24] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, Moscow, 1980, p. 267.

[25] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, Moscow, 1977, p. 143.

the goals and ambitions of the Leninist Communist Party convey the hopes and wishes of the Russian people. In effect, however, bourgeois ideologists try to twist these admissions to make them bolster the idea of the "deception" of the people by the Bolsheviks.

Advocates of this idea maintain that the Bolsheviks entertain utopian notions, that they "duped" the people by spreading false messianic theories, and concealed the real difficulties to win a popular following. Voicing his surprise at the Russian people's decision to support the Bolsheviks, the American professor Stanley P. Wagner exclaims: "The reader should not assume that there is any implication of success for the short heavy pain route. The only success implied is the adoption of this method. Undoubtedly, the Russian leaders were very capable of selling their messianic propaganda far out of proportion to the benefits received."[28] The same idea has been voiced by the British Sovietologist Hugh Seton-Watson, who wrote that the Bolsheviks used limitless demagoguery to win the people over to their side.

Such statements point to new trends in Sovietology, which make themselves felt in the growing emphasis on the ideological aspect of the Communist Party's work among the masses in the revolutionary period, and in the shift of criticism to the problem of their ideological means. And this is quite natural. The proponents of the capitalist system have come to realize that the problems of the ideological confrontation between socialism and capitalism are gaining in importance and becoming a key sector in the struggle between the two world outlooks in the present epoch.

Bourgeois scholars are launching more and more vicious attacks at the very idea of socialism in an attempt to undermine credibility in the ideals of the October Revolution and represent them as utopian and unrealizable. They have declared that the communist ideology is merely a propaganda weapon, a means employed in the power struggle, viewing it as a source of threat to the capitalist system and an effective and formidable weapon of the Communist par-

[28] Stanley P. Wagner, *The End of Revolution: A New Assessment of Today's Rebellions*, New York and London, 1971, p. 33.

ties. Zygmunt Bauman has proclaimed socialism the utopia of the modern epoch, devoting a whole book to the substantiation of this thesis, and Mostafa Rejai has pointed out the significance of ideology as a major political means employed by the revolutionary movement claiming that "ideology helps 'reach' the masses".[27]

The anxiety of bourgeois ideologists is not groundless. Communist ideas initiated by the October Revolution are indeed a powerful weapon in the modern international communist and working-class movement. Their justice is becoming more and more apparent to the peoples all over the globe. As the CPSU Programme reads, "they win the minds and hearts of people by providing an example of better social organization, a steady growth of productive forces, by ensuring conditions for creative work, for people's happiness and well-being, resolutely rejecting wars of aggression, and affirming the principles of peace and broad cooperation between peoples on the basis of equality and universal security".[28] This gives rise to acute fear among the international monopoly bourgeoisie and its ideologists, compelling them to resort to falsifications and distortions when analyzing the revolutionary processes of the past and the present. Their treatment of the role of the Communist Party led by Lenin in the preparation and accomplishment of the October Revolution highlights this trend in bourgeois social science with striking clarity.

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[27] M. Rejai, *The Strategy of Political Revolution*, p 34.

[28] *The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A New Edition*, p. 87.

Conclusion

An analysis of the main trends of the bourgeois sociology of revolution reveals that its thrust is turned against the Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution, and lays bare its class character, which influences the way this issue is treated by bourgeois researchers. A study of American and British writings on the subject throws light on the important characteristics of the sociology of revolution. The seemingly great variety of conceptions advanced within this trend serves to conceal the scarcity of new ideas, the limitations and conservatism in dealing with the problems under discussion, and the inability to depart from the traditional, firmly established patterns. The basic theoretical principles lying at the root of both the old and the more recent bourgeois conceptions of social revolution are virtually the same. New authors, who appeared on the scene in the 1970s-1980s, have tried to adapt these conceptions to the changing situation merely by slightly modifying them.

Why is that? Why are bourgeois sociologists, who used to stagger the world by producing fresh "global" conceptions of social development and claiming to be the trailblazers, now lagging behind, falling back on the old store of ideological instruments? What is the cause of the inner stagnation of the sociology of revolution which it cannot overcome despite the quantitative growth of its output?

The answer is not hard to find. Against the background of the rapidly mounting process of revolutionary change, which is at the same time gaining in complexity, the fashionable theories advanced by the theorists of the capitalist system become rapidly outdated, failing to stand up to the test of the times. Not possessing a Marxist methodology, bourgeois ideologists have proved unable to cope with the knotty problems posed by the swiftly changing realities.

The times move too fast for them, confronting them with fresh and tricky questions. The actual course of the world revolutionary process has proved more complex and capacious than the artificially created theories and failed to fit into their Procrustean bed.

Since the universal formula of revolution capable of efficiently combatting Marxist-Leninist doctrine is slow in making its appearance, the apologists of capitalism are either obliged to rehash the ideas of their predecessors, pretending to carry them further, or turn to the stale ideological baggage of the even more distant past and making use of that which, they feel, meets the demands of the day and can be promptly made fit for mass consumption.

The outlined trends are easily traceable in the works of the new generation of American and British researchers writing about revolution. Their advent, however, does not signify a change in the strategic objectives of the sociology of revolution. What is altered is the form and methods of research, and a shift in accent is sometimes made. But the most general target, the struggle against the Marxist-Leninist outlook and the revolutionary ideology, is still very much there.

A variety of methods is used in this struggle. A certain number of researchers still refuse to recognize the need for social revolution in the matter of transforming society.

However, more and more scholars can no longer turn a blind eye to the fact that the revolutionary processes in the world are mounting and they have to acknowledge the need for their extensive study while pursuing the traditional goal of protecting and vindicating the capitalist system. These researchers have evolved a sophisticated and subtle tactic: they seek to incorporate the very idea of revolution into the bourgeois system of world outlook, thus rendering it harmless, depriving it of the most dangerous element for capitalism, its class essence, and blunting its anti-capitalist edge.

Modern bourgeois sociology displays a pronounced interest in the genesis of social revolution. The common approach to this issue is a "pluralistic" one, which rejects

the possibility of a single universal theory of revolution and advocates the "multi-variant" theory. In fact, however, the pluralism of bourgeois science shows its inability to devise an overall scientifically-based methodology of research and fails to grasp the objective laws of social development. Bourgeois ideologists seek to misrepresent the real causes of social revolutions, or bury the crucial factors under a pile of secondary ones.

Many of the sociologists do not acknowledge the decisive role of economic causes behind the revolutionary processes and assign it to psychological, political and other factors. In the final analysis, all these numerous and varied interpretations, as well as the attempts to negate the presence of causality in this issue, are designed to prove the accidental character of social revolutions.

With this target in their mind's eye, bourgeois theorists are undertaking persistent attempts to narrow down or distort the essence of social revolution or substitute it by other categories. Apology for bourgeois society is at the back of their crafty theories of "true" and "untrue" revolutions. The former are supposed to embrace the bourgeois revolutions following the Western pattern, which have allegedly paved the way for democracy and progress and which are opposed to the "Marxist" (i.e., socialist.—*Authors*) revolutions to which anti-democratic and totalitarian features and leanings are ascribed. The same end, that of defending the capitalist system, is served by the effort to confuse the issue of the essence and characteristics of the socialist revolution as the highest type of social revolution of the modern epoch.

A great deal of fierceness goes into the attacks against the experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union accumulated in preparing and accomplishing the October Revolution and building socialism. To put it in a nutshell, the validity of this experience for the modern international revolutionary movement is totally discarded. Bourgeois ideologists insist that socialist revolutions are no more than accidents or "revolutions of underdevelopment", and refuse to recognize that the working class is still the chief motive force of the revolutionary process, maintaining that the

revolutions of the 20th century are either elitist or peasant ones.

The real purport of such conceptions is to empty the revolutionary process of any substance, "kill Marxism", to use Lenin's phrase, "with 'kindness', to crush it in their embraces... They take from Marxism all that is acceptable to the liberal bourgeoisie, ... they cast aside 'only' the living soul of Marxism, 'only' its revolutionary content."[1]

Over the past years, under the impact of the mounting conservative tendencies in the policies of some of the Western states and the livening up of neoconservative ideas, the bourgeois sociological and Sovietological writings have been displaying greater interest in the issues of revolutionary ideology, and even acknowledged its role in shaping the moods of the masses in revolutionary epochs, while "criticism" is shifted to the Communists' "ideological weapons". The defenders of capitalism have come to realize that the problems of the ideological struggle are gaining in acuteness and turning into the key link in the battle between the two world outlooks. They declare communist ideology a propaganda weapon, a means employed in the power struggle, viewing it, and not without reason, as an effective tool wielded by the Communist parties.

In this connection, the bourgeois theorists have launched an attack against the foundations of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the theory of socialism. The latter is represented as an "ideological myth", an "unattainable dream", a utopia used by the Marxists to cheat the masses. Seventy years after the October Revolution, when the socialist world system is developing apace, they seek to undermine confidence in communist ideals and persuade people that a socialist society is impossible to build.

However, really existing socialism, whose successes are making a strong impact on the minds of hundreds of millions of people, has proved that these assertions of its unattainability are an ideological myth which exists only in the minds of the defenders of capitalism. History has shown this for a fact.

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[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Moscow, 1978, p. 222.

The first socialist revolution that was accomplished in Russia in October 1917 allowed mankind to begin putting socialist ideas into practice. From the realm of theory, the issue of building socialism has made its way into the realm of practical action. The bourgeois world-view and the entire capitalist way of life were now counteracted not only by socialist ideas but also by a socialist way of life and socialist relations among the people that have arisen from the practical application of these ideas.

The October Revolution was the first to show the world that capitalist social relations are doomed and transitory: the building of socialism first in one country and then within the framework of the socialist world system continues to reveal the advantages of the socialist way of development over the capitalist one.

"The progress of our time is rightly identified with socialism," said Mikhail Gorbachev at the 27th CPSU Congress. "Socialism is continuously improving social relations, multiplying its achievements purposefully, setting an example which is becoming more and more influential and attractive, and demonstrating the real humanism of the socialist way of life... It has grown into a powerful moral and material force, and has shown what opportunities are opening for modern civilization."[2]

Today's experience of really existing socialism effectively frustrates the attempts of bourgeois ideologists to depict the capitalist system as a pinnacle of mankind's historical development. It exposes the reactionary nature of the criticism levelled by the theorists of anti-communism against the ideas of scientific socialism and the futility of their attacks against Marxist-Leninist theory. Attempts to stop the passage of time are vain. Time works for those who stand for the future, not the past. The socialist society that is being built by Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party moves steadily along the path of social progress by overcoming difficulties and errors which

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[2] M. S. Gorbachev, *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, pp. 8, 9.

are inevitable on this path. Witness to this is the revolutionary reorganisation of the socialist economy and social relations with a view to speeding up the Soviet society's socio-economic progress. Its significance is great for the whole world as well. It is a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution that opens up new vistas for social progress. The revolution is continuing.

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Elitist Revolution or Revolution of the Masses?

Mikhail Gavlin
Liliya Kazakova

The book analyses current American and British theories of social revolution. It subjects to criticism the treatment by bourgeois authors of the essence and nature of social revolution and their significance in the progress of society. The authors reveal the class bias of bourgeois theories, their continuity and connection with the old conceptions and the general tasks of bourgeois social revolutions.

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